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Most prior works focus on the effect of IFRS adoptin itself on earnings quality using one 
dimension of earnings quality, and cover the early years of adoption. The present thesis seeks to 
investigate how country-specific factors shape accounting quality under IFRS across 23 
countries between 2007 and 2010, the global financial cr sis period. This is the first study to 
examine the effect of country-specific factors, using recent indicators, on both accruals and real 
earnings management under IFRS. It is also the first to explore the impact of country-specific 
factors on conditional conservatism and value relevance together, which highlights earnings 
quality from contracting perspective and equity valuation perspective at the same time.   
The results of the first empirical study indicate that overstating earnings via accruals is less 
pronounced in countries with strong investor protection, strict enforcement, and large capital 
markets, and that managing earnings upward utilizing real actions is greater in such countries. 
Further, the results show that firms engage in both types of earnings management at the same 
time. 
The results of the second empirical study show that earnings are more conservative in countries 
having strong investor protection and rigorous enforcement of accounting standards, and that 
the value relevance of book values is greater in those countries. Further, the strength of capital 
markets has no impact on the extent of conservatism, whereas the value relevance of earnings is 
greater in large capital markets.  
Overall, the main findings of this thesis suggest that country-specific factors still govern 
accounting quality under IFRS and that they drive different ‘quality’ earnings. The IASB 
should emphasise the enforcement mechanisms, not only he mere adoption of IFRS. Auditors 
and regulators should also consider the possible negativ  effects of real activities to which 
managers switch in a bid to escape coming under scrutiny in countries with strong institutions. 
Additionally, researchers should be cautious when drawing conclusions on earnings quality as 
quality under contracting perspective may differ from that under equity valuation perspective. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This study explores the effect of country-specific fa tors, using recent indicators, on quality of 
accounting amounts under IFRS across 23 countries from 2007 to 2010, the global financial 
crisis period. No other work has examined the impact of ountry-specific factors on accounting 
quality under IFRS captured by an array of metrics. Prior studies focus on the effect of IFRS 
adoption on earnings quality using one metric of earnings quality, and cover the early years of 
IFRS adoption. Dechow et al. (2010) point out that e rnings quality is contingent on decision 
context so that we employ an array of accounting quality metrics. We use four proxies of 
accounting quality: accruals earnings management, ral earnings management, conservatism, 
and value relevance. This is important to capture accounting quality from different perspectives. 
Graham et al. (2005) found that managers would manage e rnings by taking real actions than 
by making within-GAAP accounting choices, therefore, it would be useful to investigate both 
accruals and real earnings management. Accruals earnings management occurs when managers 
use the discretion inherent in accounting estimates or methods for opportunistic purposes. Real 
earnings management takes place by changing the timing or structuring of transactions to 
increase earnings such as reducing discretionary expenditures or postponing a new project. 
Conservatism measures the asymmetric timeliness of earnings from a contracting perspective, 
while value relevance captures accounting quality from a equity valuation perspective.  
The remaining part of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the background and 
motivations. Section 3 presents the research aim and questions. Section 4 discusses the 
significance of the thesis. Finally, section 5 describes the structure of the thesis.  





1.2. Background and motivations 
The post-World War II era witnessed a rise in interational trade and cross-border investment 
and, consequently, an increase in the need of users, especially investors, for comparable 
financial statements. In 1960s, the need for comparable financial information became of greater 
importance following the spread of multinational companies, or more specifically the US 
corporations acquiring European companies (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007). In view of the fact 
that each country, in that period, developed its own accounting standards or practices, financial 
reporting across countries lacked comparability. Totackle this issue, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was established in 1973, then replaced by the IASB 
in 2000, in an attempt to harmonise the divergent accounting practices across countries. The 
aim of the IASC, and its successor the IASB, is to develop a single set of high-quality 
accounting standards accepted throughout the world.  
Since the IASB came onto the scene, we have seen more countries take up the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)1. The advocates of adopting a single set of accounting 
standards across the world argue that using IFRS can improve accounting quality through 
increasing comparability and transparency in a way that better reflects the performance and 
economic reality of the firms (Ball, 2006). Accordingly, IFRS adoption results in better capital 
allocation, greater market liquidity and a lower cost f capital (Ball, 2006: Tweedie, 2006). 
With different accounting standards used across the capital markets, investors find it difficult to 
compare financial statements of companies in different countries, and may incur expenses for 
the adjustments required to make the statements comparable.  
                                                          
1 IFRS includes both IAS (International Accounting Standards) and IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards). Over the 2001–2010 periods, countries have varied the timing and extent of their commitment to IFRS. 
There are a number of plausible hypotheses for these differences, including differences in corporate governance 
environments, technological differences, cultural differences, and differences in countries’ natural resources 
(Ramanna, 2013). 





A much-debated question, however, is whether one-siz  tandards fit all countries; if not, 
accounting quality could be inconsistent across countries using the same accounting standards. 
In fact, accounting quality is not only the function f accounting standards alone but also of 
other local environments (Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Burgstahler et 
al., 2006; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Daske et al., 2008). 
Accounting standards of high quality are important to produce high quality financial 
information but compliance with the standards is equally important, as the IASB has no power 
to enforce IFRS. This is of particular importance given the fact that IFRS are principles-based 
accounting standards that require the exercise of professional judgement and discretion in the 
preparation of financial reporting.  
Prior accounting studies suggest that accounting discretion is ‘a double-edged sword’ (e.g., 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Dechow and Skinner 2000). On the one hand, discretion induces 
a less costly application of reporting regulation. In addition, it permits corporate insiders to 
adapt financial reports so that they better reflect the underlying economic reality, and to convey 
private information residing within the firm. On the other hand, this discretion can potentially 
be used opportunistically. For example, corporate managers may use reporting discretion to 
secure certain earnings targets, obfuscate economic performance, or avoid covenant violations 
(Leuz, 2010). The extent to which accounting discretion is used opportunistically hinges upon 
national legal institutions (Ball et al., 2003), and firm specific characteristics (operating 
characteristics and reporting incentives) (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Christensen et al., 2015). This 
gives rise to speculation about the uniformity in financial reporting quality across the countries 
that made IFRS mandatory for companies in their financial reporting. In the absence of proper 
enforcement of accounting standards, IFRS adoption is largely inconsequential and firms may 
abuse the discretion the IFRS afford.  





The early works by Ball et al. (2000) and Ball et al. (2003) point to the importance of other 
local factors interacting with IFRS in determining the quality of reported accounting amounts. 
Leuz et al. (2003) concluded that earnings management was lower in countries with strong 
investor protection, low ownership concentration, ad large equity markets. Bushman et al. 
(2004), Burgstahler et al. (2006), and Francis and Wang (2008) found a significant positive 
relationship between local institutions and accounting quality. These studies focused on the 
effect of local factors other than the standards on accounting quality.  
With the introduction of IFRS in many countries, scholars began to investigate whether the 
adoption of IFRS improved accounting quality. For example, Barth et al. (2008) tested the 
effect of voluntary IFRS adoption on earnings management, timely loss recognition and value 
relevance across 21 countries. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) and Capkun et al. (2012) 
investigated the effect of the compulsory IFRS adoption on earnings management across 
countries. Using a sample from Europe and controlling institutional factors, Callao and Jarne 
(2010) and Chen et al. (2010) examined the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings 
management. Devalle et al. (2010), Clarkson et al. (2011), and Agostino et al. (2011) studied 
the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on value relevance. 
The most recent studies of direct relation to this study are the works of Houqe et al. (2012), 
Isidro and Raonic (2012), and Ahmed et al. (2013). Houqe et al. (2012) provide evidence that 
earnings management is lower after IFRS adoption only in countries with strong investor 
protection, while Isidro and Raonic (2012) report that value relevance under IFRS is higher 
with more globalized markets, greater business sophi tication, higher level of economic 
developments and strong institutions. Ahmed et al. (2013) suggest that earnings quality did not 
improve after mandatory IFRS adoption across 20 countries compared with 15 countries that 
did not, even with the presence of strong enforcement. The aforementioned three studies focus 





on the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings quality, and cover the early years of IFRS adoption 
up to 2007.  
It is important to bear in mind that there is not an agreed definition in the literature of what 
accounting quality, or earnings quality, means. One definition holds that high quality 
accounting information is deemed to improve transparency and reduce information asymmetry 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Ball and Shivakumar (2005, p.84) define reporting quality as 
‘‘the usefulness of financial statements to investors, creditors, managers, and all other parties 
contracting with the firm.’’ Ball (2006) identifies four requirements to subsume financial 
reporting under the category of high quality, which nclude accurate depiction of economic 
reality, lower room for managerial manipulation, timeliness, and asymmetric timeliness. In their 
review paper, Dechow et al. (2010) concluded that ‘quality’ depends on the decision context.  
Empirically, different metrics have been operationalised to measure accounting quality using 
earnings and their components; for this reason, the term ‘earnings quality’ has been used in the 
literature as well2. Higher accounting quality has been related, among others, to less earnings 
management (Leuz et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2008; Houqe et al., 2012; 
Ahmed et al., 2013), higher conservative earnings (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Barth et al., 
2008; Peek et al., 2010; Ahmed et al., 2013), and higher value relevance (Barth et al., 2008; 
Isidro and Raonic, 2012; Ahmed et al., 2013).  
While the focus of most prior studies was on the eff ct of IFRS adoption on one or more 
dimensions of earnings quality, this study focuses on the variation of earnings quality under 
IFRS owing to the differences in country-specific fa tors. This thesis enhances the literature by 
testing how earnings quality varies under IFRS across 23 countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 
or before. The next section discusses the research questions in greater detail.   
                                                          
2 For the purpose of this study, both ‘accounting quality’ and ‘earnings quality’ refer to the quality of reported 
accounting amounts.  





1.3. Research aim and questions  
This study seeks to examine the effects of country-specific factors on earnings quality across 
countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 or earlier. Holding accounting standards constant across 
the countries in the sample, this study focuses on the role of local factors in shaping accounting 
quality. In doing that, this study seeks to answer th  following research questions:   
1. Do investor protection, enforcement of accounting standards and capital market depth 
influence accruals-based earnings management across countries using IFRS?  
2. Does the tendency of managers to manage earnings through real actions differ owing to 
the differences in the strength of investor protection, enforcement of accounting 
standards and capital markets across countries mandating IFRS? 
3. Does conditional conservatism vary across countries enforcing IFRS due to the variation 
in the strength of investor protection, enforcement of accounting standards and capital 
market governing the preparation of financial reporting?  
4. Along with conservatism, is there any effect of investor protection, accounting standards 
enforcement, and strength of capital market on the value relevance of book values and 
earnings across countries using IFRS?  
1.4. Significance of the thesis  
This study explores how earnings quality varies across 23 countries that mandated IFRS in 
2005 or earlier in terms of the impact of country-specific factors on accounting quality. IFRS 
are ready-made standards developed by the IASB, a priv te organisation based in London, and 
are adopted by various countries across the world. The literature shows that country-specific 
factors play an important role in determining accounting quality (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Ball et 
al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Bushman et al., 2004; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Francis and Wang, 
2008).  





This study is significant for several reasons: 
Firstly, it employs four metrics to capture earnings quality, namely accruals earnings 
management, real earnings management, conservatism, and value relevance. Using several 
metrics is important because ‘earnings quality’ can mean different things to different 
stakeholders, and each earnings quality metric provides information on quality from a specific 
perspective. Jeanjean (2012) highlighted the importance of using several measures to capture 
different dimensions of earnings quality.  
Secondly, in relation to the previous discussion, this study examines the effect of local factors 
on both accruals and real earnings management. Graham et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2008) 
suggest that managers tend to take real actions instead of accruals manipulation to avoid 
coming under regulatory scrutiny. Doukakis (2014), who found no significant effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on real earnings management, co ducted the only international study 
on both real earnings management and accruals-based e rnings management. However, he did 
not examine the effect of institutional factors on accruals and real earnings management. At 
country level, strong institutions may drive real earnings management instead of accruals 
earnings management.  
Thirdly, in addition, the study investigates the effect of country-specific factors on conservatism 
and value relevance of accounting information. By doing so, implications of the effect of local 
environments on accounting quality under IFRS can be inferred from two perspectives, 
contracting and equity valuation. This is important because what is desirable from contracting 
perspective may not be desirable from equity valuation perspective (O’Connell, 2007).  





Fourthly, the data used in the study covers the period f om 2007 to 20103. Nobes (2011b) 
argues that firms may continue using their traditional national accounting practices in the early 
years of IFRS adoption. Furthermore, the change in conomic circumstances in post IFRS 
adoption, compared with pre-adoption, makes it more difficult to test the effect of IFRS 
adoption on accounting quality, especially because of the global financial crisis that began in 
late 2007 (Walker, 2013). Therefore, our sample includes countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 
or earlier, and data from 2007 to 2010. By doing so, the error in the test may be minimized in 
terms of the effect of practices in early years IFRS adoption and economic circumstances. Most 
previous studies covered short periods of post-IFRS adoption with a focus on the effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on accounting quality (e.g. Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Capkun et 
al., 2012; Houqe et al., 2012; Isidro and Raonic, 2012; Ahmed et al., 2013). 
Fifthly, the selection of country-specific factors that shape accounting practices after the 
adoption of IFRS is based on a general model derived from prior studies in the literature, 
especially Nobes, (1998), Nobes (2006) and Soderstrom and Sun (2007). Based on this general 
model, three general country-specific factors were us d in the test, namely investor protection, 
enforcement of accounting standards and the strength of capital market. 
Finally, this study uses recent indicators of institutions since it covers the period after 2007, 
when indictors developed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000, 2006) and La Porta et al. (2004) 
might be out of date, keeping in mind that there is neither a straightforward nor a controversial 
way to measure institutional factors. Kaufmann et al. (2007) argue that substantial changes in 
governance structure have occurred during the period f om 1996 to 2007. Christensen et al. 
(2013) found that five EU countries made changes in enforcement after IFRS adoption; 
therefore, those countries experienced better liquid ty. Furthermore, firms in countries not using 
                                                          
3 We used some data for the period 2011 in the regression of accruals earnings management. The observations in 
the models investigating the effect of country specific factors on earnings quality metrics were 16328 for the 
period from 2007 to 2010.  





IFRS revealed a positive liquidity effect with the change in enforcement of accounting 
standards. Their findings are important in that they r veal that there are some changes in 
institutions along with the adoption of IFRS. For this reason, it would be more accurate to use 
recent indicators of country-specific factors for recent data.  
1.5. Structure of the thesis  
The overall structure of the thesis takes the form f eight chapters, including this introductory 
chapter. The first chapter aims to provide a summary of the motivations for conducting this 
study. In addition, it outlines the research questions, the significance of the study, contributions 
of the study, and the structure of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 provides the context of the study in respect to IFRS adoption. It presents a brief 
history of the IASB and its structure. This is important to show that the IASB is not accountable 
in setting the standards and has no power to enforce them; this is the function of local regulators 
in each country adopting IFRS. In addition, it identifies each country in the study in terms of 
the national accounting regulator and the background of IFRS adoption. It illustrates the year of 
mandatory adoption, the process of the adoption, the version of IFRS and types of firms 
required to conform to IFRS.  
Chapter 3 presents a general model of the factors determining the accounting practices after 
IFRS adoption. This model is derived from prior studies, especially Nobes (1998), Nobes 
(2006) and Soderstrom and Sun (2007). It also discusses the early-proposed factors shaping the 
accounting practices and identifies which of these continue to influence the accounting 
practices after IFRS adoption. In addition, it demonstrates that three main factors still influence 
accounting practices after the mandatory use of IFRS and these are investor protection, 
enforcement of accounting standards and strength of capital markets. Finally, it discusses 





agency theory to show how the three aforementioned country-specific factors shape accounting 
quality.  
Chapter 4 reviews the recent research into earnings quality related to IFRS adoption and the 
effect of the country-specific factors on accounting quality. Definitions of earnings quality, 
earnings management, conservatism, and value relevanc  re also provided. In addition, a 
discussion on the difference between income increasing management and income decreasing  
management is provided as managing earnings downwards is of less concern than managing 
them upwards. It further highlights the effect of conservatism on the informativeness of 
earnings. Eight hypotheses are formulated based on the theoretical framework and the literature 
review.  
Chapter 5 moves on to describe the models used to measure accruals earnings management, real 
earnings management, conservatism and value relevanc , and defines the variables. The 
measurement of investor protection, the enforcement of accounting standards, and the strength 
of capital market are discussed in details in this c apter. The sample includes 23 countries that 
adopted IFRS in 2005 or before. This chapter also di cusses the market efficiency hypothesis 
and methodological issues.  
Chapter 6 empirically investigates whether the tendency of mangers to manage earnings 
upwards via accounting methods is lower in countries with strong investor protection, strong 
enforcement of accounting standards and strong capital market. It also investigates whether 
managing earnings upwards through real activities is greater in countries characterised by 
strong investor protection, strong enforcement of accounting standards and strong capital 
market.   
Chapter 7 is devoted to the second empirical investigation, which examines whether the extent 
of conditional conservatism captured by timely loss recognition varies across countries due to 





the differences in the investor protection, the enforcement of accounting standards and the 
capital market. It also examines the effect of the aforementioned country-specific factors on the 
value relevance of the book values and earnings.  
Chapter 8 provides a summary of the thesis, restates he contribution of the study, highlights the 
limitations, and offers suggestions for future research.  








2.1. Introduction  
Several bids to harmonise accounting standards internationally began by accounting bodies 
across the world following the international economic integration and the rise in global capital 
flows after the Second World War. In 1966, the Institute of Charted Accountants of England 
and Wales (ICAEW), the Canadian Institute of Charted Accountants (CICA) and the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) agreed to establish an International Study 
Group to address the differences in their accounting standards (Zeff, 2012). Thereafter, the 
Accountants International Study Group (AISG) came into being in 1967 producing studies on 
the variance in accounting and auditing practices in Canada, the USA and the UK. In fact, the 
three aforementioned accounting bodies were the first in the world that initiated projects to 
develop accounting standards which regulate accounting practices. In 1939 the program began 
in the USA, followed by the UK in 1942 and then by Canada in 1946.  
The first real attempt of accounting harmonisation was in 1972 at the 10th International 
Congress of Accountants, held in Sydney, where two accounting committees emerged. The first 
was the International Co-ordination Committee for Accountancy Profession (ICCAP), replaced 
in 1977 by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)4. The second was the initial 
agreement on creating the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) (Camfferman 
and Zeff, 2007).  
                                                          
4 63 accounting bodies formed the IFAC. The bodies which were not granted a full membership of the IASC 
played a key role in establishing the IFAC.  




The objective of the IASC was to harmonise the accounting standards and principles across 
borders and thus facilitate comparability of financi l reporting internationally (Camfferman and 
Zeff, 2007). From its creation in 1973 until its restructuring in 2000, the IASC issued an array 
of accounting standards termed as International Accounting Standards (IAS) in numerical order. 
The first accounting standard, IAS 1 disclosure of accounting policies, was published in 1975 
while the last one, IAS 41 Agriculture, was released in 2000. The curious paradox was that 
most IASC’s members did not adapt their local accounting standards to conform to IAS. 
IASC’S members from Anglo-American countries did not find the IAS superior to their 
accounting standards. Other members such as European continent countries and Japan  found 
IAS inconsistent with their accounting systems, which were based on taxation (Zeff, 2012). 
Nevertheless, some multinational companies began to produce their annual reports in 
conformity with IASC’s accounting standards.  
In 1984, the General Electric Company reported that t eir financial statements were prepared in 
conformity with IAS in most important aspects. Then Exxon and FMC Corporations followed it 
by reporting that their financial statements were in accordance with IAS (Camfferman and Zeff, 
2007). Over the period between 1987 and 2000, there was also an increasing movement towards 
adopting IAS voluntarily by many European multinational companies in their consolidated 
financial statements, but with variations in some cases (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007). For 
instance, German companies, such as Deutsche Bank, and Swiss companies, such as, Nestle 
confirmed their annual reports to be prepared in harmony with IAS.  
Furthermore, subsequent to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, among other organisations, the 
G7 Group of industrialised nations and the Financial St bility Forum, a group of financial 
authorities, expressed endorsement of the internatio l accounting standards (Véron 2007).  




Despite such endorsement of the IASC’s standards, the original purpose of creating IASC was 
not met in terms of producing a single set of accounting standards applicable internationally. In 
2000, the IASC was wound up in favour of the IASB. The formation of the IASB was a turning 
point in the history of international accounting, rep esented by the widespread adoption of its 
international accounting standards across the world as iscussed later in this chapter.  
This chapter provides the context of the study in respect to IFRS adoption. It is divided into 
four parts, including the introduction. The focus of Part 2 is the IFRS Foundation and the IASB. 
Part 3 describes the countries involved in the study in terms of the process of IFRS adoption, 
year of adoption and which companies are required to use IFRS. Finally, part 4 concludes the 
chapter.  
2.2. The IFRS Foundation and the IASB 
In May 2000, the IASB saw the light of the day when all the IASC member bodies agreed on 
the new structure of the international accounting standards setter (Zeff, 2012). The changes in 
the structure took effect in April 2001 when the first meeting of the IASB was held.  
The old structure of the IASC included the IASC board, Steering Committees, Consultative 
Group, Advisory Council and Standing Interpretations Committee (SIC)5 (Camfferman and 
Zeff, 2007). The new structure was composed of IASC Foundation, IASB Board, an 
Interpretations Committee, and a Standards Advisory Council (SAC). Later, the Monitoring 
Board and Accounting Standards Advisory Forum were stablished. A review of the 
constitution of the organisation is conducted every five years. 
                                                          
5 The IASC Board, the Steering Committees, the Consultative Group, the Advisory Council and the Standing 
Interpretations Committee were established in 1973, 1974, 1981, 1995 and 1997 respectively.  




Figure 2-1 The IFRS Foundation and the IASB 
 
The IASC board was mainly criticized for being a part time body having small staff members 
along with volunteering steering committees responsible for generating drafts of standards. The 
new board, the IASB, preliminarily included 12 full time members and 2 part timers, who were 
selected based on their technical expertise rather than geographical representation (Camfferman 
and Zeff, 2007). Another major change in the new structure was forming the IASC Foundation, 
which was in turn composed of 19 trustees who were in charge of appointing the members of 
the IASB, the Standards Advisory Council and the int rpretations committee, and monitoring 
the effectiveness of the IASB6. Figure 2-1 depicts the overall structure of the IFRS Foundation 
and the IASB. 
2.2.1. IFRS Foundation 
The IASC Foundation was composed of 19 trustees at the ime of its inception in 2000 (Zeff, 
2012), and then expanded to 22 in the subsequent years (Deloitte, 2014). On 1 July 2010, the 
                                                          
6 The new interpretations committee was carried overfrom the old committee established in 1997. The IASC 
Foundation is similar to the old Advisory Council which was formed in 1995. 




IASC Foundation was renamed to become the IFRS Foundation (IASC Foundation, 2010). 
Currently, six of the trustees are from the Asia/Oceania region, six from North America, six 
from Europe, one from South America, one from Africa and two from the rest of the world 
(Deloitte, 2014). The trustees are not involved in standard setting, which is the board’s 
responsibility. Instead, their responsibility is to appoint the members of the IASB board, the 
Interpretations Committee and the SAC, and to supervis  the finance of the IFRS Foundation.  
Nevertheless, there are loud voices in the EU to review the governance and rules of the IFRS 
Foundation. As quoted in The Daily Telegraph, Sharon Bowles, a former Member of the 
European Parliament, said: “[q]uestions have been raised by the European Parliament about the 
governance structures and lack of transparency of these bodies, as well as their close links to 
the accounting industry’’ (Armitstead, 2014). 
The IFRS Foundation has also been widely criticized for relying significantly upon the funding 
from big accounting companies. In 2012, roughly 33% of the contributions were raised from 
accounting firms (IFRS Foundation, 2013a). This relatively large proportion of contributions 
might undermine the independence of IFRS Foundation nd its board. 
2.2.2. IASB Board  
At the outset of the new organisation in 2000, the IASB board was composed of 14 members, 
of whom 12 were full timers and 2 were part timers. Ten members were from Anglo Saxon 
countries, 3 from Europe (Germany, France and Switzerland) and 1 from Japan. Furthermore, 
two members were previously partners of KPMG, another was a partner of an audit company 
member of PWC and one more member was a partner of PWC (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007).  
In January 2009, the Trustees took the decision to widen the IASB by two more members by 
July 2012 to become 16, including a maximum of three part-timers (IASC Foundation, 2009). 




The selection of the IASB members was based upon their technical experience rather than their 
geographical representation. This has since changed, and the board takes into consideration the 
geographical diversity to avoid any geographical dominance. One more point to be made is that 
the IASB’s members are paid salaries, as one of the criticisms to the old organisation was 
because it tended to be a voluntary organisation. David Tweedie was appointed as the chairman 
of the IASB from its creation until July 2011, when he was succeeded by Hans Hoogervorst, 
who will carry on till June 2016. The IASB has eliminated some of the old IAS, issued by the 
IASC, and kept some while the new standards are being issued under the name of IFRS. 
Critics have said that English speaking countries (Botzem and Quack, 2009), and accounting 
companies (Chiapello and Medjad, 2009) dominate the IASB. It seems like the regulated parties 
take part in setting the regulation with which they have to comply. Some critics claim that the 
IASB was responsible for the failure of banks when have been allowed to hide bad debts in 
their financial statements7. Shareholders feel that their interests are not sufficiently taken into 
consideration. However, the IASB is not the only party to blame; the IASB was also heavily 
lobbied by the EU threatening to ‘carve out’ an exception of IAS 39, Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement, because the application of the mark to market model would 
cause the banks to report losses or volatile earnings. 
The IASB was caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, if the IASB had refused the 
EU’s demands, it would have risked its legitimacy; then the EU would have withdrawn its 
support for the IASB. On the other hand, if the IASB had responded to them, it would have 
dented the attempts of international harmonization, which assumed that all adopters applied the 
same standards. The EU adopted the IAS 39 partially with some modifications regarding the 
fair value option and Hedge accounting in 2004 (EC Regulation 2086, 2004). At the end, the 
                                                          
7 For example, Gordon Kerr, a former banker, wrote a r port for the Adam Smith Institute criticizing the IFRS 
rules in that they allowed banks to recognize expected income as current income (The Guardian, 2011).   
 




IASB bowed partially to the EU’s pressure making small changes in the standard in 2005, thus 
restricting the use of fair value in valuing some instruments. In response, the European 
Commission resolved the fair value option ‘carve out’ leaving the Hedge one in effect (EC 
Regulation 1864, 2005).  
At a Treasury committee meeting in November 2008, Sir David Tweedie declared that he had 
considered resigning in reaction to the political pressure exerted by the EU upon the IASB 
(Jetuah, 2008). The IASB was forced to amend IAS 39 allowing the reclassifications of hard 
value financial assets under the threat by the EU to do another carve out if not. Without such 
reclassification, some banks in Europe would recognize loss or report volatile earnings, 
following the financial crisis 2007, when the governments were focusing on the relief efforts 
for banks. Such amendment would open the doors to modifying the international standards by 
the adopters for national purposes.  
This political intervention in setting the international accounting standards raises questions 
whether the IASB is indeed independent based on expertise as it claims. What about the other 
countries outside Europe? Why do they adopt standards being set to suit the needs of the 
business environment of other countries? With such large pressure on the IASB in setting the 
accounting standards, it would not be surprising that t e implementation is different across 
countries adopting IFRS.  
2.2.3. IFRS Interpretations Committee 
The new constitution proceeded with the old interprtations committee formed by the IASC in 
1997, the IASC’s standing committee. In March 2002, its name was changed formally to 
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) and then to the IFRS 
Interpretations Committee in 31 March 2010. 




There were 12 initial members, and later this expanded by two more. The 14 voting members of 
the IFRS Interpretations Committee have technical expertise and belong to diverse countries. 
The objective of the interpretation committee is to pr duce interpretations of the international 
accounting standards. In essence, the IOCSO and the SEC suggested the formation of the 
interpretations committee. The trustees of the IFRS Foundation appoint the members of the 
IFRS Interpretations Committee, who are chosen to deal with implementation issues providing 
solutions drawn from their technical ability (IFRS Foundation, 2013b). In addition, they are in 
charge of addressing the financial reporting issues not dealt with in the IFRS.     
2.2.4. Standards Advisory Council  
Another component of the new structure of the IASC is the Standards Advisory Council (SAC), 
whose members are also appointed by the trustees. Is responsibility is to give the IASB and the 
trustees some advice such as on priorities in IASB’s work. The members of the SAC represent a 
broad range of parties interested in financial repoting such as preparers, auditors, users, 
financial analysts, regulators, standards setters, accounting bodies and academics (IFRS 
Foundation, 2013b).   
2.2.5. Monitoring Board  
In January 2009, the trustees decided to establish the Monitoring Board to be the link between 
them and public authorities, claiming to promote thpublic accountability of the organisation 
(IASC Foundation, 2009). The members of the Monitoring Board are the European 
Commission, the emerging markets committee of the IOSCO, the technical committee of the 
IOSCO, the SEC, the Japan Financial Services Agency, and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision as an observer (IASC Foundation, 2009). The task of the Monitoring Board is to 
ensure the trustees’ fulfilment of their duties set out by the Foundation in addition to 
participating in appointing and reappointing the trus ees (IASC Foundation, 2009). 




2.2.6. Accounting Standards Advisory Forum (ASAF) 
In February 2013, the IFRS foundation formed the Accounting Standards Advisory Forum 
(ASAF), as a technical advisory body to the IASB, to help achieve the goal of setting a single 
globally accepted set of high quality accounting standards. The main aim of the ASAF is to 
provide the IASB with a broad range of inputs on technical issues from the accounting bodies in 
different geographical regions/jurisdictions.  
The next section moves on to provide some context about the countries in the study.  
  2.3. Countries in the study  
Since this study is concerned with the effect of country-specific factors on earnings quality after 
mandatory IFRS adoption, we add some context by providing information about the countries 
in the study. More specifically, several issues arehighlighted here, including the year of 
adoption, IFRS version, which companies comply with IFRS and the exceptions to the 
compliance with IFRS if any, as presented in Table 2-1.  
Our sample includes 16 countries from Europe and 5 from Asia including 2 from the Middle 
East, in addition to Australia and South Africa8. Countries in the study can be divided into three 
groups: EU countries9 that use IFRS as adopted by the EU, countries that use IFRS equivalents, 
and countries that adopt IFRS as issued by the IASB. This shows that there are different 
versions of IFRS used across countries, which is discussed in Chapter 3 as a possible reason for 
the variation in accounting practices after IFRS adoption.  
                                                          
8 In Chapter 5: Research Methodology, we provide information on why we chose these countries.  
9 In this study, EU countries mean the countries that are subject to EU Directives. 




In this section, we provide a detailed explanation of the firms required to use IFRS as prior 
studies have shortcomings when specifying firms reporting under IFRS; section 5.6. reveals 
these drawbacks.  
On a separate note, some countries have put IFRS in place since 2005 but are not included in 
the sample because of the insufficient number of firms to run the earnings management models.  
2.3.1. EU countries10 
The role of the European Union was significant in promoting the efforts of international 
accounting standards harmonization. In 1990s, the EU continent has witnessed important 
developments. The transition from only national listing to cross border listing brought about the 
need for using a common accounting language in the preparation of financial reporting that can 
be understood by the investors worldwide. Firms wishing to list on foreign securities markets 
are required to conform to the local legislation in these countries. The crux of the problem lay 
in the lack of consistency in the regulations across the world. To some countries, setting their 
accounting standards is a matter of sovereignty, not to mention the fact that countries are 
reluctant to change the principles underpinning their accounting systems.  
The significance of accounting standards harmonisation became evident when the largest EU 
Company Daimler Benz, Daimler AG now, decided to list on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Daimler AG was following German GAAP in their financial reporting; therefore, it needed to 
reconcile its reports into US GAAP as required by the SEC. The thunderbolt was the huge 
difference between the earnings reported according to German GAAP in the financial reporting 
for the year 2003 and its equivalent according to the US GAAP. It was unbelievable that a 
                                                          
10
 The European Directives, including accounting ones, apply to the EEA countries, which include EU countries in 
addition to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The EU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. 




profit of 0.6 billion using German GAAP became a 1.8 billion loss after the reconciliation into 
US GAAP (Véron, 2007). 
The EU system to harmonise the accounting standards was different from its counterpart of the 
IASC and the IASB. While the IASC/IASB model was Anglo-American, the accounting system 
in continental Europe was followed by the countries in the EU. In fact, the harmonisation of 
accounting in Europe was through legislations in form f company law directives, which had to 
be agreed and implemented by Member States (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
With the increasing number of European companies seking secondary listing in the USA in 
1990s, the EU concerns rose over the European companies being subject to the American rather 
than European regulation and legislation. The European Union had to choose between two sets 
of accounting standards, the US GAAP and the IAS. The EU could enforce the US GAAP in 
the EU countries; however, it would not have any influence over setting the standards which 
would be fully produced by the FASB (Berger, 2010). 
In March 2002, the EU Parliament passed legislation requiring the use of IAS/IFRS in the EU. 
The legislation enforces listed companies on EU regulated markets to lodge their financial 
reports in accordance with IAS/IFRS starting from 2005 (IAS Regulation, 2002). There was a 
consensus on the IAS/IFRS endorsement in the EU Parliament, which was passed by 492 votes 
to five, with 29 abstentions.   
The adoption of future and revised standards by the EU is not automatic, but rather through a 
process called ‘endorsement’. To reach a decision to adopt a standard, three committees engage 
in the process: the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), Standards Advice 
Review Group (SARG), and the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC). Figure 2-2 depicts 
the endorsement process of IFRS in the EU. 




In addition to the aforementioned bodies engaged directly in the endorsement process, the FEE 
plays an important advisory role on issues related o company laws and accounting 
harmonization. It represents the accountancy profession in Europe with members from 36 
European countries including the 28 member states of the EU.  












In June 2001, the EFRAG, an accounting technical committee representing a wide spectrum of 
parties interested in accounting, was established to assist the Commission in issues related to 
international accounting and harmonisation (EFRAG, n.d.). The Commission seeks the advice 
of the EFRAG regarding new and revised standards. When the IASB issues or amends a 




















the Commission. To ensure whether the opinion of the EFRAG on the endorsement of a 
standard was proper and balanced, SARG was established n July 2006 and was composed of 
independent experts who could give such advice. TheSARG delivers its advice to the 
Commission, which in turn prepares a proposal to be sent to the ARC for voting.  
The ARC receives the proposal from the European Commission based on the advice of the 
EFRAG and SARG. The ARC was formed pursuant to the requirements contained in Article 6 
of the IAS Regulation in the EU with a regulatory function. All Member States are represented 
on the ARC, chaired by the European Commission (EC, 2014). If the ARC agrees on the 
proposal, the Commission will send a draft regulation o the European Parliament and Council, 
who have three months to reject the draft regulation. When the European Parliament and 
Council give a positive option or do not oppose the draft in a period of 3 months, the draft 
regulation is adopted by the Commission. The last stage is to publish the regulation in the 
Official Journal with an effect identified in the rgulation (Deloitte, n.d.a).  
That is to say, the version of IFRS used in the EU could be different from those issued by IASB 
since the endorsement is in the hands of the European Commission advised by EFRAG, SARG 
and ARC. For political reasons, there could be contradictions between one of the IFRS and the 
interests of some parties in the EU; therefore, the European Commission may modify or not 
adopt it. Indeed, we have IFRS as issued by the IASB and IFRS as adopted by the EU. This 
raises the issue of the differences in the IFRS versions adopted across the world and whether 
they lead to inconsistent accounting practices. A question mark hangs over the IASB ability to 
develop globally accepted high quality accounting standards where the national/transnational 
regulators choose from the standards what suits their business environment.  
No better evidence of the departure from the IFRS is the case of IAS 39 on financial 
instruments in the EU as explained above in this chapter. Again, the European Commission did 




not ratify IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, the IAS 39 replacement in response to the financial 
crisis, in the EU (EFRAG, 2014)11. This time the EU chose not to endorse the standard instead 
of asking for amendment by the IASB. However, in both cases harmonization of accounting 
standards across the globe is negatively affected.  
In summary, this section presented the endorsement of IFRS in EU countries. It began by 
reviewing accounting harmonisation across the EU and then went on to describe the adoption of 
IFRS in the EU and the endorsement process in which t ree European committees are involved, 
namely the EFRAG, SARG and ARC, and were chaired by the EC. It also showed that the final 
decision on the adoption of new standards resides in the hands of the European Parliament and 
Council. Further, the section provided some insight nto the politics of IFRS endorsement in the 
EU in terms of the modification of accounting standrds or the postponement of the adoption as 
in the case of IAS 39 and IFRS 9.  
Our sample includes 16 European countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Pursuant to the EU’s regulation No 1606/2002, the European 
Economic Area (EEA) companies listed on a regulated market in any of EEA countries must 
use IFRS as adopted by the EU in lodging their consolidated financial statements starting from 
2005. 
 
                                                          
11
 IFRS 9 introduces a principle-based approach for classification of financial assets based on two models, the cash 
flow characteristics model and the business model, to replace the classifications in IAS 39 that were considered 
complex. Another major change in IFRS 9 is the ‘expected loss’ impairment model, which replaces the ‘incurred 
loss’ model under IAS 39, requiring more timely recognition of expected credit losses. For hedge accounting, the 
new Standard provides a reformed model for hedge accounting enhancing the disclosures of risk management 
activities. Under the new Standard, gains and losses, resulting from the changes in the entity’s credit risk of 
financial liabilities measured at fair value, should be presented in other comprehensive income instead of income 
statement under IAS 39 (IFRS Foundation, 2014). 
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Table 2-1 Background of IFRS across countries 12 
                                                          
12
 This table is prepared based on information available on the IFRS Foundation and the IASB website.  
13 WorldScope database provides a variable called "WS.AcctgStandardsFollowed" which shows whether the company applying IFRS. If the output is 23, it means that the 
company applies IFRS. 






of a principle 
IFRS for domestic listed 
companies 





    Consolidated Individual  Required Permitted  
Australia  Australian IFRS 
equivalents 
2005 Yes Yes Yes - Yes 23 
Austria IFRS as adopted by the 
EU 




IFRS as adopted by the 
EU 
2005 Yes Yes No - Yes 23 
Bulgaria IFRS for Banks 
IFRS as issued by the 
IASB 






























Denmark  IFRS as adopted by EU 2005 Yes Yes permitted - Yes 23 
Finland IFRS as adopted by EU 2005 Yes Yes permitted - Yes 23 
France  IFRS as adopted by EU 2005 Yes Yes No - Yes 23 
Germany  IFRS as adopted by EU 2005 Yes Yes No - Yes 23 
(This Table is continued on the next page)  
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Table 2-1 (Continued) 
Greece IFRS as adopted by the EU 2005 Yes Yes Yes - Yes 23 
Hong Kong  (HKFRSs) identical to 
IFRS 
2005 Yes Yes Yes - Yes 01, 23 
Italy  IFRS as adopted by the EU 2005 Yes Yes Yes - Yes 23 
Jordan IFRS as issued by the IASB 1997 Yes Yes Yes Yes - 23 
Netherlands  IFRS as adopted by the EU 2005 Yes Yes permitted - Yes 23 
Norway IFRS as adopted by the EU 2005 Yes Yes Permitt d - Yes 23 
Oman IFRS as issued by the IASB 1986 No Yes Yes - - 23 
Philippines 
 
(PFRS) ) equivalent to 
IFRS 
200514 Yes Yes Yes PFRS is 
required 
- 01,23 
Poland  IFRS as adopted by the EU 2005 Yes Yes Permitt d - Yes 23 
Portugal  IFRS as adopted by the EU 2005 Yes Yes Permitt d - Yes 23 
Singapore  (SFRS) equivalent to IFRS 2005 Yes Yes Yes - Yes 01, 23 






Spain IFRS as adopted by the EU 2005 Yes Yes No - Yes 23 
Sweden  IFRS as adopted by the EU 2005 Yes Yes No - Yes 23 
UK IFRS as adopted by the EU 2005 Yes Yes permitted - Yes 23 
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The regulation permitted Member States to delay compliance with IFRS until 2007 for publicly 
traded companies whose securities are only debt securiti s, and for companies listed both in the 
EU and on other regulated markets outside the EU which are applying different accounting 
GAAP. Therefore, the year 2007 was the year when all companies listed on regulated markets 
in the EU prepared their financial statements in accordance with IFRS. In addition, foreign 
companies listed on a regulated market in EAA counties are required to comply with IFRS as 
endorsed by the EU starting from 2007, unless their national standards are deemed to be 
equivalent to IFRS by the European Commission; in such case they may use their national 
standards (IFRS Foundation, n.d.). 
With regard to the separate accounts of listed companies, as it is apparent in Table 2-1, the 
requirement is different across Europe. Some countries require IFRS as adopted by the EU such 
as Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy, while other countries require local standards in the preparation 
of individual accounts of listed companies, such as Au tria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain 
and Sweden. In some countries, companies may use IFRS as adopted by the EU or local 
standards in their standalone accounts, such as Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, and the UK (IFRS Foundation, n.d.).  
2.3.2. Countries adopting IFRS equivalents   
Four of the countries in this study use local standards equivalent to IFRS as Table 2-1 shows. 
While the Australian standards are the same as IFRS, the standards in Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Philippines are almost the same as IFRS with a few modifications.  
Australia  
The convergence process between the international accounting standards and Australian GAAP 
goes back to 1996, culminating in publishing the Australian Convergence Handbook in  2002 
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(AASB, 2009). In 2002, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in Australia provided the 
Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) with a strategic direction for 2002 - 2003 
(FRC, 2002). In it, as from 1 January 2005 all domestic companies listed on a public market 
should lodge their financial statements in accordance with the Australian national standards 
described as IFRS-equivalents. The Australian adoption of IFRS coincided with the EU 
adoption timetable. On the other hand, foreign companies listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchanges can lodge their financial statements under IFRS. Alternatively, they can apply the 
accounting rules followed in their country of origin only if these standards are suitable, 
pursuant to the Australian Securities Exchange and Corporations Act (IFRS Foundation, n.d.). 
The FRC urged the AASB to carry on harmonising the Australian accounting standards with 
IFRS except that one of IFRS was not in the interess of the entities in Australia. The AASB 
carries out its own consultative process on the IASB’s consultation document for comment. In 
some cases, the IASB may issue a pronouncement but the AASB has not issued its Australian 
equivalent yet. 
When the IASB issues a new standard, for example, the AASB arranges its own consultations 
to decide whether the standard is suitable for the Australian environment. If yes, an Australian 
accounting standard equivalent to that issued by the IASB will be laid out by the AASB 
(Deloitte, n.d.b). Thus, the AASB might decide not to adopt a standard set out by the IASB due 
to not being in the interests of private and public se tors in Australia. It might also modify the 
standard to be in the line with the Australian environment.  
The AASB, largely, adopts the content and the wording of IFRS in setting its equivalent 
Australian standard (AASB, 2004). It is not often that the AASB will change the wording, not 
unless there is a legal requirement to fulfil. Regarding the alternative treatments and 
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disclosures, the AASB may adopt one treatment of the options stipulated in IFRS and require 
additional disclosures.  
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is one of the two special Administrative Regions of China, with its own 
legal system. Pursuant to Section 18A of the Professional Accountants Ordinance, the 
Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA) is the only official 
accounting standard-setting body in Hong Kong (IFRS Foundation, n.d.). 
Since January 2005, Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (HKFRSs) have become fully 
converged with IFRS except for minor differences. Similar to the term IFRS, which includes all 
IFRS and IAS, the term ‘HKFRSs’ includes all HKFRSs, Hong Kong Accounting Standards 
(HKASs), the new name of Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP), and all 
interpretations (ibid). 
All domestic companies listed on a public market in Hong Kong are required to prepare their 
financial statements (stand alone or consolidated) in accordance with HFRSs, the Hong Kong 
IFRS equivalents. Some companies might be domiciled in Hong Kong but incorporated abroad, 
the case in which IFRS, as issued by the IASB, or HKFRSs could be used. For this reason, the 
latter companies are considered domestic rather than foreign. Foreign companies listed on the 
Hong Kong Exchange can use one of the following if the issuer is from China: HKFRSs, IFRS, 
and the China Accounting Standards for Business Enterprise (CASBE) ; alternatively, they can 
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Philippine Financial Reporting Standards (PFRS) are nearly the same as IFRS with limited 
modifications (IFRS Foundation, n.d.). All domestic companies listed on a public market are 
required to use IFRS as PFRS in both individual andconsolidated financial statements. All 
large and publically accountable companies must also use IFRS as PFRS in their financial 
reporting whether or not they are listed on a public market. Companies are deemed to be large if 
their total assets exceed approximately $8 million, r their total liabilities are approximately 
more than $6 million.  
Companies listed on a public market or in the process of issuing any instruments on a public 
market are also considered to be large and publically accountable. In addition, large and 
publically accountable companies include those holding secondary licenses issued by a 
regulated agency. Foreign entities trading in a public market in Philippines use PFRS in the 
consolidated financial statements.  
Singapore 
The Singapore Accounting Standards Council (ASC) is empowered by law to regulate 
accounting in Singapore. Since 2003, the Companies Act (Cap.50) has required all domestic 
companies (listed and unlisted) to lodge their financi l statements under the Singapore 
Financial Reporting Standards (SFRS) (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008).  
Singapore is classified as an IFRS adopter (Deloitt, 2007) because SFRSs are nearly word for 
word IFRS with several modifications, including transition provisions and effective dates of the 
standards. Singapore has not adopted IFRIC 2 Members’ Shares in Co-operative Entities and 
Similar Instruments which has, however, no effect on Singapore’s incorporated companies, 
listed and unlisted. Furthermore, the sole modification to the requirements of IFRS has no effect 
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on Singapore’s incorporated listed companies. These modifications took place before 2005; 
therefore, SFRS has been equivalent to IFRS since January 2005. Singapore Exchange Listing 
Rules permit foreign companies listed on Singapore Exchange (SGX) to apply SFRS, IFRS or 
US GAAP (IFRS Foundation, n.d.). 
The Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA) of Singapore can grant 
permission to Singapore’s incorporated companies to use IFRS instead of SFRS. In addition, a 
Singaporean incorporated company whose securities ar  publicly traded in Singapore and 
outside is permitted to use IFRS if they are required by countries in which these companies are 
listed (IFRS Foundation, n.d.). 
When the IASB issues exposure drafts and other pronouncements, the ASC conducts its own 
consultative process soliciting comments from the public and interested parties on these 
pronouncements. Then, the ASC submits the collected comments to the IASB. If there is a new 
IFRS, the ASC deems the endorsement of a SFRS an IFRS equivalent, taking into consideration 
several issues:  
(a) it  should be in the interests of stakeholders;  
(b) it improves comparability, transparency and disclosure,  
(c) whether it is compatible with international accounting standards, and  
(d) the Singapore’s international business environment. 
2.3.3. Countries adopting IFRS as issued by the IASB  
Jordan, Oman and South Africa adopted IFRS as issued by the IASB but not at the 
same time, as it is apparent from Table 2-1.  
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The adoption of IFRS in Jordan began in 1997 when t Companies Law no.22 enforced public 
shareholding companies to prepare their accounts using the IAS. This was followed by the 1997 
Temporary Securities Law No.23, which restructured the capital market in Jordan in accordance 
with IAS adoption. Three new institutions were annou ced to be formed in replacement with 
the Amman Financial Market (AFM) (Al-Akra et al., 2009). Jordan Securities Commission 
(JSC) came into existence in 1997 while the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and the Securities 
Depository Centre (SDC) in 1999 (IFRS Foundation, n.d.). 
Again, in 2002, Securities Law No. 76 mandated all companies to fully conform to IFRS in the 
preparation of their financial statements. In 2004, an amendment to the Securities Law asserted 
that all companies would be monitored by the JSC to ensure compliance with IFRS (Al-Akra et 
al., 2009). 
In brief, IFRS as issued by the IASB is compulsory for all domestic and foreign companies 
operating in Jordan (IFRS Foundation, n.d.). Despit the fact that the JSC and other government 
authorities eliminated some alternative treatments permitted by the IASB, the annual reports of 
companies are still in full compliance with IFRS as issued by the IASB (ibid). 
Oman  
The compliance with IFRS in the Sultanate of Oman began in 1986 with the issue of 
the Royal Decree 77, the law of Organising the Accountancy and Auditing Profession. 
It obliged accountants to use the international accounting standards (ibid).   
Later, both the Capital Market Law (Royal Decree 80/1998) and the Code of Corporate 
Governance required listed companies to prepare their financial statements in accordance with 
IFRS, for both consolidated and individual accounts. The Law does not permit foreign 
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companies to list on Muscat Securities Market. Since IFRS is adopted by law in Oman, there is 
no need to endorse the new or the amended standards individually (IFRS Foundation, n.d.).  
South Africa  
The Accounting Practices Board (APB) in South Africa began harmonising the SA 
GAAP with IFRS in 1995. As from 2003, the APB issued SA GAAP, which is the 
same as IFRS but under a different name. SA GAAP was compulsory for all types of 
companies in South Africa. The Companies Act Regulations and Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) Listings Requirements require domestic companies listed on JSE to 
use IFRS as issued by the IASB in the preparation of their both separate and 
consolidated financial statements starting from January 2005. For foreign companies 
whose primary listing market is JSE, it is mandatory to use IFRS, while it is optional 
for companies for which JSE is the secondary listing, in which case they may use their 
home market GAAP (IFRS Foundation, n.d.).   
2.7. Conclusion  
This chapter provided a brief history of international accounting, and added some context by 
providing information about the countries targeted in the study. It discussed the IFRS 
Foundation and the IASB, in addition to endorsement of IFRS across the world. The final part 
of the chapter provided information about how countries adopted the IASB’s standards, 
including the IFRS version and the date of adoption, a d which countries were required to 
comply with the standards.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework  
3.1. Introduction  
An early discussion of harmonisation of accounting standards emerged during 1960s with a 
proposal prepared by Kraayenhof (1960; cited in Schwekart, 1985) in which he casts doubts on 
the attainability of harmonisation due to the differences in local environmental factors across 
countries. A few years later, exploring the effect of environmental factors on accounting 
systems and practices had become a trend in international comparative studies (e.g. Muller, 
1968; Radebaugh, 1975; AAA, 1977). There was a need for atheory to employ in international 
accounting studies. Thomas (1986) argued that a considerable body of comparative 
international studies employed a contingency approach implicitly, stating “[t]here is thus an 
implicit underlying theory that the reporting practices of each country are contingent on certain 
social, political and/or economic variables’’ (p.255). 
Contingency theory emerged in management and organisation structures studies in the 1960s 
and 1970s, rejecting the approach that prescribes a single ‘best way’ on which all managers 
should rely to secure efficient organisational operations. That is, using certain managerial 
principles is contingent upon the situation (Bartol et al., 2004). Then the application of 
contingency theory found its way into management accounting literature.  
This has been followed by the employment of contingency approach in financial accounting 
literature. In an early empirical study, Thomas (1986) examined whether the accounting 
methods which corporates use are dependent on circumstantial variables. Such variables require 
that managers use their discretion in the preferenc of accounting methods15.  
The literature of international accounting reveals some attempts to classify the accounting 
systems and address the reasons behind the differences i  such accounting practices around the 
                                                          
15 The term ‘circumstantial variables’ has been used first by Cadenhead (1970). 
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world. Most of these studies were in the era before the use of IFRS in different countries. Then, 
the attention turned to explain the reasons for the variation in accounting practices after the 
switch to IFRS. To address the reasons behind the national patterns of IFRS following the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, it would be useful to identify the reasons for international 
accounting differences before the switch to IFRS, and then after the IFRS adoption.  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a conceptual theoretical framework for the factors 
determining accounting practices after mandatory IFRS adoption. It discusses the factors that 
shape accounting practices across countries using a contingency approach on macro level, and 
then agency theory to explain why these factors are important to produce high accounting 
quality under IFRS. It is composed of eight themed s ctions, including the introduction. The 
second section presents the early-proposed frameworks. The third section is concerned with the 
empirical works and more developed models. Section 4 deals with culture and institutional 
factors. Section 5 describes more recent studies. Section 6 draws upon studies in the IFRS era. 
Section 7 discusses agency theory. Section 8 concludes the chapter.  
3.2. Early frameworks  
In 1967, “International Accounting’’, written by Professor Gerhard Mueller (Mueller, 1967), 
was published and was the first textbook dealing with accounting practices across the world. In 
it, Mueller tried to classify accounting systems, or accounting practices, around the globe. 
Under this classification, national accounting systems can fall into one of four categories: 
macroeconomic, microeconomic, independent discipline a d uniform approach.  
First, under the macroeconomic approach, accounting is viewed as a tool that helps 
governments in their national economic policies. The accounting system in Sweden at that time 
was cited to be in the macroeconomic group. Second, in the microeconomic approach, such as 
in Netherlands, accounting serves as a tool that aids individual private businesses in achieving 
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their objectives. Such type of accounting systems may be popular in a market-oriented economy 
where the emphasis is placed on individual enterprises. Third, accounting systems as an 
independent discipline refers to the systems in countries where profession and business 
practices play an important role in developing the accounting systems in isolation from the 
economic theories or governments. Mueller had classified the accounting systems in the UK 
and the USA as an independent discipline. Fourth, accounting as a uniform approach has been 
developed to be an administrative tool, and standardised by governments. France was suggested 
as an example of uniform accounting systems.  
Seidler (1967) provided a different classification f accounting systems based on the term 
‘spheres of influence’ proposing three systems: British, American and Continental European. 
Accounting practices in two countries may be similar due to political, traditional, or colonial 
factors. Seidler’s model is simple making the accounting systems contingent on external factors 
but ignoring the effect of internal factors. Previts (1975) discussed Seidler’s classification, 
suggesting Australia, Canada, Greece, Nigeria, South Africa, some countries in South America, 
Thailand and the British West Indies to be under the British system. He also associated 
Germany and Japan with the American model. The last model, the continental European 
system, which was primarily French, was identified as the system which was popular in 
Southern Europe and former territories where the commercial codes embodied the codes 
promulgated by Napoleon. Ten years after the Seidler, th  American Accounting Association in 
its Committee report (AAA, 1977) expanded the classification of accounting systems based on 
‘’zones of influence’’ into five systems. These were British, French-Spanish-Portuguese, 
German-Dutch, Communist, and USA.  
In 1968, Mueller produced another classification that explains the differences in accounting 
practices among countries using four characteristics of business and social environments. These 
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were business developments, business complexity, legal and political system. Generally, 
Mueller emphasises the role of environments, such as political and economic, in developing the 
accounting systems. He contends that accounting “must respond to the ever-changing needs of 
society and must reflect the social, political, legal and economic conditions within which it 
operates” (Mueller, 1968, p.95).  
A clearer use of the contingency model in international accounting studies can be noted in the 
studies by Radebaugh (1975) and AAA (1977), where the proposition was that accounting 
systems are contingent on a number of factors. Relativ ly speaking, Radebaugh (1975) 
introduced a more comprehensive framework addressing both local and international factors 
that influence national accounting objectives, standards and practices. Building upon the work 
by Mueller, he provided eight groups of environmental variables: nature of the enterprise, 
enterprise users, government, other external users, accounting profession, local environmental 
characteristics, academic influences, and internatio l influences. He applied this model to Peru 
stressing the importance of understanding the factors hat led to a change in accounting 
objectives, standards, and practices. By doing so, it would be possible to determine when it is 
suitable to implement uniform accounting standards and when these universal accounting 
standards are not applicable. Although this was the most comprehensive model produced at that 
time, it has not escaped criticism from some authors. For example, Saudagaran and Diga (1999) 
pointed out that Radebaugh did not fully elaborate the link between the proposed variables and 
accounting practices making its explanatory contribu ion limited.  
An alternative framework to categorize accounting systems is using morphology, which is a 
way of preparing a list of factors that influence accounting systems. Having described these 
features, one can use empirical data to gain clustering. Buckley and Buckley (1974) were the 
first who proposed morphology describing the accounting standards setting but their work was 
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not specifically developed for the purpose of interational accounting systems. The American 
Accounting Association (AAA, 1977, p.99) provided a morphology of accounting systems 
based on eight features of parameters. These were:  
1- political system;  
2- economic system;  
3- stage of economic development;  
4- objectives of financial reporting;  
5- source of or authority for standards;  
6- education, training and licensing;  
7- enforcement of ethics and standards; and  
8-  client.  
Saudagaran and Diga (1999) criticized the AAA (1977) model in terms of not differentiating 
between accounting parameters and environmental parmeters. Further, no link has been made 
between the proposed framework and the hypotheses about why and how the combinations of 
their model characteristics emerged, persisted and v ried over time.  
The next section moves on to present empirical studies and more developed models including 
the works of Frank (1979), Nair and Frank (1980), Nobes (1981), Belkaoui (1983), Belkaoui 
and Maksy (1985), and Schweikart (1985).  
3.3. Empirical studies and more developed models  
Inspired by the same reasoning that stresses the importance of environmental factors in 
determining accounting practices, Frank (1979) used factor analysis to classify 38 countries in 4 
groups based on the extent of 233 accounting princiles. These four categories were British 
Commonwealth, Continental European, Latin American and US-influenced countries. Then he 
tested the relationship between the four groups and three explanatory variables that measured 
culture (language), economic structure, and internaio l trade patterns, concluding that cultural 
and economic features influenced accounting principles and practices. Nair and Frank (1980) 
extended the work of Frank (1979) by examining whether grouping yielded by disclosure 
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practices was the same as that resulting from measur ment practices in forty four countries 
using data from surveys administered by Price Waterhouse in 1973 and 1975. The results show 
that groupings based on disclosure practices were different from those based on measurement 
practices whereas environmental variables associated wi h both sets of groupings.  
Similar to Frank (1979) and Nair and Frank (1980), Nobes (1981) reiterated his doubts about 
the classification of accounting systems based on data provided by Price Waterhouse. In his 
paper comment, Nobes (1981) questioned the reliability of data based on the surveys done by 
Price Waterhouse and listed three flaws which marred th  data16 in the survey of 1973. Nobes 
(1983) expressed another criticism regarding the diff rences between the UK and the USA. He 
identified nine factors influencing accounting measurement practices, not disclosure practices17, 
in 14 developed countries. Two of these factors were explanatory variables and the others were 
discriminating features of local accounting practices.  
He argued that there was a difficulty in determining whether some factors were explanatory 
variables or discriminating practices. For example, th  importance of tax variable could be an 
explanatory variable or a discriminating one. Because of this, he repeated his analysis adding 
the taxation variable to explanatory variables. The first division of countries was into two 
groups. The first included the UK, Australia, Netherlands, Ireland, New Zealand, the USA, and 
Canada. The second included most European continental countries, France, Belgium, Spain, 
Italy, Germany, Sweden, and Japan. It is important to bear in mind that the model proposed by 
Nobes (1983) is not applicable to developing countries where the economic features are 
different from those in developed countries. 
                                                          
16 He mentioned  straightforward mistakes, some answers that were misleading and inappropriate use of questions.  
17 As in Nair and Frank (1980), he differentiated between measurement accounting practices and disclosures 
practices.  
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Belkaoui (1983) examined whether political, economic, and demographic environment 
influenced the accounting disclosure adequacy. The proxy to capture political environment was 
political rights, civil liberties and political system. Economic environment was measured by 
five factors: Economic System, Per Capita GNP, Growth Rate of Income, government 
expenditures and the level of exports; whereas the population was the proxy of demographic 
environment. Despite the fact that he did not find significant results, he indicated the need to 
investigate the effect of political, economic and civil factors on accounting practices to develop 
a contingency theory in international accounting research. He was the first who pointed out 
contingency theory explicitly in the field of international accounting. In the same vein, the work 
by Belkaoui and Maksy (1985), which was an extension of Belkaoui’s (1983), did not support 
the proposition that disclosure levels were influenced by economic and social environment. 
In 1985, Schweikart published a paper in which he discussed the use of contingency theory in 
international comparative studies, this work was the most explicit discussion of employing 
contingency approach in international accounting literature. Based on management accounting 
research, Schweikart (1985) identified four environme tal variables determining the accounting 
needs: educational, economic, political, and social environments. Schweikart (1985) suggested 
the application of contingency theory in countries with very similar accounting methods, 
decision problems and institutions reside. Because of this, Saudagaran and Diga (1999) 
questioned Schweikart’s work in terms of its applicability in developing countries where the 
environments are diverse.  
Prior to the aforementioned studies, the literature on comparative management accounting 
reveals some studies describing environmental factors influencing management accounting 
practices. For example, Farmer and Richman (1966) proposed an early model describing the 
factors shaping management accounting practices in firms. Of the factors, they identified the 
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external environmental factors including educational, sociocultural, legal, political, and 
economic factors. Building on this model, Arpan and Radebaugh (1985) discussed accounting 
systems in terms of the effect of economic, legal, po itical, educational and cultural factors on 
them. They concluded that economic characteristics are the most influential among the others 
since they not only influence the accounting practices but also other factors, such as legal, 
political, educational, and cultural ones. At the same time, legal, political, educational, and 
cultural variables influence accounting practices.  
The studies presented thus far are the principal early studies in comparative international 
accounting that used contingency approach as a framework in an attempt to address the factors 
determining national accounting systems. The focus of these studies was listing the 
environmental variables while little attention has been given to cultural variables, which would 
mirror the local accounting practices. The work of Frank (1979) was the only empirical work, 
among those mentioned before, which investigated th effect of culture, captured by language, 
on accounting principles and practices.  
On the other hand, Gernon and Wallace (1995) are critical of international accounting 
researches employing contingency theory approach in that they neglect to account for the 
variation in the behaviour of organisations in a specific country. Those studies downplayed the 
role of variables internal to entities apart from controlling for their attributes such as size. 
Gernon and Wallace (1995) pointed, at that time, to the need for more empirical work to 
examine the proposition that accounting is the product of its environment.   
Returning to culture, in a discussion of the development of international accounting standards, 
Violet (1983) argues that culture imposes constraints on international accounting 
harmonisation. That is, accounting is a social institution dependent on culture and is even a 
product of it. Without appreciating and understanding the cultural differences across the 
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nations, the IASC, at that time, would not have succeeded in achieving what it was established 
for. Violets (1983) concluded that “the best possible system” for a country is a system that 
mirrors the technology and cultural factors of that country.  
On a national basis, Harrison and McKinnon (1986) proposed a theoretical framework to reveal 
the properties and attributes of corporate financial reporting regulation with a focus on their 
change. In their framework, they incorporated culture as an essential factor that influences the 
change in social systems with reference to Japan in their study. The logic behind that is the 
effect of culture on ‘(1) the norms and values of such systems; and (2) the behaviour of groups 
in their interactions within and across systems’ (p.239). Gray (1988), who criticised prior 
literature in that it ignored the influence of culture on accounting practices, published a key 
study trying to address the impact of cultural variables on accounting systems.  
So far, this chapter has focused on factors proposed to determine accounting practices with no 
reference to culture. The following section will discuss the key studies on the possible nexus 
between culture and accounting systems and practices.  
3.4. Culture and institutional factors models   
Gray (1988) was critical of prior frameworks proposed to explain variations in accounting 
systems across nations in terms of the effect of culture on accounting practices. Violet (1983, p. 
10) argues that accounting is a product of a culture. Gray (1988) discussed in details, building 
on Hofstede's (1980; 1983) work, how culture contributes to the cross-national differences in 
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Figure 3-1 The relationship between societal values, accounting values and accounting practices 
 
 
Perera (1989) provided a summary of the relationship between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions; 
Gray’s accounting values and accounting practices, as in the Figure 3-1. As shown in it, 
professionalism is related to authority, uniformity is linked to application, conservatism 
influences measurement and secrecy has an impact on disclosure. 
Gray (1988) proposed a model describing factors which influence accounting practices derived 
from Hofstede (1980, p. 27) in terms of societal culture patterns with some extension (see 
Figure 3-2). Societal values are influenced by ecological factors, which in turn are determined 
by external factors and reinforced by institutions. 












Application   
Measurement  
Disclosure  
The relationship between societal values, accounting values, and accounting practices 
Source: Adapted from Perera (1989) 
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Figure 3-2 Culture, accounting values and the accounting sub-culture 
 
Source: Gray (1988) p.7 
These institutions such as legal system, corporate ownership, capital markets, education, and 
religion are shaped by the societal values and havean influence on accounting systems at the 
same time. Accounting systems are also influenced by the accounting values.  
Reviewing the literature of international accounting, Meek and Saudagaran (1990) listed the 
most commonly agreed environmental factors influencing accounting practices. They included 
legal system, capital market, tax laws, inflation level and political and economic ties but they 
excluded culture.  
Doupnik and Salter (1995) took the first four variables listed by Meek and Saudagaran (1990) 
and added two more variables suggested by Mueller (1968), and then classified them as 
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environmental factors shaping accounting practices. Those two were the level of education and 
the level of economic development.  
In addition to environmental variables, Doupnik and Salter (1995) used  Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and Masculinity. They 
claimed to have proposed a general model derived from the literature in which there were three 
elements shaping the accounting practices, namely external environment, cultural values and 
institutional structure. External environments shape both the cultural values and institutional 
structure and furnish external stimuli leading to a change. Cultural values, in turn, impact 
institutions and, at the same time, control the intractions between the institutions and how they 
respond to the external stimuli. Cultural variables are the Hofstede cultural dimensions. 
Accounting systems are one of the institutions which are influenced by culture and external 
environments.  
Nobes (1998) discussed the model of Doupnik and Salter (1995), and provided an adaption of 
the relationship between the three elements suggested by them. He provided a simplified figure 
of the Doupnik and Salter (1995) model (see Figure 3-3).  
Nobes (1998) points out that there are two difficult es associated with their model. The first is 
the possibility of double counting since culture affects both accounting practices and 
institutional structures. The second is the possible interactions between the institutions, which 
can cause each other. Furthermore, Nobes (1998) argues that four of the institutions are not 
necessary in the model. Those were tax laws, level of inflation, level of education and economic 
development. He concludes that their model is not a general framework; instead, it is a mix of 
frameworks. The work of Nobes (1998) is discussed in etail in the next section.  
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Figure 3-3 A simplification of  the Doupnik and Salter (1995) model 
 
Listing cultural variables under internal environment, Cooke and Wallace (1990) proposed a 
framework of the factors influencing the accounting regulation. These were internal 
environments, external environments, the accounting re ulator, and the enforcement 
mechanisms. One can notice that there is an interaction between the variables shaping the 
accounting regulation. In fact, many factors included in the model were already identified in 
prior studies (e.g. Radebaugh, 1975; AAA, 1977) as variables influencing accounting practices. 
The most significant development in this model is classifying the factors into internal and 
external, and including two new variables represented by the accounting regulator and the 
enforcement mechanism. Another aspect is the dichotomy between the enforcement 
mechanisms and the legal system, which was classified as an internal factor.  
Cooke and Wallace (1990) found that financial disclo ure regulation in developed countries is 
influenced by internal factors such as business enviro ment whereas the latter is less significant 
in developing countries. In such countries, external factors (e.g. colonial history and the impact 
of foreign enterprises) have greater effect on the financial disclosure regulation while the 
influence of internal factors is trivial.  




Source: Nobes (1998) p.163 adapted from Doupnik and Salter (1995)  
Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework  
 
       
 
48 
Likewise, Saudagaran and Diga (1997a) hold the view that external environments are the 
determinants of financial disclosure regulation in developing countries. They provided 
explanation for why ASEAN countries preferred a global approach of harmonisation to regional 
approach.  
Lawrence (1996) suggests that cultural, legal, politica , and economic factors all determine the 
characteristics of national accounting systems. Consistent with the previous literature which 
stressed the importance of culture (e.g. Gray, 1988 ), Lawrence (1996) considered culture as the 
key factor among the others. He argued that culture influences the social environments, which 
distinguish a society from others, and for this reason, culture is the key influential factor in 
accounting systems while the others are part of it. 
Conversely, Gernon and Wallace (1995) demonstrated th  limitation of using cultural variables 
with specific criticism of the methodology which Hofstede used in developing his measures of 
culture. They concluded that Hofstede’s sample suffered from limitations in terms of 
generalization to other populations, organisations r countries, since the dimensions are drawn 
from the questionnaire to managers of IBM in 67 countries. Similarly, d’Arcy (2001) is critical 
of applying quantitative measures of culture to accounting practices.  
Nobes (1998) maintains that culture would be of direct significance in examining other issues 
such as behaviour of auditors, citing the work of Seters and Schreuder (1988) as an example. 
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to divide countries into culturally dominated or self-
sufficient nations, the thing he did when developing his model. Another major criticism of 
Hofstede’s work, made by Baskerville (2003), is that t e theoretical basis for the dimensions of 
culture is weak. That is, cultures do not equate with nations as there would be multiple cultures 
in one nation, and the variable ‘’culture’’ tends to be a qualitative not quantitative variable and 
dynamic. It appeared that Hofstede was measuring socio-economic factors because of the 
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connections between these factors and the culture dim nsions which he proposed (Baskerville, 
2003). Evans (2004) employed culture to mean socio-e onomic, political and institutional 
factors.  
Briefly, this section has reviewed the models that considered culture as a factor in shaping 
accounting practices. While Gray (1988) made a connection between Hofstede’s dimensions 
and the accounting values he developed, some authors pr posed factors determining accounting 
practices and labelled culture as a factor (e.g. Cooke and Wallace, 1990; Doupnik and Salter, 
1995; Lawrence, 1996). However, some other authors criticised those models in terms of the 
limitations of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (e.g. Gernon and Wallace, 1995; Nobes, 1998). 
Nobes (2002) related financing and legal systems, rathe  than culture, to accounting, whereas 
Evans (2004) adopted a wider aspect of culture to mean socio-economic, political and 
institutional factors residing in a country. This study takes the stance that legal systems and 
financing systems are of more direct influence on accounting practices than culture is, which 
will be explained in detail in the sections that follow.  
The next part of this chapter will present more recent international accounting research dealing 
with developing a model that explains the reasons fr the variations in accounting systems from 
one country to another.   
3.5. Recent studies  
Rather than listing several variables, many of them may not actually influence accounting 
systems, Nobes (1998) suggests that they can boil down to a main factor that may explain the 
reasons for the differences in accounting systems. He built his framework on the proposition 
that the difference in the purpose of financial reporting is a key cause underlying the variations 
in the international financial reporting. He suggested that the source of finance is the key 
variable while the others are either related to it or do not shape the accounting systems.  
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The literature reveals some empirical studies on the connection between the strength of capital 
market (captured by market capitalization) and accounting disclosure. For example, Adhikari 
and Tondkar (1992) examined the requirements of stock exchange disclosure in 35 countries in 
terms of the effect of two types of environmental factors. The first was economic including the 
country's stage of development and type of economy whether agricultural, service, or industrial. 
The second was related to the degree of development in equity markets captured by the size of 
equity market, activity on equity market, and disper ion of stock ownership. They concluded 
that stock exchange disclosure requirements are a function of environmental factors. However, 
the size of equity market captured by market capitalization was found to be the only significant 
explanatory variable that explains the variations i the requirements of equity market 
disclosures.  
Pushing further, the source of finance in a country is suggested to be a determining factor of the 
purpose for which the financial reports are produce. Traditionally, two types of financing 
systems have been proposed: (a) capital market based system and (b) credit based system, 
including either governmental or financial institutions (Zysman, 1983). In all types, companies 
use their profits for capital; however, the differenc  in the sources of external finance makes 
this division. In capital market system, the long-term finance sources, shares and bonds, are the 
important external sources. In credit system, governm nt may administer the sources, or the 
financial institutions such as banks have  dominance. Zysman (1983) proposed the presence of 
a capital market financing system in the UK and the USA, a governmental credit financing 
system in France and Japan, and a financial institutions credit system in Germany.  
Nobes (1998) developed the classification proposed by Zysman (1983) based on whether the 
providers of finance were ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’. He defined ‘outsiders’ as those who ‘are not 
members of the board of directors and do not have privileged relationship with the company 
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(e.g., such as that enjoyed by a company’s banker who is also a major shareholder)’ (pp 166-
167). In addition to individual shareholders, some institutions such as unit trusts and insurance 
companies may be labelled as outsiders. Those types of institutions own widely diversified 
portfolios; therefore, their holding of capital of any company is more likely to be small, and 
thus they are outsiders. On the other hand, ‘insider ’ such as families, banks, and governments 
hold large proportion of a company’s shares; thereby, they have privileged access to accounting 
information.  
Category I is a credit based system, more common tha II, where creditors are dominant and 
have their own access to accounting information withou  the need for external audit. Category 
II is a credit-based system where the dominance is for outsider owners; however, this type of 
financing systems is not common. According to Nobes (1998) credit based systems as classified 
by Zysman (1983) fall into category I.    
 Category III is strong equity dominated by insiders who own large proportion of shares. In 
Category IV, financing systems are characterised by the presence of strong equity dominated by 
outsiders with no private access to accounting information of which published accounts are the 
source. Category II and III are rare while the most common financing systems can fall into 
either IV or I. 
Nobes then suggested two types of financial accounting systems:  
Type A represents the strong equity systems dominated by outsiders. In this type, financial 
reporting plays a key role as a source of accounting information for parties with no private 
access to the information. It has been suggested that earnings reported in such systems tend to 
be non-conservative.  
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Table 3-1 Financing systems 
                                                  Financing Systems  
 Strong credit Strong equity 
Insiders dominant  I III 
Outsiders dominant  II IV 
Source: Nobes (1998) p.166 
  
Type B represents the strong credit systems dominated by insiders.  In this type, insiders have 
their private access to accounting information thereby financial reporting is of less importance 
in comparison with that in type A. In contrast to type A, earnings reported tend to be 
conservative18.  
Financial accounting in outsider systems has developed to fulfil the needs of finance providers, 
whereas with the insider systems there is no apparent n ed for financial reporting to provide 
information as is required under outsiders systems. 
Besides the financing system, Nobes (1998) suggested that colonial inheritance is a relevant 
factor in explaining the differences in international accounting systems. This argument has its 
roots in the literature represented by spheres of influence, the variable on which Seidler (1967) 
classified accounting systems across countries. The influence of colonialism can be addressed 
by looking at whether countries are culturally dominated. 
Based on this, Nobes divided countries into two groups: the first represents the culturally self-
sufficient countries, and the second represents the culturally dominated countries. Culturally 
dominated countries may use the accounting systems applied in the dominant countries 
regardless of their appropriateness to their local environment as indicated by Hove (1986). That 
                                                          
18
 Watts (2003) argue that with the threat of shareholders litigation, managers and auditors have the motives to 
report conservative earnings in an attempt to escape the litigation costs. The legal systems, evolving to impose 
constraints on opportunistic overpayments to the parties interested in the firm such as managers, explain the 
asymmetry in litigation costs.  
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is, one of the ways of transferring accounting technologies of developed countries to less 
developed countries was colonialism.  
With respect to invasions, similar to colonialism, they may influence the accounting systems as 
those in France, Germany and Japan. However, the effect of invasion on accounting would fade 
with the departure of the invader in case that the for ign accounting systems were not suitable 
for the needs of the host country.  
As explained earlier, Nobes (1998) diminished the importance of culture, as measured by 
Hofstede and proposed by Gray, in shaping accounting systems; rather, he suggested employing 
culture to examine its association with other issue such as behaviour of auditors. In addition, 
he suggested that culture can explain the differences in capital markets across nations instead of 
being itself a determinant factor as to how the accounting systems differ. He assumed that some 
cultures bring about strong capital market with outside capital providers while some others do 
not.  
Nobes (1998) concludes that in culturally independent countries, the strength of capital market 
is the driver of accounting system, whereas in cultura ly dependent countries, culture influences  
the financial reporting systems. He excluded the otr factors because they either do not explain 
the differences in accounting practices or they result from the capital market or at least are 
linked to the market. For example, tax does not explain the differences in accounting practices 
between type A and type B; rather, it is of significance to explain the differences in accounting 
practices within type B. This can result from the connection between accounting practices and 
tax practices in type B.  
Another issue is the difficulty in measuring some factors even though they may be the reasons 
for the differences in capital market.   
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3.6. IFRS era 
Before IFRS adoption, the attention of international accounting writers was focused on listing 
the factors that would lead to different accounting systems across the countries. To that end, 
many factors were proposed to explain the differences in international accounting systems 
regardless of what the accounting system meant, de jure rules or de facto practices. After the 
arrival of IFRS in many countries especially in the EU in 2005, attention has turned to the 
factors influencing the compliance with IFRS across the nations mandating IFRS application.  
To propose a general model of the factors influencing the conformity with IFRS across the 
adopting countries, it would be useful to focus on the primary factors that would cause the 
departure from the spirit of the standards. As Nobes (1998) indicated in his early study, the 
purpose of financial reporting is the main factor in explaining the differences in accounting 
systems; the same is applicable after IFRS adoption. That is, financial reporting prepared for 
outsiders would be of different quality to that prepared for insiders.  
In the case of IFRS adoption, another factor of significance is investor protection, which is 
itself enhanced by the enforcement of IFRS. The enforcement of IFRS is of vital importance as 
the IASB is a private organisation without power to enforce any issues. This task is for local 
authorities, which differ from one country to another in terms of their effectiveness in enforcing 
the rules. These factors will be explained in detail later after illustrating the key studies that 
have attempted to explain the possible factors shaping the outcomes of adopting IFRS across 
different countries.  
Most cited work after IFRS adoption (see, for example, Nobes, 2006; Soderstrom and Sun, 
2007; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Nobes, 2011a; Nobes, 2011b; Nobes, 2013) has attempted to 
conceptualize or test the potential reasons for the variation in accounting practices across the 
nations enforcing IFRS.  
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3.6.1. Financing system  
As mentioned earlier, financing system, or the strength of capital market, has been suggested as 
a determinant factor of accounting practices before the adoption of IFRS since the purpose of 
financial reporting in shareholders outsiders system  is different from that in insiders. Since 
2005, both the UK (outsiders) and Germany (insiders) have required listed companies to use 
IFRS in their consolidated financial statements in accordance with EU Regulation. This raises 
questions on the continuation of the differences in accounting practices after IFRS adoption in 
such countries with different strength of capital mrkets.  
Nobes (2006) points out that the compliance with IFRS among German companies, after the 
mandatory adoption, may not be as presumed as a consequence of continuing the practices 
associated with insider financing systems. The practices of companies in insider financing 
systems may not change towards producing financial statements that meet the general purpose 
of financial reporting; instead, the traditional cuture would remain in effect especially with the 
presence of weak enforcement. Given the enforcement of IFRS is a national matter, a variance 
in the compliance with IFRS might be present between the UK and Germany, where the 
enforcement of accounting standards is weaker than t t in the UK as suggested by La Porta et 
al. (1997).  
3.6.2. Legal system  
In relation to the strength of capital market, La Porta et al. (1997; 1998) demonstrated a 
significant association between strong capital markets and common law countries, where 
investor protection is stronger than in law code countries.  The dichotomy between common 
law countries and code law countries reflects the diff rences in monitoring and enforcement 
(Nobes, 2006). National regulators take the responsibility for monitoring and enforcing IFRS; 
therefore, legal system may still influence accounting practices after the adoption of IFRS. For 
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this reason, the compliance with IFRS among German companies putatively adopting of IFRS 
would be lower than that among companies in the UK.To put it differently, the effect of legal 
system on accounting practices in the post IFRS adoption era would persist through the strength 
of investor protection, and monitoring and enforcement of IFRS rules.  
3.6.3. Tax 
Nobes (2006) proposed taxation as a third possible factor causing the differences in 
international accounting standards after IFRS adoption. In an earlier study, Nobes (1998) 
argued that in the absence of strong capital market where accounting serves the needs of 
shareholders, the purpose of accounting is for taxation.  
Germany does not permit IFRS in the standalone financial reporting; instead, the German 
GAAP is applied in the preparation of unconsolidate financial reporting to calculate the 
taxable income. Nobes (2006) raises the issue that German companies may apply the same 
principles of unconsolidated reporting when preparing consolidated statements. Even in the 
UK, where unconsolidated financial statements can be prepared in accordance with IFRS, 
companies tend to recognise intangibles because of their tax implications. In the preparation of 
unconsolidated statements, companies tend to interpre  intangibles based on the considerable 
judgment provided by the IFRS rules in an attempt to minimize capitalization and thus tax. 
Such practices may find their way into the consolidate  financial statements as well. However, 
to alleviate the effect of taxation on accounting practices, the presence of strong investor 
protection and enforcement—the two factors that are associated with strong equity market—is 
necessary.  
From the previous discussion, it can be proposed that t e effect of taxation on accounting 
practices after the adoption of IFRS can be captured by the strength of capital market due to the 
reasons mentioned earlier in terms of the strength of investor protection and enforcement.  
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3.6.4. The effect of other factors after IFRS adoption  
As regards culture, it has been suggested to be a dtermining factor of accounting practices 
(see, for example, Gray, 1988; Doupnik and Salter, 1995). On the other hand, Gernon and 
Wallace (1995) and Nobes (1998) are critical of applying Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to 
accounting practices. Nobes (1998) asserted that culture would influence accounting practices 
through its effect on other factors such as finance systems, which in turn affect the practices. 
Again, Nobes (2006) reaffirmed that it is not necessary to test whether culture directly shapes 
financial reporting practices.   
In addition to the aforementioned environmental factors, Nobes (2006) discussed the 
opportunity for differences in accounting practices resulting from IFRS. This included 
‘different versions of IFRS; different translations of IFRS; gaps in IFRS; overt options in IFRS; 
covert options, vague criteria and interpretations in IFRS; measurement estimations in IFRS; 
transitional or first-time issues in IFRS; and imperfect enforcement of IFRS’ (p. 234).  
Those eight factors would cause the variations in international accounting; nevertheless, with 
strong institutions such as enforcement, investor pr tection and strong equity market, the effect 
of those factors would be trivial. For example, in the case of different versions of IFRS, the 
differences in environments across countries would explain why some countries modify or do 
not fully adopt IFRS as issued by the IASB. Then, the existence of different IFRS versions is a 
result rather than a reason itself.  
In this context, Nobes (2006) argued that the factors mentioned earlier, i.e. the financing 
system, legal system and taxation, may partly cause  mix of political pressures on regulators in 
favour of specific practices resulting in national versions of IFRS.  This can be seen in the case 
of countries with assertive lobby groups of finance directors along with preference for leasing 
due to their tax implication. In such countries, regulators tend to issue interpretation on leasing 
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in a way that makes it less strict in terms of liabi ty recognition (Nobes, 2006).  Soderstrom 
and Sun (2007) maintain that political pressure hasan impact on setting the accounting 
standards since different parties such as shareholdrs, managers and tax authorities exercise 
pressure on the regulators in a way that serves their int rests.  
In fact, the eight factors proposed by Nobes (2006) further emphasize the importance of strong 
institutions to obtain consistent financial reporting across countries putting IFRS into effect. 
Nobes (2006) concluded that users of financial reporting should be cautious regarding the 
comparability of financial reporting subsequent to IFRS implementation. Despite its 
improvement, the compliance with IFRS is more likely to differ due to country specific factors 
such as financing system, legal system and monitorig and enforcement mechanisms. In a 
report, Nobes (2011b) summarised the proposed reasons for international differences after the 
adoption of IFRS. In his report, he reconfirmed what e published in 2006 on the motives and 
the opportunities of the differences in IFRS accounting practices.  
Empirically, Nobes (2011a) tested the accounting practices in Australia and seven other 
European countries in 2008-2009 requiring listed companies to use IFRS19. His aim was to find 
out whether the traditional dichotomous split of accounting practices into Anglo and European 
continental was still persistent in the IFRS era across those countries. This dichotomy between 
accounting systems has its roots in 1980s. In an earlier study before the switch to IFRS in the 
EU, Nobes (1983) suggested a classification of countries based on accounting practices in 
which the UK and Australia were in one group and most other European countries in the other. 
One may expect that this split is no longer valid in the case of Australia and European countries 
as the same accounting standards are required since 2005.  
                                                          
19 The sample included Australia, Sweden, the UK, Germany, France, Spain, Netherlands, and Italy. 
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Interestingly, Nobes (2011a) concluded that the UK and Australia were in one group and the 
other six European countries in his sample were in the other based on the accounting practices 
of the largest listed companies. In this recent study, Netherlands fell into the European 
continental category whereas it was under the category with the UK and Australia in the earlier 
study of Nobes (1983) but it tended to be an outlier in the Anglo group at that time. There has 
always been a difficulty in classifying Netherlands; for example, Da Costa et al. (1978) pointed 
out that Netherlands could not be categorised20.  
These results suggest that the dichotomy between Anglo and European continental countries 
still survives in spite of the fact that these countries require listed companies to comply with 
IFRS in the preparation of the consolidated financil statements. If the application of IFRS had 
led to consistent accounting practices across different jurisdictions, the UK and Australia would 
not have been grouped differently from the other countries in the sample that Nobes (2011a) 
used. With room for judgement available in the application of IFRS, some traditional practices 
persisted after the adoption of IFRS, suggesting that IFRS alone is not enough to produce 
homogenous financial reporting.  
Building on prior research that suggests the existence of national patterns after IFRS adoption 
(e.g. Nobes, 2006), Kvaal and Nobes (2010) investigated the presence of systematic differences 
in the accounting policies across five stock markets in the first year of the switch to IFRS. 
These five stock markets were in Australia, France, G rmany, Spain, and the UK, where two 
versions of IFRS were present: the EU endorsed IFRS and the Australian based IFRS. They 
concluded that national differences in 16 IFRS policy choices still exist in such countries where 
IFRS is compulsory. They suggested that one of the reasons for the differences was using 
                                                          
20 According to Frank (1979) Netherlands is in the U.S. group, but it is under the UK group according to Nair and 
Frank (1980) who used the sub-set of Frank’s (1979) data.  
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different versions of IFRS. Furthermore, they reported that companies in these countries could 
continue to use pre IFRS practices extensively after the official move to IFRS. 
In a recent study, Nobes (2013) draws attention to the fact that most countries alleging IFRS 
implementation do not enforce IFRS as issued by the IASB; instead, national versions such as 
Australian or EU regional versions exist. Let alone that IFRS is not required for all companies 
or statements where some countries mandate listed companies to use it only in consolidated 
financial reporting. He also pointed out to the role f language and enforcement in the survival 
of the differences in IFRS practices.  
In their review, Soderstrom and Sun (2007) identified three determining factors of accounting 
quality, one of which is quality of accounting stand rds. In the case of compulsory use of IFRS, 
two factors continue to be determinants of accounting quality: legal and political system, and 
the incentives of financial reporting. These incentives were capital structure, financial market 
development, ownership structure, and tax system. Political and legal systems have a direct 
impact on accounting quality through the enforcement of accounting standards and an indirect 
one by influencing the incentives of financial reporting, which in turn affects the quality.  
To avoid double counting of factors, what Soderstrom and Sun (2007) proposed can be 
summarised in  three variables: strength of capital market, investor protection and enforcement. 
That is, the discussion now is on accounting practices difference across nations using the same 
accounting standards, more specifically IFRS.  
The direct effect of legal and political systems on accounting quality is argued to exist because 
of the differences in legal system, i.e. common or c de, in addition to enforcement. As 
discussed earlier, the common law countries tend to have strong investor protection and 
enforcement mechanisms; therefore, the effect can be captured by those two factors.  
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With regard to financial reporting incentives, their effect can also be captured by the 
aforementioned two factors, investor protection and e forcement, along with the strength of 
capital market. Capital structure, which is proposed to be a determinant factor according to 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007), is of direct relationship w th financing system. In addition, 
developed equity market is associated with strong investor protection, whereas tax system 
effect can also be explained by financing system. With concentrated ownership, investor 
protection and enforcement can also control the opportunistic behaviour of managers.  
3.6.5. Country-specific factors shaping accounting practices under IFRS 
Given the previous discussion in section 3.6, strength of capital market, investor protection and 
enforcement of accounting standards are the most relevant determinants of accounting practices 
after the compulsory use of IFRS. The effect of other factors such as tax system, version of 
IFRS, and capital structure is secondary and can be explained by the three primary 
aforementioned factors. At the same time, strong enforcement and strong equity market 
enhance the protection of shareholders, which in tur  has an impact on accounting practices.  
La Porta et al. (1997; 1998) argue that investor prtection is stronger in outsider financing 
systems in comparison with that in insider financing systems. Leuz et al. (2003) suggests strong 
capital market  complement investor protection. In large capital markets, financial reporting is a 
key source of information, and thus there is a higher degree of investor protection, whereas in 
weak capital markets, insiders such as governments, banks and families have their private 
access to information.  
Ding et al. (2007) noted that strong investor protection curtails the differences between IFRS 
and national accounting standards; this gives weight to the role of other local factors in shaping 
accounting practices. 
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Hope (2003) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) attribute less compliance with accounting standards 
to the lax enforcement. Both Daske et al. (2008) and Li (2010) observed that the decrease in 
cost of capital after the introduction of IFRS was only in countries of strong legal enforcement. 
What is more, Christensen et al. (2013) document that liquidity changes after the switch to 
IFRS is significantly influenced by enforcement changes which differ across countries. 
Liquidity was more persuasive in five EU countries where substantive changes in reporting 
enforcement were made. On the other hand, countries w thout such changes in reporting 
enforcement did not witness liquidity improvements after IFRS adoption, even those having 
strong legal and regulatory systems21. Recently, Glaum et al. (2013) shows that better 
compliance with some accounting standards across 17 EU countries, namely IFRS3 and IAS36, 
are associated with strong enforcement and large equity markets.    
                                                          
21
 Related to this point, we argue in the next chapters hat there were some changes in enforcement and other
institutional factors after IFRS adoption; therefor, the traditional measures of country-specific factors could be out 
of date. To escape the drawbacks of the old measures, we use more recent indicators developed by World Forum 
and the World Bank (see chapter 5).  
Figure 3-4 Country-specific factors shaping accounting practices after IFRS adoption 
Country-Specific Factors  
Enforcement  Strength of capital 
market 
Investor Protection  
Accounting 
practices  
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Regarding not including culture, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, as discussed before, have 
limitations in being applied to accounting, not to mention the fact that its effect can be captured 
through exploring the effect of financing system. Evans (2004) argues that there is no one 
agreed definition of culture in accounting literature, and adopts a wider aspect of culture to 
mean socio-economic, political and institutional factors.  
The accounting practices using IFRS across different countries are contingent upon investor 
protection, enforcement of accounting standards and the depth of capital market (see Figure 3-
4). In other words, there are no ‘one size fits all’ accounting standards due to the variation in the 
implementation of the standards across countries which ave different local environments. 
Using the same accounting standards across the globe may lead to harmonized accounting 
principles; however, it may not lead to harmonized accounting practices that are the outcomes 
of the principles’ implementation.  
Exploring earnings quality under IFRS which is conditional on country-specific factors 
provides some insights into the role of local environments in shaping accounting practices after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. We expect earnings quality under IFRS to vary across countries 
because of the effect of country-specific factors governing the implementation of IFRS, given 
the fact that the IASB has no power to enforce IFRS. In essence, accounting practices in a 
specific country are the outcomes of its local circumstances for which local accounting 
standards were developed. The IASB’s accounting standards are the product of western 
environment; more specifically Anglo-American, and as such exporting them to other 
environments may be less successful in unifying the accounting practices. Metaphorically, 
importing petrol of high quality to run a diesel engine is useless. IFRS is similar to fuel in that it 
would be of high quality but is not suitable to be applied in all environments due to the 
differences in countries’ settings.  
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The contingency approach provides a list of variables that influence accounting practices under 
IFRS but it does not explain why these variables are important to produce high accounting 
quality. To overcome these shortcomings, we employ agency theory to provide a deeper 
explanation of the role of the country-specific factors in determining accounting quality under 
IFRS.  
3.7. Agency Theory  
Agency theory focuses on the relationship between the principal (owner) and the agent 
(manager), who is assumed to be driven by self-interes . Managers have the incentive to 
demonstrate that they are acting in the interests of the owners to receive higher payments, 
which can be lower if the principals have doubts about their behaviour.  The divergence in the 
interests between the principal and the agent can, however, be limited by setting up a suitable 
incentive system and by monitoring the abnormal activities of the agent, which means incurring 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The wider perspective of agency theory views the firm as a “nexus of contracts” and these 
contracts aim to reduce the conflicts of interests of different parties who will never act other 
than in self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The main two types of contracts are the 
reward contracts of managers to constrain their opportunistic behaviour and the contracts made 
between creditors and the firm (Walker, 2013).  
Agency theory indicates that the conditions of uncertainty the firm operates under lead to two 
main types of information asymmetry between managers and external investors. These are 
moral hazard and adverse selection. The moral hazard problems arise when external investors 
cannot observe the action choices made by managers, and the adverse selection problems 
happen when managers hide relevant information fromexternal investors (Walker, 2013).  
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Agency theory also suggests that there is a conflict between shareholders and bondholders over 
dividend policy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The risk for bondholders increases with the 
overpayments to shareholders which decrease the assets available to meet the fixed claims of 
bondholders. To mitigate such conflict, there is a need for external mechanisms that protect the 
interests of all parties contracting with the firm.  
Another conflict, which is between the controlling shareholders and both minority shareholders 
and creditors, further highlights the importance of external mechanisms. Large publicly traded 
firms, in most countries, are held by controlling shareholders who can designate and monitor 
managers (La Porta et al., 1999). In that case, the central agency problem is the expropriation of 
minority shareholders and creditors by controlling shareholders rather than the failure of 
managers to serve minority shareholders and debtholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
In addition to managerial incentive plans used to align the interests of managers and investors, 
Bushman and Smith (2001) propose some external corporate control mechanisms that protect 
investors against expropriation by managers. These include outside shareholder or debtholder 
monitoring and securities laws. In fact, these external mechanisms are important to make sure 
that managers do not manage earnings in an attempt to increase their bonus. Executive 
compensation plans may motivate managers to engage in activities that maximise their own 
interests, as argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
With the adoption of IFRS across countries, stronger protection of investors (shareholders and 
debtholders) is necessary to yield better quality financial reporting. Accounting quality under 
IFRS in countries with weak investor protection would be poor because managers can use their 
financial reporting discretion to conceal their activities, and controlling shareholders may 
expropriate the minority shareholders and debtholders. This is of particular importance given 
the fact that IFRS are principle-based accounting standards.  
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Similarly, with poor enforcement of accounting stand rds, managers may not comply with 
IFRS; instead, they may claim to adopt IFRS while implementing accounting practices that 
increase their compensation. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) note 
that the purpose of the enforcement of standards is “to protect investors and promote market 
confidence by contributing to the transparency of financial information relevant to the 
investors’ decision making process” (CESR, 2003, p.4). As mentioned before, the IASB has no 
power to enforce IFRS but it is the responsibility of national authorities; therefore, accounting 
quality may differ across countries adopting IFRS. Accounting quality under IFRS may be 
better with more efficient enforcement as it limits the managers’ ability to depart from the 
spirits of the standards given the fact that they act in their self-interests.  
General-purpose financial reports aim to provide usful information to existing and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors (IASB, 2010). They contribute to reducing the 
information asymmetry between managers and external investors and thus decreasing the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems. The strength of capital markets has an influence on the 
demand for financial reporting. In strong capital markets, shareholders are the source of 
finance, therefore, the aim of financial reporting s to provide information about the economic 
reality of the entity. In contrast, in weak capital markets, the providers of finance, such as 
families, banks and governments, have access to inside information and thus the demand for 
financial reporting is not as in strong capital markets. This has an impact on the quality of 
financial reporting in that the demand for financial reporting limits the opportunistic behaviour 
of managers. Accounting quality under IFRS would be higher in large capital markets due to 
the demand for financial reporting by shareholders to decrease the information asymmetry and 
consequently alleviate moral hazard and adverse selection problems.  
It is worth mentioning that creditors would prefer specific attributes of accounting which are 
different from those preferred by shareholders. As mentioned before, there is a conflict between 
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shareholders and creditors who may prefer more conservative earnings than shareholders do. 
Hence, the effect of capital market on conservatism may not be significant but the size of debt 
market is. Indeed, Ball et al. (2008) conclude that t e debt markets are the ultimate source of 
the demand for conditional conservatism. In section 4.4, we provided detailed explanation of 
the difference in accounting quality from the contrac ing perspective and the equity valuation 
perspective.  
3.8. Conclusion  
This chapter has described the causes of international differences in accounting practices before 
the adoption of IFRS and whether they persist after IFRS adoption. It went back to the 
emergence of the international accounting in 1960s showing the early studies in this area. Then 
it moved to the IFRS era in an attempt to determine the primary determinants of accounting 
practices based on the key studies on international accounting systems. Three main factors still 
influence accounting practices after the mandatory use of IFRS. These are strength of capital 
market, investor protection, and enforcement. Finally, it discussed agency theory which 
provides an explanation of how country-specific factors influence accounting quality under 
IFRS.  
The next chapter presents prior empirical research on earnings quality metrics, earnings 
management, conservatism and value relevance. By doing so, the gap in the literature of 
earnings quality is identified, and then hypotheses ar  formulated based on what is discussed in 
the present chapter and the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 Literature Review  
 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter follows on from the previous chapter that outlined the debate and discussion 
surrounding international accounting. In this thesis, we are specifically looking at the 
effectiveness of international accounting harmonisation, the merits of which have been extolled 
by Ball (2006) among others, given the context of the variability of settings in different 
countries, as measured by earnings quality. In the preceding chapter, it has been argued that 
investor protection, enforcement of accounting standards and strength of capital market 
determine accounting practices under IFRS. Accounting practices can be in the form of 
measurement practices, financial information discloure, or accounting standards 
implementation. In this thesis, we argue that, under IFRS, earnings quality, which is shaped by 
measurement practices, is contingent upon country-specific factors. We improve on prior work 
by focusing on the effect of country-specific factors accounting quality under IFRS across 23 
countries between 2007 and 2010. To that end, we inv stigate how country-specific factors 
shape not only accruals earnings management but also real earnings management. This is 
important because mangers may switch to take real actions in a bid to overstate earnings. We 
also explore how country-specific factors determine earnings quality from contracting 
perspective and equity valuation perspective at the same time, employing conservatism and 
value relevance to capture earnings quality.  
The purpose of this chapter is to review recent research into accounting quality 
captured by earnings management, conservatism and value relevance under IFRS. It 
begins with a brief overview of the definition of accounting quality in section 2. This 
is followed by section 3, earnings management. Section 4 moves on to describe 
conservatism and value relevance. Section 5 is devoted to discuss conservatism in 
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detail. Section 6 presents prior literature on value relevance. Section 7 provides 
definitions of country-specific factors. Section 8 presents the research hypotheses. 
Section 9 concludes the chapter.  
4.2. Accounting quality 
Quality of accounting information is of key importance to different users of financial reporting 
as it is presumed to be the source of information fr decision-making purposes such as 
investment and contracting decisions. Accounting information of high quality is deemed to 
improve transparency and reduce information asymmetry (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). For 
accounting standards setters, quality of financial reporting may indirectly mirror quality of 
accounting standards (Schipper and Vincent, 2003).  
The ‘Accounting quality’ term is a broad concept that is difficult to define, let alone to measure. 
Prior studies developed several metrics to measure accounting quality using earnings and 
earnings components. In a survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005), earnings have been 
ranked as the most important measure, even more important than the cash flows. Earnings are 
the cornerstone of the compensation contracts and debt agreements. In the case of overstated 
earnings, income based compensation schemes induce overstated compensation to managers 
causing wealth transfers. Similarly, overstated earnings might fool the lenders due to not 
depicting solvency accurately (Schipper and Vincent, 2003).  
As the metrics developed to capture accounting quality were based on earnings, the term 
‘earnings quality’ has been used instead. The literature does not provide a clear-cut definition of 
earnings quality. For example, Sloan (1996) holds the view that earnings are of high quality 
when their operating cash flow component constitutes th  principal part, and are of low quality 
if their accruals component constitutes the main part.   
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Penman and Zhang (2002) consider earnings to be of high quality if they reflect future earnings, 
in which case the sustainable earnings refer to less opportunity for earnings management. On 
the other hand, non-sustainable earnings are of poor quality with greater opportunity to manage 
earnings as in the case of hidden reserves. However, managers could engage in earnings 
management activities to avoid volatile earnings.  
Dechow and Dichev (2002) document earnings quality s the strength of current accruals to 
explain past, current, and future cash flows. They proposed a model to measure earnings quality 
by regressing current accruals on past, current and future cash flows where the standard 
deviation from their model is the metric of earnings quality. To examine the relationship 
between auditor tenure and earnings quality, Myers et al. (2003) employed accruals quality 
metrics as a measure of earnings quality.  
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) interpreted reporting quality as the usefulness of financial 
statements to all different parties contracting with the firm such as investors, managers, and 
creditors. They investigated conservatism as a dimension of earnings quality.   
Barth et al. (2008) did not provide a definition of accounting quality; rather, they employed 
three metrics including earnings management, timely loss recognition and value relevance to 
capture accounting quality, or, earnings quality. Similarly, Houqe et al. (2012) operationalised 
the earnings management metric as a proxy of earnings quality. In a recent study, Ahmed et al. 
(2013) recognised there was no agreed definition of earnings quality, and used three metrics 
including earnings aggressiveness, earnings smoothing and earnings management towards 
targets as proxies for earnings quality.  
In their review of the literature on earnings quality and its determinants, Dechow et al. (2010, 
p.344) assume that higher quality earnings “provide more information about the features of a 
firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by specific decision-
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maker”. Based on this definition, earnings quality depends on decision-making context. 
Earnings ‘quality’ means different things to different stakeholders; perhaps, different country-
specific factors drive different ‘quality’ earnings, particularly when in combination with IFRS 
adoption.  
In general, prior research concerned with accounting quality has characterised several 
dimensions that reflect quality of reported earnings and these are divided into two main types: 
Accounting based attributes and Market based attribu es. Accounting information is used to 
measure accounting based attributes while the market based attributes are measured by using 
both accounting and market data. Francis et al. (2004) identified seven dimensions of earnings 
quality: four accounting based dimensions including accrual quality, smoothness, persistence, 
and predictability, and three market based measures including value relevance, conservatism22 
and timeliness.  
This thesis employs three dimensions to measure earnings quality, namely earnings 
management, conservatism and value relevance. Earnings management may provide inferences 
for both contracting and investment decisions while conservatism may be useful for contracting 
decisions and value relevance for investment decisions. In the section that follows, earnings 
management is discussed.  
4.3. Earnings management  
4.3.1. Definition and the motives for earnings management 
It is necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant by earnings management. An early 
definition of earnings management provided by Schipper (1989) referred to the deliberate 
intervention in financial reporting in purpose of achieving private gains.  
                                                          
22 Conservatism can be measured by both market-based models and accounting-based models.  
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A further definition is given by Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368), who state that earnings 
management occurs when: 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions 
to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or t influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
The above definitions make the use of judgment in financial reporting conditional on the 
managerial intent to determine whether there is earnings management or not, the characteristic 
which is difficult to ascertain.  
Taking a different perspective, Walker (2013) defins earnings management23 as the use of 
managerial discretion over (within GAAP) accounting choices, earnings reporting choices, and 
real economic decisions to influence how underlying economic events are reflected in one or 
more measures of earnings. The last definition refers to both accounting and economic activities 
taken to manage earnings with no indication of the managerial intent, and excludes accounting 
fraudulent reporting that violates GAAP.  
A question that needs to be asked, however, is, should we consider earnings management as 
fraud? In the literature ‘fraudulent financial reporting’ and ‘earnings management’ are defined 
as subgroups of ‘earnings manipulation’. Both fraud and earnings management involve 
discretionary accruals management; hence, there is a fine line between them (Rosner, 2003)24.  
Dechow and Skinner (2000) made a distinction between acceptable discretion within GAAP, 
which would lead to conservative accounting, neutral earnings or aggressive accounting, and 
unacceptable discretion that violates GAAP, in which case it leads to fraud accounting (see 
Figure 4-1). On the other hand, earnings can be managed via real cash flow choices to manage 
                                                          
23 According to Walker (2013), earnings smoothing is one of many forms of earnings management. 
24 Rosner, (2003) distinguishes between earnings management, income-increasing earnings manipulation and 
fraud. Earnings management is the immaterial earnings manipulation/within the boundaries of GAAP while 
Income-increasing, manipulation is the material earnings overstatements. Fraud is the material misstatements with 
‘intent to deceive’.  
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earnings downwards by delaying sales, accelerating some expenses, or upwards by accelerating 
sales and postponing some expenses, which cannot be c nsidered as fraud accounting.  
  
Managers may manage earnings upwards (increasing earnings) or downwards (decreasing 
earnings), which is subject to some incentives. Themain two motives to manage earnings 
upwards are contracting motives and capital market motives. 
As regard to the first motive, the aim is to achieve contractual gains such as management 
compensation contracts or other contracts based on reported earnings. The agency relationships 
between the managers and stakeholders can result in some earnings management practices. 
Several empirical studies provide evidence consistent with the intuition that managers manage 
earnings to increase their earnings based bonus (e.g. Guidry et al., 1999; Holthausen et al., 
1995). Others concluded a relationship between earnings management and the avoidance of 
debt covenants violations (e.g. Dichev and Skinner, 2002). 
Source: Dechow and Skinner (2000) p.239 
Figure 4-1 The distinction between fraud and earnings management 
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The second motive is influencing information released to outsiders such as investors and 
information intermediaries as this information is ued to form perceptions of firm risk or 
expectations of future cash flows (Walker, 2013). For instance, increasing earnings has been 
found to be consistent with security issues, initial public offerings (Teoh et al., 1998) and 
seasoned equity offerings (Rangan, 1998) in addition to stock financed acquisitions (Erickson 
and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004). Mangers are also likely to manage earnings upwards in an 
attempt to avoid losses or earnings declines or to meet market expectations (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Ayers et al., 2006).   
On the other hand, political cost hypothesis of positive accounting theory, according to Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986), indicates that firms, which are l rge and publically visible, tend to use 
income-decreasing strategies to escape scrutiny and regulations. For instance, banks and 
utilities may manage earnings downwards to avoid harsh taxes and regulations (Walker, 
2013)25.  
Turning to prior studies on earnings management, two main streams of literature are relevant to 
this study. The first includes studies that investigate earnings management in a specific country 
after IFRS adoption. The second includes comparative studies on earnings management.   
4.3.2. Single country studies 
Single country studies on earnings management after IFRS adoption would show indirectly the 
importance of local environments to secure the compliance with the standards, rather than 
continuing national accounting practices, by exploring whether the move to IFRS had resulted 
in better quality. If the adoption of IFRS did not lead to better accounting quality, the focus 
should be on the effect of local factors governing the implementation and enforcement of IFRS. 
                                                          
25 I dropped banks and utilities from the sample, see section 5.3. 
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Van tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) examined whether there were differences in earnings 
management between German companies that had adopted IFRS voluntarily and those that had 
used German GAAP over the period from 1999 to 2001. They found no difference in earnings 
management between the two groups. They attributed the results to the low investor protection 
in Germany, a code law country.  
Van der Meulen et al. (2007) tested the differences in earnings quality of two groups of German 
New Market firms from 2000 to 2002; the first applied IFRS, the second adopted US GAAP. 
Four metrics were investigated: two accounting-based earnings attributes, accrual quality and 
predictability, and two market-based earnings attribu es, timeliness and value relevance. 
Accrual quality, timeliness, and value relevance were found similar under IFRS and US GAAP 
whereas earnings under US GAAP revealed better predictability.  
Zéghal et al. (2011) examined the effect of mandatory IAS/IFRS adoption on earnings 
management in France from 2003 through 2006. The eff ct of six factors on earnings 
management was also investigated. These factors were  the   separation  of   roles of Chairman 
and CEO of   the   board,  the existence  of   block  shareholders, the   existence  of   an  
independent  audit  committee , the efficiency and independence of the board of   directors, the   
listing   on  foreign financial  markets and the   quality  of   the   external   audit. The findings 
revealed that IAS/IFRS is correlated with a decrease in earnings management. The level of 
earnings management has declined after mandatory IAS/IFRS adoption for firms which 
depended on foreign financial markets and those of go d corporate governance. The existence 
of block shareholders, the existence of an independent audit committee, the efficiency and the 
independence of the board of directors, the listing o  foreign financial markets, and the quality 
of the external audit were all found to be important factors for IAS/IFRS enforcement in 
France.  
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However, Paananen (2008), who investigated whether accounting quality improved after 
mandatory IFRS adoption using Swedish publicly listed firms from 2003 to 2006, found no 
such improvement in earnings quality. Following Barth et al. (2008), managing earnings toward 
targets, earnings smoothing, value relevance and timely loss recognition were used as proxies 
for measuring earnings quality. Interestingly, Paananen (2008) provided evidence that earnings 
quality declined after implementing IFRS in Sweden, particularly for the committed adopters.  
Similarly, Paananen and Lin (2009) studied the development of accounting quality under IAS 
and IFRS over time among German companies from 2000 to 2006. Following prior research, 
they operationalized accounting quality with value relevance, earnings smoothing and timely 
loss recognition metrics. The findings suggested a decline in accounting quality after mandatory 
IFRS adoption in Germany.  
Christensen et al. (2015) documented less earnings management, higher value relevance, and 
higher timely loss recognition in the financial reporting of German companies that adopted 
IFRS voluntarily before 2005. However, no such improvements were found in the financial 
reporting of German companies that were obliged to comply with IFRS when the latter became 
mandatory in 2005. Drawing on their findings, they concluded that the adoption of IFRS might 
not lead to better earnings quality. They also concluded that managerial incentives govern the 
outcomes of IFRS adoption. An interesting finding was that the companies, which did not adopt 
IFRS until it became compulsory, had insider characteristics, which would explain the 
differences in reporting incentives. In fact, their conclusions further indicate the importance of 
existence of strong institutional settings to obtain high quality earnings across the countries. Not 
to forget that the capital market in Germany falls into the insider type as opposed to the 
outsider. In other words, earnings quality across counties enforcing IFRS is not consistent due 
to the effect of country specific factors. This result is similar to that found by Daske et al. 
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(2008) in terms of the effects of capital market that were greater in the firms that adopted IFRS 
voluntarily rather than mandatorily.   
The results of the effect of voluntary IFRS adoption n earnings quality might not apply to 
mandatory IFRS adoption because in the first case the firms have incentives to adopt the 
standards to enhance the quality of their financial reporting. On the contrary, when firms are 
obliged to adopt IFRS, it is possible that they do not comply with these standards especially in 
the countries with low investor protection, weak enforcement, and weak stock markets. 
Soderstom and Sun (2007, p.695) stated that “one canot compare their conclusions of studies 
in settings where adoption is mandatory to studies where adoption is voluntary or optional”. 
Given that IFRS adoption across countries aims to achieve uniformity in accounting practices, 
comparative studies on the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings quality would be more useful 
than single country studies. In multi-country studies, the effect of local environments on 
accounting practices can be examined to provide some insights whether the adoption of IFRS is 
of the same outcomes across countries.  
4.3.3. Multi country studies 
Two streams of comparative studies are relevant to our study. The first is the studies that 
examined the relationship between earnings quality nd institutional factors. The second is the 
cross-countries studies on earnings quality and IFRS adoption.  
The first comparative study on earnings quality andinstitutional factors represented by earnings 
management was by Leuz et al. (2003), who concluded that earnings management was lower in 
countries with strong investor protection, low ownership concentration, and large capital 
market. Before Leuz et al. (2003), Ball et al. (2000) and Ball et al. (2003) pointed out to the 
importance of institutions in determining reported arnings. Bushman et al. (2004) noted that 
Chapter 4. Literature Review   
 
       
 
78 
corporate transparency is determined by legal and political factors. While political/judicial 
system shapes governance transparency, political economy determines financial transparency. 
Francis and Wang (2008) found that earnings quality is higher when investor protection is 
stronger providing that firms have a well-known inter ational Big4 auditor. Burgstahler et al. 
(2006) reported that private firms were more likely to manage earnings than public firms, 
whereas both types of firms engaged in less earnings management with strong legal systems.  
Employing three earnings quality metrics, namely earnings management, timely loss 
recognition and value relevance, Barth et al. (2008) examined the effect of IFRS adoption on 
the quality of financial reporting by comparing earnings quality metrics for firms using non-
U.S. domestic standards and firms adopting IFRS across 21 countries. They used data from 327 
firms that adopted IFRS between 1994 and 2003, when t  adoption of IFRS was voluntary in 
the sample countries. This study provided evidence that firms applying IFRS revealed less 
earnings management, more value relevance of accounting amounts, and more timely loss 
recognition than did matched sample firms adopting non-U.S. domestic accounting standards. 
Despite the fact that they used research design features to alleviate the effect of both the change 
in the firm’s incentives and economic environment, they pointed out that those two factors 
might be the reasons for earnings quality improvement, not the accounting standards. They did 
not, unlike the current study, test the effect of these factors on accounting quality.  
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) investigated the effect of ompulsory IFRS adoption on earnings 
management by using 1,146 firm-year observations from France, the United Kingdom and 
Australia from 2005 to 2006. They provided evidence that earnings management in these 
countries did not decrease after compulsory IFRS adoption, and even increased in France. That 
is, national institutional factors and management incentives play an important role in shaping 
financial reporting characteristics, not only accounting standards. They suggested that IASB, 
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the EC, and SEC should focus on harmonizing institutional factors and incentives along with 
accounting standards.  
Capkun et al. (2012) re-examined whether mandatory IFRS application facilitated or deterred 
earnings smoothing across 29 countries from 1994 through 2009. They argued that international 
accounting standards changed significantly from the early voluntary adoption era to the 
compulsory adoption year in Europe in 2005. That is, revised IAS and new IFRS allow more 
flexibility in choosing alternative accounting methods in comparison with the earlier IAS. They 
posited that this flexibility induced greater earnings smoothing under current IFRS. Consistent 
with their hypothesis, they found that earnings smoothing increased in post 2005 compared to 
pre 2005 for early adopters, late voluntary adopters and mandatory adopters in the countries 
where IFRS were not permitted before. 
Callao and Jarne (2010) studied whether IFRS adoption across 11 European countries increased 
or decreased earnings management. They used data for he periods 2003 and 2004 to study 
discretionary accruals before IFRS adoption, and 2005 and 2006 for the post IFRS adoption. 
They also examined the effect of firms’ characterisics and country institutional factors on 
discretionary accruals before and after IFRS application. The results indicated an increase in 
earnings management after implementing IFRS across Europe. For the effect of factors in 
explaining earnings management, firm size and leverage were found to be positively associated 
with earnings management before and after the IFRS adoption era while investor protection and 
legal system were found to be negatively associated with earnings management in both eras. 
Based on the latter findings, it was concluded that t e differences in the level of earnings 
management before and after IFRS adoption can be due to existence of some room for 
manipulation in IFRS compared to domestic accounting standards. 
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Chen et al. (2010) studied earnings quality before and after mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 
across 15 EU countries using five quality metrics: earnings smoothing, managing earnings 
toward targets, magnitude of cross-sectional absolute discretionary accruals, accruals quality 
and timely loss recognition. The pre-adoption period was 2000-2004, and 2005-2007 was the 
adoption period. Their study focused on the adoption of IFRS taking the first years of adoption 
up to 2007 and using a sample of 15 EU countries. Further, they compared the medians and 
means of some institutional factors before and after th  adoption to infer whether they had an 
effect on the quality26. The results showed improvements in the majority of quality indicators 
after applying IFRS in the EU. That is, there were a lower magnitude of absolute discretionary 
accruals, less managing earnings towards the target, and higher accruals quality. However, the 
findings also revealed that firms recognized large losses in less timely manner and engaged in 
more earnings smoothing in the post IFRS periods. It was also concluded that the improvements 
in earnings quality was attributable to IFRS adopting rather than to the changes in business 
environment factors, institutional features of capit l markets, and other managerial incentives. 
They inferred that the improvement due to the IFRS adoption was because the mean (median) 
values for most institutional factors they used were the same before and after the adoption. 
Houqe et al. (2012) investigated the effect of compulsory IFRS application and investor 
protection on quality of financial reporting across forty-six countries. They used signed 
discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings management for the period from 1998 to 2007. 
The results indicated an improvement in earnings quality in the post IFRS adoption era in the 
countries of stronger investor protection. These findings draw regulators’ attention to the 
importance of designing mechanisms that control managers’ earnings management practices 
along with issuing high quality accounting standards. 
                                                          
26 These factors included the Change in: Confidence in the Quality of Business Regulation in a Country, 
Confidence in the Quality of Contract Enforcement, Control of Fraud in Financial Reporting, the Degree of 
Freedom of Information, Political Stability, Managers’ Confidence in Government Effectiveness, Overall Financial 
Reporting Environment, and Political Incentives for Earnings Management.  
Chapter 4. Literature Review   
 
       
 
81 
More recently, Ahmed et al. (2013) provided evidence of the introductory effects of 
compulsory IFRS adoption on accounting quality across 20 countries that adopted IFRS 
mandatorily in 2005 compared with a benchmark group f companies from 15 countries that 
did not apply IFRS. They used data from 2002 to 2004 for pre IFRS adoption and data from 
2006 to 2007 for post IFRS adoption and dropped 2005. Earnings smoothing, earnings 
benchmarks, accruals aggressiveness and timely loss recognition were used as metrics to 
measure earnings quality. They reported an increase in income smoothing for the firms that 
adopted IFRS mandatorily compared with the benchmark firms. They also documented no 
change in managing earnings to meet benchmarks for the companies that adopted IFRS relative 
to benchmark companies after compulsory IFRS adoption. It was also found that there was a 
significant increase in aggressive reporting of accruals for IFRS companies compared with 
benchmark companies. With regard to timely loss recognition, they found a significant decline 
in the timely loss recognition relative to gain recognition for companies adopting IFRS 
compared with benchmark companies. Their overall findings suggest that earnings quality did 
not improve after mandatory IFRS adoption even with the presence of strong enforcement. 
They also suggest that earnings quality did not improve after mandatory IFRS adoption, in 
contrast to prior studies.  
Investigating the effect of the financial crisis onearnings management, Filip and Raffournier 
(2014) concluded that there was a decrease in earnings management during the financial crisis 
across 16 European countries covering the period from 2006 to 2009. They used two metrics of 
Leuz et al.’s (2003) to measure earnings smoothing and three accruals earnings management 
metrics. They also investigated some institutional factors. They found that investor protection, 
enforcement, corporate governance, and market forces had an impact on earnings smoothing 
but not on accruals earnings management.  
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4.3.4. Reasons of the variations in the findings of prior studies   
The variations in the findings of multi-country studies can be attributed to several reasons. One 
obvious reason is using different proxies to measure earnings management, and employing 
different samples across different periods.  
The sample used is important when exploring the effct of IFRS adoption on earnings quality 
since countries differ in the way they adopted the standards. When local standards before the 
move towards IFRS were identical to IFRS, the adoption of IFRS may not have had an effect on 
earnings management. For example, local accounting standards in South Africa became the 
same as IFRS starting from 2003 following the harmonisation process that started in 1995. In 
2005, South Africa adopted IFRS as issued by the IASB. For this reason, it is important to 
identify whether national accounting standards used b fore the introduction of IFRS were the 
same as IFRS but were labelled as national accounting s andards, in which case IFRS adoption 
may not have had a significant influence on earnings quality. Another point is that in some 
countries IFRS was permitted only for some companies; therefore, such firms may not have 
experienced major differences when it became compulsory.  
In relation to the point above, some countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore adopt IFRS 
almost word for word with a few modifications but under the name of national standards. 
Studies employing data from databases would consider companies using such standards to be 
non-adopters while in fact they use accounting standards that are almost the same as IFRS. In 
chapter 2, we provided an explanation of issues related to the selection of countries in the 
present study (more details are also provided in Chapter 5).  
Most prior studies that investigated the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management cover 
only the early years of adoption up to 2007. Drawing conclusions on the effect of IFRS 
adoption based on data covering the first years of ad ption is probably not accurate. To tackle 
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this issue, we chose countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 or before, and dropped the first years 
of adoption, covering the period from 2007 to 2010 (see chapter 5). While the focus of most 
prior studies was on whether the adoption of IFRS decreased earnings management, the present 
thesis focuses on earnings management under IFRS, given the variation in countries’ settings.  
Walker (2013) draws our attention to the difficulty of investigating the effect of IFRS adoption 
on earnings management, given the possible differenc s in the economic circumstances before 
and after the adoption. For example, the global financial crisis which began in late 2007, had a 
significant effect on listed companies in the EU; therefore, the comparison of financial 
statements between post 2007 and pre IFRS adoption is probably not easy. As such, the 
difference in the economic circumstances between before and after the adoption is a possible 
reason for the variation in the findings of prior studies. Walker (2013) further refers to the 
difficulty in the direct comparison of financial statements in 2005 with those in later years in 
terms of the effects of measurement and recognition choices made at the first-time IFRS 
adoption. As in Garcia-Osma and Pop (2011), firms that ‘clean up’ their balance sheets before 
IFRS implementation have greater opportunities to manipulate earnings in the later years27.  
Prior empirical studies lack a theory that provides a useful account of institutional factors 
shaping earnings quality including earnings management. In addition, most previous studies 
(e.g. Leuz et al, 2003; Callao and Jarne, 2010) used La Porta et al. (1998)’s measures; however, 
a major problem with these kind of measures is their val dity for recent data; they are probably 
out of date. Christensen et al. (2013) maintain that m ny EU member states introduced changes 
in enforcement along with the introduction of IFRS in 2005. For this reason, it is possible that 
traditional measures widely used in the literature do not mirror the real settings.  
                                                          
27 The clean-up is done by eliminating accumulated accruals bloat, hence allowing greater room for accounting 
discretion in the subsequent years.  
Chapter 4. Literature Review   
 
       
 
84 
Our study provides a detailed explanation of the factors that would determine accounting 
practices before and after IFRS adoption. We provide a general model of the factors 
determining accounting practices (See chapter 3). In addition, measures of country-specific 
factors used in this thesis are adopted from the World Forum and the World Bank (see chapter 
5). We also explore earnings management from 2007 to 2010 (during the financial crisis) to 
escape the drawbacks associated with first-time IFRS adoption and any changes in the 
economic circumstances before and after the adoption, focusing on the role of country-specific 
factors in determining earnings management under IFRS.  
4.3.5. Real earnings management  
Although extensive research has been carried out on accruals based earnings management, to 
the best of my knowledge, no single study has examined how real earnings management varies 
across countries that adopted IFRS mandatorily. DeFond (2010) indicated a scarcity in real 
earnings management research in comparison with accruals earnings management ones. The 
survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005) shows that managers engage in real economic 
actions to achieve earnings targets, for instance, delaying advertising expenditure and 
maintenance rather than taking accounting actions. For this reason, real earnings management 
has cash flow consequences and is, therefore, more c stly than accruals-based earnings 
management. Graham et al. (2005, p. 32) find that  
80% of survey participants report that they would decrease discretionary 
spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings 
target. More than half (55.3%) state that they would delay starting a new 
project to meet an earnings target, even if such a del y entailed a small 
sacrifice in value. 
Roychowdhury (2006, p.337) defines real activities manipulation as “departures from normal 
operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into 
believing certain financial reporting goals have ben met in the normal course of operations”.  
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Real earnings management has not been given the sam attention as accruals manipulations in 
that a handful of studies in the literature investigated the real actions to manage earnings 
(Gunny, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Doukakis (2014) 
was the first to examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on both accruals and real 
earnings management across countries. More specifically, he examined the effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on real and accrual based earnings management across 22 European countries 
covering the years from 2000 to 2010. He found no significant effect of mandatory adoption on 
real or accrual based earnings management whereas fi m level incentives shaped accounting 
quality. It should be noted, however, that Doukakis (2014) investigated the effect of standards, 
not the effect of the differences in countries settings, on real and accrual earnings management 
activities. 
The literature provides some evidence of less accruls earnings management in countries with 
strong institutions but does not show whether real earnings management substitute the accruals 
earnings management in such cases. One can expect that in countries with strong institutions, 
real earnings management is more popular than accruls earnings management and vice versa. 
Schipper (2003) argues that firms switch to real earnings management activities with tighter 
standards. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) reported that tighter accounting standards are 
positively associated with better earnings quality, however, managers switch to costly real 
earnings management. Therefore, having the accounting s andards constant, tighter institutions 
may cause real earnings management to be more popular than accruals management across the 
adopting countries. 
4.3.6. The effect of firm characteristics on earnings management  
Prior research hypothesises that the differences in fundamental firm characteristics and capital 
market incentives affect earnings management and hece there is a need to control for them 
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before inferring the presence of opportunistic earnings. However, the effect of control variables 
on accruals earnings management may differ from its effect on real earnings management.  
Firm size could affect the firm’s tendency to manage earnings. Albrecht and Richardson (1990) 
found that small firms are more motivated to smooth earnings than large firms. Large and 
publicly visible firms are more scrutinised by investors and regulators (Siregar and Utama, 
2008), therefore, managers in large firms may not manage earnings via accruals; instead, they 
may prefer real activities to escape detection. Forthis reason, we predict a negative 
relationship between the size of a firm and accruals e rnings management, but a positive one 
with real earnings management.  
There is substantial evidence that firms with binding debt covenants, an indication of higher 
leverage, are more likely to boost earnings, to mitigate covenants violation, than firms without 
such closeness to debt covenants (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). To that end, firms may use 
accounting methods (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; Francis and Wang, 2008) 
or real activities such as asset sales (Bartov, 1993). For this reason, we predict a positive 
relationship between leverage and accruals earnings management but we make no such 
prediction between our real earnings management metrics and leverage.   
Overall, growth is a potential reason to window-dress the financial statements by increasing the 
earnings to attract more investors. Prior research suggests that the incentive to boost earnings 
increases with firms’ growth opportunities (e.g. Barth et al. 1999 and Skinner and Sloan, 
2002). However, Richardson et al. (2005) show that growth is negatively associated with 
earnings management. Therefore, we made no directional prediction about the effect of growth 
on accruals earnings management.  
The results of studies regarding the relationship between real earnings management and growth 
are mixed. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2015) provide evidence that real 
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earnings management activities have a negative effect on future performance. Similarly, Zhang 
(2008a) and Leggett et al. (2009) report a negative association between real earnings 
management activities and stock return performance. Only the work of Gunny (2010) finds a 
positive effect of real earnings management on subsequent operating performance. Therefore,  
a negative association between real earnings management actions and growth is predicted.  
Capital market incentives may influence earnings management activities (Barton and Simko, 
2002; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). More earnings management activity is 
associated with a greater number of shares outstanding to beat a given per share earnings target 
(Zang, 2012). However, this high threshold would discourage earnings management when the 
target is more difficult to hit (Barton and Simko, 2002). Furthermore, Cohen and Zarowin, 
(2010) argue that it is not clear whether number of shares drives accruals or real earnings. 
Hence, we made no directional prediction about the eff ct of number of shares on earnings 
management.  
Profitability may influence earnings management.  Doyle et al. (2007) show that the incentives 
for earnings management are greater with weak performance. However, DeAngelo et al. (1994) 
find that maintained weak performance provides less opportunity for accounting earnings 
management. Therefore, we made no prediction regarding the relationship between 
profitability and accruals earnings management. Real earnings management can have a 
negative effect on future operating performance; for example, increasing current sales through 
giving discounts may decrease the future profits when companies return to the old prices 
(Gunny, 2005). For this reason, it is more likely that real earnings management is negatively 
associated with profitability.  
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4.3.7. Discussion  
There is a large volume of published studies on earings management. The early studies tried to 
test the motives for earnings management and their consequences. Exploring earnings quality in 
general, including earnings management, is a recent tr d in international accounting studies. 
An early work by Ball et al. (2000) provided evidenc  that properties of accounting earnings 
vary across different counties because of the institutional differences in the demand for 
accounting income. This was followed by work of Ball et al. (2003), where they found that 
strong institutions were of great importance in shaping earnings quality, not only using a single 
body of high quality accounting standards.  
Since then, several studies have begun to explore the effect of institutions on earnings 
management (e.g. Leuz et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Gassen et al., 2006; Francis and 
Wang, 2008). All these studies concluded that there was a significant positive relationship 
between local environments and accounting quality; in other words, less earnings management.  
With the movement towards the adoption of IFRS, firstly voluntarily and then mandatorily, 
studies exploring the effect of the adoption on earnings management began to emerge. In 
Germany, no difference was found in earnings management under IFRS compared with other 
standards (e.g. Van tendeloo and Vanstraele, 2005; Van der Meulen et al., 2007). Such results 
could be because of the role the local factors play in the implementation of accounting 
standards. On an international basis, Barth et al. (2008) found that firms using IFRS across 21 
countries revealed better earnings quality than did matched sample firms adopting non-U.S. 
domestic accounting standards. It is important to mention that the former two studies were 
conducted when IFRS adoption was voluntary.  
The conclusions of voluntary IFRS adoption may not apply to mandatory adoption, in which 
case firms may not have the incentives to comply with the standards. Indeed, Christensen et al. 
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(2015) documented higher earnings quality in the financial reporting of German companies that 
adopted IFRS voluntarily, before 2005. However, no such improvements were found in the 
financial reporting of German companies that were obliged to comply with IFRS when it 
became mandatory in 2005.  
Then, with the introduction of IFRS in the EU in 2005, the focus turned to investigate the effect 
of mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings quality in a given country (e.g. Zéghal et al., 2011; 
Paananen, 2008; Paananen and Lin, 2009) and across counties (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; 
Capkun et al., 2012). Chen et al. (2010) provided evi ence that earnings management was less 
after the mandatory IFRS adoption in Europe and this was due to the adoption of the standards. 
A work by Ahmed et al. (2013), however, suggests that earnings quality did not increase after
mandatory IFRS adoption even in countries with strong legal enforcement.   
This raises a question about the reasons for the differences in the outcomes of mandatory IFRS 
adoption across different countries. To answer this question, it would be useful to examine the 
effect of other local factors on quality.  
Callao and Jarne (2010) found that strong investor pr tection and legal system are consistent 
with less earnings management before and after IFRS adoption in the EU in 2005. In a more 
global study, Houqe et al. (2012) found that IFRS adoption led to less earnings management in 
counties with strong investor protection, whereas Ahmed et al. (2013) found no improvement in 
earnings quality after IFRS adoption even in countries with strong legal enforcement. In another 
study, Filip and Raffournier (2014) came to a conclusion that earnings management was less 
after the financial crisis across the EU. They found that investor protection, enforcement, 
corporate governance, and market forces had an impact on earnings smoothing but not on 
accruals earnings management. 
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Almost all comparative papers published on earnings management employed accruals based 
models, smoothing models or both. The only paper, by Doukakis (2014), examined the effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on accruals and real earnings management across 22 European 
countries, concluding that there was no significant effect on either type of management.  
The first empirical chapter in this thesis fills this gap by exploring the effect of investor 
protection, enforcement of accounting standards and the strength of capital market on accruals 
and real earnings management across 23 countries mandating IFRS28. While previous studies 
focus on the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management, our first empirical chapter 
concentrates on the effect of country-specific factors on earnings management under IFRS. As 
all countries in the sample enforce IFRS adoption, the results may further emphasise the role of 
local environments in shaping accounting quality. If the adoption of IFRS alone is enough to 
obtain consistent accounting practices, institutions should not have an effect on accruals and 
real earnings management. Another benefit of exploring accruals and real earnings management 
is to address how companies respond to institutional factors in managing earnings if they do. 
In addition, we examine the effect of country-specific factors on conservatism and value 
relevance together. The sections that follow provide nsights on the effect of accounting 
conservatism on value relevance, some definitions, and a review of prior studies on 
conservatism and value relevance.  
4.4. Conservatism and value relevance: contracting perspective and equity valuation 
perspective  
Accounting information serves a dual purpose; it isa source for both equity valuation (valuation 
perspective) and for contracting (contracting perspctive) (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
The essence of information perspective of accounting can be traced back to the work of Ball 
                                                          
28 See chapter 3 Theoretical Framework, which includes a justification for the selection of these three factors.  
Chapter 4. Literature Review   
 
       
 
91 
and Brown (1968) who investigated the relationship between accounting numbers and stock 
prices based on the assumption that accounting numbers provide information for investment 
decisions. As such, under valuation perspective, th function of accounting is to provide 
information, especially to shareholders, which is usef l in assessing the market price and 
making investment decisions. 
With the introduction of agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a new perspective of 
accounting information emerged which is the contracting perspective. Agency theory suggests 
that the firm is ‘’nexus of contracts’’ between different parties who are driven by their self-
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The main contracts are the debt contracts between the 
firm and the creditors, and the compensation contracts made to limit the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers (Walker, 2013).  Hence, the role of accounting information is to reduce 
the agency costs associated with outside financing and bonus plans and thus facilitating the 
contracting process. For example, creditors may requi  including debt covenants in debt 
contracts based on accounting information. The role f accounting, under contracting 
perspective, is to provide information that is usefl in evaluating contracting settings and 
economizing the transactions costs.  
Of accounting attributes, what is desirable from valuation perspective may not be desirable 
from contracting perspective. Watts (2003) and Leone et al. (2006) hold the view that earnings 
conservatism may be an optimal attribute from contracting perspective. With regard to value 
relevance, Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue that the value relevance research is of value in 
equity valuation perspective but this does not apply to contracting perspective and, therefore, it 
is of less value in measuring earnings quality. However, Barth et al. (2001) point out that value 
relevance measure is one of a number of different metrics of earnings quality.  
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The literature shows an effect of conservatism on value relevance of earnings. For example, 
Basu (1997) and Hayn (1995) suggest that the decline in value relevance of earnings across 
time can be explained by the increase in nonrecurring items and negative earnings; in other 
words, higher conservatism. In this case, book values become more important than earnings in 
explaining stock prices (Barth et al., 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collins et al., 1999).  
In a study exploring value relevance across 40 years from 1953 to 1993, Collins et al. (1997) 
found no decrease in the combined value relevance of book value and earnings; instead, there 
was a slight increase over time. The value relevance of book value increased while the value 
relevance of earnings decreased over time. They attributed the decrease in value relevance of 
earnings to the increase in the frequency of negative earnings, significant incidence of one-time 
items, and changes in intangible intensity. These findings indirectly support the argument that 
conservative accounting reduces the value relevance of earnings across time.  
Another reason for the increase in the value relevance of book values at the expense of earnings 
after IFRS adoption is the increase in conservative accounting because of the fair value 
requirements in the standards. For example, Givoly and Hayn (2000) note more conservative 
accounting in the United States because of the FASB’s fair value rules that require earlier 
recognition of expenses and losses or deferred recogniti n of revenues. 
In a study investigating the effect of conservatism on value relevance directly, Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2010) suggest a positive relationship betwen the reliability of earnings and the 
usefulness of earnings, over book values, for explaining stock prices. Earnings are deemed 
more reliable if they have higher predictability of future earnings. Earnings become less reliable 
with higher conditional conservatism. Taken together, igher conservatism leads to less reliable 
earnings, making the book values more useful in explaining the stock prices than the current 
earnings. As such, balance sheet numbers are relatively higher in value relevance compared 
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with income statements amounts. This is consistent with Barth (2006), who contends that 
accelerating the recognition of future expenses and losses reduces the ability of earnings to 
predict themselves while it improves the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows. The 
decrease in the ability of current earnings to predict future earnings makes earnings less 
relevant.   
Heflin et al. (2014) attempted to evaluate the effect of conservatism on the usefulness of GAAP 
earnings for evaluation purposes. They concluded that conditional conservatism reduced the 
informativeness and persistence of earnings, and made the earnings less smooth. Consequently, 
investors preferred Street earnings that are less con ervative than GAAP earnings.  
Altamuro et al. (2005) found that even when earnings management incentives are high, 
accelerating revenue recognition is associated withhig er market response. This means that 
either aggressive accounting is not an indication of lower quality of earnings, or the high market 
response is not evidence of better quality. Furthermore, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2013) pointed 
out that investors adjust the face value of reported earnings for interpretation purposes; for this 
reason, investigating the relationship between stock prices and reported earnings may not 
provide valid inferences. 
Our study does not examine the effect of conservatism on value relevance directly; it rather 
tests the effect of some country specific factors on b th conservatism and value relevance of 
book values and earnings. Investigating only one of them does not provide a full picture of 
earnings quality as conservatism may be desirable from contracting perspective while value 
relevance may be desirable from equity valuation perspective. This is another contribution we 
add in the second empirical chapter. 
The next section moves on to present definitions of accounting conservatism in addition to a 
review of prior studies in this area.  
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The statement of concepts No.2, the (FASB), 1980 provides a definition of conservatism as “[a] 
prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent in business 
situations are adequately considered.’’  
The IASB conceptual framework (1989) provides a definition of prudence as:  
the inclusion of a degree of caution in the exercis of the judgments needed in 
making the estimates required under conditions of uncertainty, such that 
assets or income are not overstated and liabilities or expenses are not 
understated  (IASC, 1989).  
 
According to Watts (2003), conservatism is “the differential verifiability required for 
recognition of profits versus losses. Its extreme form is the traditional conservatism adage: 
anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses” (Watts, 2003. p.207). In general, conservatism 
holds that there is a comparative downward bias in accounting value to the economic value 
when measuring net assets.  
There is a debate whether conservatism is a desirable attribute of financial statements or not. 
Watts (2003) relates the preference for conservatism to its constraints on managerial 
opportunistic behaviour, which leads to eliminating the noise and bias in accounting measures 
on which the contracts base. Ball et al.(2000) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) contend that 
conservatism reduces the information asymmetry betwe n managers and other parties making 
the financial reporting more transparent. Similarly, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) write that 
financial reporting prepared conservatively is of better quality and useful for contracting 
purposes29.  
                                                          
29 In addition to contracting, Watts (2003) provides other explanations for conservatism. Shareholders litigation 
may explain conservatism since the understatement of net assets reduces the expected litigations costs. Regulation 
and tax are other factors that may explain conservative ccounting. 
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On the other hand, Penman and Zhang (2002) cast doubt on the benefits of the practice of 
conservatism in accounting in terms of the greater flexibility available to managers to manage 
earnings. The hidden reserves resulting from conservative accounting with investment growth 
lead to less predictability of current earnings for future firm performance.  
The Chairman of the IASB Hans Hoogervorst (2012) maintains that “[a] systemic bias towards 
conservatism undermines the value of earnings as a performance indicator”. He also states that 
prudence may create scope for opportunism in financial statements in terms of earnings 
management.  
In the 1989 IASC’s conceptual framework, prudence was identified as one of the qualitative 
characteristics of financial reporting. However, in 2010, the IASB and the FASB issued a 
revised version of the conceptual framework, dropping prudence and reliability from the 
desired qualitative characteristics of financial reporting. The removal of prudence from the 
conceptual framework was because of its conflict with neutrality, whereas the replacement of 
reliability with faithful representation was owing to the lack of common understanding of its 
meaning. 
Ever since, the concept of prudence has become a controversial issue. Calls on the IASB to 
reintroduce prudence in the conceptual framework have persisted since the release of the 
framework in 2010. European politicians went as far as to threaten to cut off the funds the EU 
provides to the IASB unless the latter reinserts prudence in the conceptual framework (Crump, 
2013).   
In his speech at the FEE conference on corporate reporting of the future, Hoogervorst (2012) 
attributed the removal of prudence from the conceptual framework to the need to help align 
IFRS with US GAAP as the IASB and FASB stressed the importance of neutrality of financial 
reporting. He asserted that despite leaving out the concept of prudence from the conceptual 
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framework, it was inherent in IFRS and had a role in the development of the new standards 
(Hoogervorst, 2012).  
Kothari et al. (2010) argue that the demand for verifiable information by both shareholders and 
debt holders contributes to the increase in conditional conservatism. In a recent letter in the 
Financial Times, a group of shareholder representatives, asset managers, and institutional 
investors called for restoring prudence as a guiding principle in the financial statements30. They 
pointed out that “[p]rudence ensures that performance and capital are not overstated. This in 
turn underpins the confidence of shareholders and le ers in companies’ balance sheet strength 
and capital stewardship” (Quinn et al., 2015). 
In response to the previous letter, Hans Hoogervorst (2015) wrote that the IASB had the 
intention to reintroduce prudence in the conceptual framework, though in support of neutrality 
not as a replacement for it. He agreed on the need to avoid the overstatements of earnings and 
assets, and understatements of liabilities, but he equally believed that a deliberate 
understatement of earnings and assets is imprudent. H  reaffirmed the commitment of the IASB 
to setting accounting standards in which financial reporting reflects the economic reality as 
closely as possible (Hoogervorst, 2015).  
Watts (2003) and Leone et al. (2006) maintain that earnings conservatism may be an optimal 
attribute from contracting perspective. O’Connell (2007) tends to support this view as he 
suggests that conservatism may not be beneficial from valuation perspective but it may help 
with assessing stewardship.  
                                                          
30 The letter is signed by: Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, RPMI Railpen, Sarasin & Partners, Threadn e le 
Investments, GO Investment Partners, UK Shareholders Association, and Independent Director.  
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4.5.1. Conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism 
Authors divide conservatism into two types: conditional conservatism (timelier loss 
recognition), and unconditional conservatism (independent of losses) (Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005).  
Basu (1997) defines conditional conservatism as the tendency of accountants to follow policies 
accelerating recognizing bad news while taking higher degree of verification with regard to 
good news. Thus, it can be said that there is conditi al conservatism in the financial statements 
when they reflect bad news quicker than good news, or when the loss recognition is timelier 
than gain recognition. Conditional conservatism is al o referred to as event driven, news-
dependent, ex post, or earnings conservatism. It can be achieved by long-lived intangible and 
tangible asset impairment (Ryan, 2006). Other common examples of conditional conservatism 
include asymmetry in gain/loss contingencies and inventory valued at the lower of cost or 
market (Ruch and Taylor, 2015). 
Unconditional conservatism refers to the conservatism in assets values resulting from a 
systemic under-recognition of their accounting value by, for example, using higher depreciation 
rate compared to the economic rate (Ryan, 2006). Other examples of unconditional 
conservatism include expensing R&D costs, expensing advertising costs, and increasing the 
provisions related to future costs, such as the allow nce for doubtful accounts (Ruch and 
Taylor, 2015). This form of conservatism is referred to as unconditional because it is not based 
on information about the performance of an asset; th reby some authors describe it as ex-ante 
conservatism or news-independent (e.g. Ryan, 2006).  
From contracting perspective, conditional conservatism is more important than unconditional 
conservatism since what is required under this perspective is more timely information, which is 
captured by conditional conservatism (Ryan, 2006). In addition, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
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argue that unconditional conservatism does not boost the efficiency of contracting, as it does 
not add any new information unknown at the date of contracting. 
Unconditional conservatism may interact with real ernings management activities. Managers 
can increase earnings via real activities such as postponing expensing or advertising costs, in 
which case there is less unconditional conservatism in the financial statements. With respect to 
the relationship between conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism, the 
literature provides evidence that conditional conservatism is negatively associated with 
unconditional conservatism (e.g. Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). One can argue that higher 
conditional conservatism is associated with lower unconditional conservatism and higher real 
earnings management. Indeed, García Lara et al. (2012) showed that the increased conditional 
conservatism was associated with a decline in accruls earnings management while it was 
associated with an increase in real earnings management31. 
4.5.2. Single country studies 
A large body of literature on conservatism has been published using samples of US companies. 
Some investigated the effect of conservatism on financial statements (e.g. Kim and Kross, 
2005; Jackson and Liu, 2010; Chen et al., 2014). Others tested the effect on equity market users 
including information asymmetry (e.g. Hui et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2013), value relevance 
(Balachandran and Mohanram, 2011; Bandyopadhyay et l., 2010; Heflin et al., 2014), cost of 
equity capital (Francis et al., 2004; García Lara et l., 2011) and analysts forecasts (e.g. Pae and 
Thornton, 2010; Louis et al., 2014). Another set of literature on conservatism tested its effect on 
lenders (e.g. Zhang, 2008b) and executive compensatio  (Iyengar and Zampelli, 2010), and its 
relationship with corporate governance metrics (e.g. García Lara et al., 2009). Of these studies, 
                                                          
31 Using data for US firms over the period from 1991 to 2010 
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studies on the effect of conservatism on earnings quality and value relevance would be more 
relevant to our research.  
Studies on the effect of conservatism on earnings quality reveal that there is an effect of 
conservatism on earnings predictability of future earnings and cash flows, and value relevance.  
Penman and Zhang (2002) examined the effect of conservative accounting on earnings quality 
using US firms from 1975 to 1997. They found that ernings were less predictable because of 
the hidden reserves resulting from unconditional conservatism.  
In another study, Kim and Kross (2005) tested the eff ct of conservatism on the ability of 
earnings to predict future operating cash flows. The results revealed an increase in the ability of 
earnings to predict future operating cash flows because of the increase in conditional 
conservatism.  
Consistent with Kim and Kross (2005), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) provided a broader 
explanation of the effect of conservatism on earnings and cash flow. They noted that 
conservatism increased the predictability of future cash flows based on current earnings while it 
reduced the predictability of future earnings. They also suggested a positive relationship 
between the reliability of earnings and the usefulness of earnings, over book values, for 
explaining stock prices. Earnings are deemed more reliable if they have higher predictability of 
future earnings. Earnings become less reliable with h gher conditional conservatism. Taken 
together, higher conservatism leads to less reliabl earnings, making the book values more 
useful in explaining the stock prices than the current earnings. 
On the effect of unconditional conservatism on value relevance, Balachandran and Mohanram 
(2011) found that the value relevance decreased over tim  and the unconditional conservatism 
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increased over time. However, they did not find evid nce that the increase in unconditional 
conservatism led to the decrease in the value relevance over time.  
Heflin et al. (2014) attempted to evaluate the effect of conservatism on the usefulness of US 
GAAP earnings for valuation purposes. They concluded that conditional conservatism reduced 
the informativeness and persistence of earnings, and made the earnings less smooth. 
Consequently, investors preferred Street earnings that are less conservative than GAAP 
earnings for equity valuation32.  
With respect to the effect of conservatism on earnings management, Jackson and Liu (2010) 
demonstrated that earnings were managed using the bad debt expense to meet the targets. The 
unconditional conservatism allowed in treating bad debts allowances gave room to exercise 
earnings management.   
Using data for US firms over the period from 1991 to 2010, García Lara et al. (2012) tested the 
effect of conditional conservatism on both accruals nd real earnings management. They 
showed that the increased conservatism was associated wi h a decline in accruals earnings 
management while it was associated with an increase in r al earnings management. Since real 
earnings management is costly, the benefits of conservatism represented by lower accruals 
earnings management should exceed the costs of the increase in real earnings management to 
yield a positive net effect of conservatism on earnings management. They also found that firms 
applying more conservative accounting are less engaged in both accruals and real earnings 
management; hence they drew the conclusion that conservatism curtails earnings management. 
Barth et al. (2014) found that the reaction to earnings announcement is slower with higher 
conditional conservatism. They argued that lower information content of earnings was the 
                                                          
32 There is a difference between GAAP earnings and Street earnings in that the latter are modified earnings 
excluding earnings components resulting from conditional conservatism, which tends to increase transitory 
components in GAAP earnings (in both unusual items and other items).  
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potential cost of conditional conservatism. The results showed that investors were unable to 
reconcile the negative bias in conservative earnings since firms with higher conditional 
conservatism experienced positive returns after the earnings announcement. Subsequent to 
earnings announcement, firms exercising conservative accounting revealed higher level of 
insider purchases owing to the investors’ low reaction giving the insiders an advantage.   
Briefly, the aforementioned studies examined the eff ct of conservatism on other attributes of 
earnings. Higher unconditional conservatism was associated with less predictable earnings, 
lower value relevance, and greater room for earnings management. Greater conditional 
conservatism was positively correlated with less reliable earnings (in which case book values 
were more useful), a decrease in the informativeness and persistence of earnings, lower accruals 
earnings management and higher real earnings management, and slower reaction to earnings 
announcements.  
Another stream of literature on conservatism in a specific country emerged to examine the 
effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on conservatism, being o e of the earnings traits.  
Using data from Germany from 1998 to 2002, Hung andSubramanyam (2007) examined the 
effects of voluntary IFRS adoption on timeliness and conditional conservatism33. The evidence 
that income under international standards exhibits greater conditional conservatism and 
timeliness than income under HGB was weak34.  
                                                          
33 They examined value relevance of equity and net income as well. They did not find evidence to suggest that IAS 
improved the value relevance of book value and net income.  
34 HGB is Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code, Germany) 
Chapter 4. Literature Review   
 
       
 
102 
In another study, Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) studied th  determinants of voluntary adoption of 
IFRS from 1998 to 2004, and earnings quality in two gr ups of firms, HGB firms and IFRS 
firms. They found that IFRS firms were more conservative than HGB firms35.  
Paananen and Lin (2009) reported less timely loss recognition after mandatory IFRS adoption 
compared with voluntary IFRS adoption and IAS36. They attributed the decrease in earnings 
quality to the changes in the standards as some IAS were revised and new IFRS added. 
Similarly, Christensen et al. (2015) noted an increase in timely loss recognition after the 
voluntary adoption of IFRS in Germany whereas there was no such increase in firms that did 
not adopt IFRS until it became mandatory in 2005. 
4.5.3. Multi country studies 
An early work by Ball et al. (2000) across seven countries concluded that there was greater 
conservatism represented by timely loss recognition in common law countries compared with 
code law countries, where the litigation is not as in the common law countries37.  
In a later study, Ball et al. (2003) studied financi l reporting quality captured by timely 
recognition of economic income in four Asian countries: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand. The accounting standards in the UK and the US, in addition to the IAS, had 
substantially influenced the accounting standards in those four countries. However, the results 
indicate an effect of reporting incentives, which are influenced by local institutions, on timely 
economic recognition, particularly losses. 
                                                          
35 Overall, they found earnings in IFRS firms of less predictability, more persistence and higher conservatism than 
in HGB firms. IFRS firms were of higher accruals quality and higher value relevance than HGB firms but the 
differences were insignificant.  
36 They also found less value relevance and greater ernings smoothing.  
37 Ball et al (2000) stated “Nevertheless, German accounting in particular is widely presumed to be more 
conservative, because German managers have unusual di cretion to reduce reported income during good years. 
However, they also have unusual discretion to delay recognition of economic losses, and thus to increase reported 
income in bad years” (p.47). 
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Peek et al. (2010) compared asymmetric timeliness in public firms to that in private ones across 
13 western European countries from 1993 to 2000. They made a distinction between creditors 
and shareholders concluding that the demand for conservatism in public firms was greater by 
creditors than by shareholders. The latter, however, d manded higher conservatism than their 
counterparts in private firms did. 
Using data from 38 countries over the period 1992–2001, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) 
explored whether institutional factors shape the prope ties of accounting amounts. They found 
higher conservatism in countries with higher quality of judicial systems, strong investor 
protection, and stronger enforcement of securities law 38.  
Francis and Wang (2008) examined the joint effect of investor protection and Big4 audits on 
earnings quality across 42 countries over the period 1994–2004. They concluded that timely 
loss recognition was higher in common law countries for firms having Big4 auditors. 
As some firms around the world began to use IAS/IFRS voluntarily and then mandatorily in 
their financial reporting, there has been a growing body of literature investigating the effect of 
IAS/IFRS adoption on earnings quality metrics including conservatism.  
To best of my knowledge, the work by Barth et al. (2008), which investigated the effect of 
voluntary IAS adoption on accounting quality across 21 countries, was the first to explore the 
effect of IAS adoption on conservatism across countries.39The results showed that timely loss 
recognition was higher after voluntary IAS adoption.  
Chen et al. (2010) compared accounting quality across 15 European countries between the pre 
IFRS adoption period (2000-2004) and the post IFRS adoption period (2005-2007). Of the 
                                                          
38 Our study differs from theirs in that ours focuses on countries enforcing IFRS, which makes the effect of 
standards constant, and using different institutions with different measurement. In addition, we investigate value 
relevance to provide a better picture of earnings quality. 
39 They examined earnings management and value relevanc  as well.  
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metrics they employed, timely loss recognition was found less timely in the post mandatory 
IFRS periods.   
Ahmed et al. (2013) provided evidence on the introductory effects of compulsory IFRS 
adoption on accounting quality across 20 countries that adopted IFRS mandatorily in 2005 
compared with a benchmark group of companies from 15 countries that did not apply IFRS. 
They used data from 2002 to 2004 for pre IFRS adoption and data from 2006 to 2007 for post 
IFRS adoption and dropped 2005. They found a significant decline in the timely loss 
recognition relative to gain recognition for companies adopting IFRS compared with 
benchmark companies. They suggested that earnings quality did not improve after the 
mandatory IFRS adoption even with the presence of str ng enforcement. 
Using data from 16 European countries over the period f om 2000 to 2010, André et al. (2015) 
found similar results to those reported by Chen et al. (2010) and Ahmad et al. (2013). They 
documented a decrease in conditional conservatism in the post IFRS period in Europe. 
However, the decrease was lower in countries with strong auditing and strong enforcement of 
accounting standards40.   
Given the above, there is no recent study exploring the effect of country-specific factors on 
conservatism under IFRS. The second empirical chapter of this thesis partially adds to the 
literature by investigating the effect of country-specific factors on conservatism under IFRS.  
4.6. Value relevance 
In general, the value relevance literature refers to tudies that examine the relationship between 
an accounting amount and equity market price. Accounting earnings are relevant and reliable 
                                                          
40 They used the Brown et al. 2014 audit and enforcement index.  
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when their relationship with equity market value is s gnificant. The higher accounting values 
reflected in the equity market price, the higher value relevance is.  
In September 2010, the joint Conceptual Framework of the FASB and IASB identified 
relevance as one of the primary qualitative characte istics of useful financial reporting. 
Accoutring earnings are relevant if they are capable of making a difference when making 
economic decisions. Relevant accounting earnings information has either a predictive value or a 
confirmatory value, or both (IASB, 2010). Reliability has been considered as a fundamental 
characteristic of financial reporting for a long time but now replaced by faithful representation 
in the last draft of the IASB’s Conceptual Framework. In the past, the IASB used to classify 
faithful representation as a secondary characteristic enhancing reliability. The FASB’s 
Conceptual Framework identifies relevance and reliability as fundamental features of financial 
reporting. Hence, several studies linked value relevance to decision usefulness (e.g. Francis and 
Schipper 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999). 
Exploring the relationship between accounting amounts a d market values is not a recent trend; 
it goes back to 1960s with the first work by Miller and Modigliani (1966), as Barth et al. (2001) 
argue. Barth et al. (2001) claim that the first explicit use of the term ‘value relevance’ was by 
Amir et al. (1993). 
An early stream of value relevance studies look at the relevance and reliability of fair value 
estimates used for different items in the financial reporting. Various items have been used in the 
literature, including pensions and other postretirement benefits obligations (e.g. Barth, 1991; 
Choi et al., 1997), debt and equity securities in ba ks and other property liability issuers (e.g. 
Barth, 1994; Barth and Clinch, 1998; Carroll et al., 2003). In addition, derivatives (e.g. 
Venkatachalam, 1996; Wong, 2000) bank loans (Nelson, 1996; Barth et al., 1996) non-financial 
intangible assets (Barth and Clinch 1998; Aboody et al. 1999), have been used. The 
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aforementioned studies tried to address whether fair v lue estimates for some items were 
relevant and reliable by examining its relationship w th market value.  
Another set of value relevance studies were across different countries (e.g. Alford et al., 1993; 
Harris et al., 1994; Joos and Lang, 1994; King and Langli, 1998; Graham and King, 2000; Fan 
and Wong, 2002). In general, these studies examined how value relevance differed across the 
countries where there were differences in corporate governance, accounting standards, and 
capital markets.  
Starting from 2000, a new set of value relevance studies emerged, testing the value relevance of 
accounting amounts in the financial reporting prepad using IAS and then IFRS. This set of 
studies inquired into whether financial reporting under IAS/IFRS was of higher value relevance 
than that under local accounting standards.   
Since our study explores the effect of institutional factors on value relevance across countries 
mandating IFRS, two main streams of literature are rel vant to it. The first is the specific 
country studies on value relevance after IFRS adoption, and the second is the studies on value 
relevance across countries.  
4.6.1. Single country studies 
Most single-country studies on IFRS adoption and value relevance were conducted in Germany. 
The underlying cause can be the permission of dual fin ncial reporting in Germany from early 
1990s, one complying with either US GAAP or IFRS and another complying with HGB 
(Christensen et al., 2015). Hence, the availability of data allows researchers to conduct studies 
comparing accounting quality under different standards for the same firms.    
Niskanen et al. (2000) examined the effect of IAS adoption on earnings quality by comparing 
value relevance of earnings under domestic accounting standards with the same earnings 
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reconciled to IFRS in Finnish firms. The results provided no evidence of value relevance for 
reconciliation of Finnish Accounting Standards to IAS at an aggregate level. It was also 
reported that there was significant value relevance for reconciling adjustments of untaxed 
reserves and consolidation differences. 
Elsewhere, Babalyan (2001) compared earnings quality reported by Swiss firms under US 
GAAP and earnings reported under Swiss GAAP as well as earnings reported under IAS, using 
a sample of Swiss companies from 1997 to 1999. He documented that U.S. GAAP was more 
value relevant than Swiss GAAP and IAS. Audit quality and firm size were proved to be 
significantly influential factors for earnings quality under IAS compared to Swiss GAAP.   
In Germany, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) examined th effects of IFRS adoption on value 
relevance of equity and net income from 1998 to 200241. They did not find evidence to suggest 
that IAS improved the value relevance of book value and net income. The variability of book 
value and income, book value of equity and total assets was significantly higher under 
international standards than under German GAAP (HGB).  
In another study, Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) studied th  determinants of voluntary adoption of 
IFRS from 1998 to 2004, and earnings quality in HGB firms and IFRS firms. Of earnings 
quality metrics, they found value relevance in IFRS firms higher than in HGB firms but the 
differences were insignificant42. 
Jermakowicz et al. (2007) evaluated the effect of cr ss listing on the NYSE, adopting IFRS, or 
applying US GAAP on the value relevance of earnings to market value of German DAX-30 
companies from 1995 to 2004. The statistical analysis indicated a significant relationship 
                                                          
41
 They also examined the timeliness and asymmetric timeliness. The evidence that income under internatiol 
standards exhibits greater conditional conservatism and timeliness than income under HGB was weak.  
42 IFRS firms were found to have more persistent, less predictable and more conservative earnings than HGB firms 
did.  
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between the book values of earnings and stock prices. The findings confirmed that cross-listing 
on the NYSE, adopting US GAAP or IFRS, significantly improved the value relevance of 
earnings to market value of equity.  
Van der Meulen et al. (2007) tested the differences in earnings quality of two groups of German 
New Market firms from 2000 to 2002; the first applied IFRS, the second adopted US GAAP. 
Four metrics were investigated: two accounting-based earnings attributes, accrual quality and 
predictability; and two market-based earnings attribu es, timeliness and value relevance. 
Accrual quality, timelines, and value relevance were found similar under IFRS and US GAAP 
whereas earnings under US GAAP revealed better predictability.  
4.6.2. Multi country studies 
The first stream of multi country studies on value relevance focused on exploring the 
differences in value relevance of earnings and book values due to the differences in the 
accounting standards (e.g. Alford et al., 1993; Harris et al., 1994; Joos and Lang, 1994; King 
and Langli, 1998). Another set of multi country literature investigated the effect of macro 
factors such as financing system, accounting regulator, tax, accounting cluster43 and spending 
on auditing services (Ali and Hwang, 2000). Other studies investigated investor protection 
(Hung, 2001; Cahan et al., 2009), ownership concentration (Fan and Wong, 2002) governance 
mechanisms44 (Davis-Friday et al, 2006), legal system origin, disclosures requirements and the 
accounting regulator (Anandarajan and Hasan, 2010). Anandarajan et al. (2011) examined the 
influence of transparency, corporate, economic, and fi ancing environments, and legal 
environment on value relevance in banking institutions. 
                                                          
43 British-American, Continental, South American and Mixed Economy.  
44 They operationalized corporate governance metric as omposite score of shareholder rights, creditor rghts, rule 
of law, and ownership concentration from La Porta e l., (1998), and audit quality from Saudagaran andDiga, 
(1997b). 
Chapter 4. Literature Review   
 
       
 
109 
A recent set of multi country studies has examined the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on value 
relevance of earnings and book values across countries (Barth et al., 2008; Devalle et al., 2010; 
Agostino et al., 2011; Liao, et al., 2012). Regarding the effect of institutions, Clarkson et al. 
(2011) investigated the effect of legal system on value relevance. The only recent study 
exploring the effect of institutional factors on value relevance of accounting information was by 
Isidro and Raonic (2012).  
An early work by Alford et al. (1993) examined the value relevance of accounting information 
across 17 countries where US firms were used as a benchmark. They found that the value 
relevance of accounting earnings reported under local a counting standards in Australia, 
France, the Netherlands, and the UK was greater than that of earnings prepared in accordance 
with US GAAP. On the other hand, earnings under US GAAP were of more value relevance 
than those under local GAAP in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Singapore, and Sweden. The results 
of the other countries were not conclusive.  
Harris et al. (1994) compared the value relevance of bo k value and earnings of German 
companies with those of US companies matched in terms of size and industry. The motive 
behind their study was the controversy on the SEC’s requirements to reconcile financial 
reporting of foreign firms seeking listing on a US stock market from local GAAP to US 
GAAP45. The disclosure to investors under German GAAP wasdeficient according to many 
observers. Interestingly, they provided evidence that t e value relevance of earnings under 
German GAAP and under US GAAP were not significantly different. However, the value 
relevance of shareholders’ equity in German firms wa  lower than in US firms.  
In a similar study on Germany, France and the UK, Joos and Lang (1994) concluded that there 
was no difference in the association between stock price and accounting amounts between the 
                                                          
45 The controversy was between the SEC and the New York St ck Exchange (NYSE).  
Chapter 4. Literature Review   
 
       
 
110 
UK firms and German firms whose measurement practices tended to be more conservative than 
the UK firms’. They also found that the implementation EU directives, in an attempt to 
harmonise accounting practices in the EU, did not decrease the country specific measurement 
practices across Germany, France, and the UK.  
King and Langli (1998) examined the value relevance of book value and earnings per share 
across Norway, the UK, and Germany. Despite the fact that the accounting rules across the 
three countries were different in terms of conservatism and the adherence to clean surplus 
accounting, they found a significant association betwe n stock prices and both earnings per 
share and book value across all three countries.  
Graham and King (2000) relate equity market value to book values and earnings in six Asian 
countries, namely Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. In 
all six countries, the book value and the residual earnings were positively related to the stock 
prices. On the other hand, the explanatory power for South Korea and Philippines was relatively 
high whereas it was relatively low for Malaysia and Taiwan. They attributed these differences 
to the differences in accounting practices even thoug  the result of Korea was unexpected, 
where the accounting practices were influenced by the tax law.  
Ali and Hwang (2000) explored the effect of country specific factors on value relevance of 
accounting information across 16 non-US countries and using US firms as a control. They 
found that value relevance was higher in countries where the financing system was market 
oriented; i.e. where private sector bodies had a key role in setting the accounting standards, 
accounting systems fell into the British American type and the spending on auditing services 
was high.  
Hung (2001) investigated the effect of using accrual accounting versus cash accounting on 
value relevance of accounting performance measures (earnings and REO) across 21 countries. 
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The findings suggested that using accrual accounting had a negative effect on value relevance 
only in countries with weak investor protection. Strong shareholders’ protection reduced the 
negative effect of accrual accounting on value relevance of accounting performance measures, 
and even increased the value relevance. 
Fan and Wong (2002) tested the relations between value relevance and ownership concentration 
in seven East Asian economies excluding Japan. They documented that ownership structure 
affected the informativeness of accounting earnings. Specifically, firms with concentrated 
ownership had lower earnings informativeness than tose with dispersed ownership structure. 
They attributed this conclusion to the fact that under concentrated ownership, accounting 
information reflects the controlling owners’ intentions rather than the firm’s economic reality.  
Davis-Friday et al. (2006) investigated the value rel vance of book value and earnings in four 
Asian countries, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand during the period of the Asian 
crisis. They found that the value relevance of book value increased in Indonesia and Thailand 
during the crisis in contrast to value relevance of arnings, which significantly decreased. While 
the crisis had no significant impact on the value rel vance of earnings or book value in South 
Korea, the value relevance of both book value and earnings declined during the crisis in 
Malaysia. They also found that the value relevance of book value decreased with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms, which had no effect on the value relevance of earnings. 
Finally, the accounting systems affected the value rel vance of book value during the crisis.  
Cahan et al. (2009) investigated the effect of earnings quality46, investor protection and 
information environment on value relevance across 13 countries over the period from 1993 to 
2003. They found that the association between return ea nings and earnings quality was higher 
                                                          
46 earnings persistence and the earnings-future cash flows
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in countries with strong investor protection and low information opaqueness. It is worth 
mentioning that they measured investor protection by anti-director rights and legal enforcement.   
Anandarajan and Hasan (2010) inquired into the value relevance of earnings and its 
components across seven countries in Asia and Africa, namely Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. The value relevance was greater in the financial reporting 
prepared under accounting standards issued by private bodies rather than governmental 
organisations. In addition, the value relevance of reported earnings was higher in the presence 
of more foreign shareholders. Legal system origin, c vil or common, had an effect on the 
association between stock prices and book values and e rnings in that greater value relevance 
was in common law countries.  
In banking institutions, Anandarajan et al. (2011) examined the value relevance across 38 
countries using data from 1993-2004. More specifically, they investigated the effect of some 
macro level factors, such as transparency, corporate, economic and financing environments and 
legal environment, and micro level factors, such as size, risk, and organization form. They 
found higher value relevance in countries with greater disclosure requirements and more focus 
on the private sector. Value relevance of earnings and book values were greater in common law 
countries than in code law countries.    
In an emerging market and using a monthly data from 2000 to 2006, Alali and Foote (2012) 
investigated the value relevance of IFRS in financil reporting of firms listed on in the Abu 
Dhabi Stock Exchange. They found that earnings and book values were relevant in terms of 
their association with stock prices. However, in bearish trends the accounting information under 
IFRS may not be value relevant. They also noted a change in the value relevance of accounting 
information across the time since the market was establi hed in 2000.  
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Since some firms began to use the international accounting standards IAS voluntarily in their 
financial reporting and then IFRS mandatorily, several studies tested the effect of this adoption 
on value relevance across countries.  
In an international context, Barth et al. (2008) provide evidence that firms that use IFRS 
voluntarily reveal more value relevance of accounting amounts than do matched sample firms 
adopting non-U.S. domestic accounting standards across 21 countries.  
Devalle et al. (2010) used a sample of 3.721 firms listed on five EU stock exchanges, Madrid, 
Paris, Frankfurt, Milan, and London to test whether value relevance increased after the 
introduction of IFRS in Europe in 2005. They observed mixed findings on the improvement in 
value relevance of earnings and book value of equity to share prices. However, the association 
between earnings and stock price increased after IFRS adoption in France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom whereas the association between book values and stock prices decreased 
following the introduction of IFRS except for the UK.  
Clarkson et al. (2011) used a sample of 3,488 firms to examine the effect of IFRS adoption on 
earnings and book value relevance to share prices of firms from EU countries and Australia that 
adopted IFRS mandatorily in 2005. They documented differential valuation effects for code law 
and common law countries. While the value relevance of IFRS earnings and book value equity 
for code law countries changed marginally, it declined for common law countries. Such 
expositions are unsatisfactory because they covered only one year after mandatory IFRS 
application. 
Covering a year before the adoption and the year of mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU, 
Aharony et al. (2010) compared the value relevance of goodwill, research and development 
expenses, and the asset revaluation across 14 EU countries. The results showed an increase in 
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the value relevance of goodwill, research and development expenses, and asset revaluation 
increased after mandatory IFRS adoption across 14 EU countries. 
In the bank sector, Agostino et al. (2011) showed, as expected, that the value relevance of 
earnings increased in the post IFRS adoption period for the entire sample. The greatest 
incremental effect was in Italy and Germany, the smallest in the UK. This result was consistent 
with the view that IFRS are of better quality than domestic EU accounting standards. It also 
coincided with the view that the quality of UK GAAP was already as high as IFRS. On the 
other hand, the findings on equity book value were l ss clear-cut. That is, less transparent banks 
did not experience significant improvement in value relevance of book value after mandatory 
IFRS adoption. 
Liao et al. (2012) explored the comparability of book value and earnings between French and 
German firms after mandatory IFRS adoption. Their rsults suggest that book value and 
earnings under IFRS are comparable between France and Germany in the first years of IFRS 
adoption with a decrease in comparability thereafter.   
Isidro and Raonic (2012) investigated earnings quality, earnings manipulation and the value 
relevance of accounting information across 26 countries that mandated IFRS, in two years of 
the adoption, 2006 and 2007. They found that strong monitoring mechanisms, more globalized 
markets, greater business sophistication, and higher lev l of economic development influence 
accounting quality positively. 
4.6.3. Discussion 
The findings of the effect of IFRS adoption on value relevance in a given country are mixed. 
While Niskanen et al. (2000) show no evidence of value relevance for reconciliation of Finnish 
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Accounting Standards to IAS at an aggregate level, Babalyan (2001) documented that U.S. 
GAAP were more value relevant than Swiss GAAP and IAS.  
Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) and Hung and Subramanyam (2007) found no significant 
differences in value relevance between IAS adopters and their HGB counterparts. Similarly, 
Van der Meulen et al. (2007) found similar value relevance extent between two groups of 
German firms: the first applied IFRS, the second adopted US GAAP. In an international study, 
Barth et al. (2008) provided evidence that firms using IFRS voluntarily revealed more value 
relevance of accounting amounts than did matched sample firms adopting non-U.S. domestic 
accounting standards across 21 countries. 
On mandatory adoption, Devalle et al. (2010) concluded mixed results on the effect of IFRS 
introduction in 2005 in the EU. The association between earnings and stock price increased 
after IFRS adoption in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom whereas the association 
between equity book value and stock price decreased following the introduction of IFRS except 
for the UK. In a more comprehensive study across the EU and Australia, Clarkson et al. (2011) 
noted that the value relevance of earnings and book values for code law countries changed 
marginally; it declined for common law countries in the year of IFRS introduction in 2005. In 
the bank sector, Agostino et al. (2011) showed, as expected, that the value relevance of earnings 
increased in the post IFRS adoption period for the entire sample.  
Another work by Liao et al. (2012) suggested that book value and earnings under IFRS were 
comparable between France and Germany in the first years of IFRS adoption with a decrease in 
comparability thereafter. Aharony et al. (2010) explored the value relevance of goodwill, 
research and development expenses, and asset revaluation after mandatory IFRS adoption 
across 14 EU countries, concluding that there was an increase in the value relevance of those 
items.  
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Studies on the effect of country-specific factors on value relevance are rare covering the period 
before the adoption of IFRS or in banking institutions.  
Ali and Hwang (2000) found that value relevance was higher in countries where the financing 
system was market oriented, where private sector bodies had a key role in setting the 
accounting standards, accounting systems fell into the British American type and the spending 
on auditing services was high. Hung (2001) noted that strong investor protection reduced the 
negative effect of accrual accounting on value relevance of accounting performance measures, 
and even increased the value relevance. Fan and Wong (2002) related higher value relevance to 
less ownership concentration. During the financial risis, corporate governance mechanisms 
had no effect on the value relevance of earnings whereas weak governance decreased the value 
relevance of book value as found by Davis-Friday et al. (2006).  
Cahan et al. (2009) found a higher association betwe n return earnings and earnings quality in 
countries with strong investor protection and low information opaqueness. Anandarajan and 
Hasan (2010) found that value relevance was greater in common law countries than in code law 
countries. Value relevance was also higher when there w re more foreign shareholders, and the 
private bodies took part in setting the accounting standards. In banking institutions, 
Anandarajan et al. (2011) found that value relevance of earnings and book values were higher in 
common law countries.  
To best of my knowledge, the work by Isidro and Raonic (2012) was the first that discussed the 
effect of country-specific factors on value relevance of accounting information across 26 
countries that mandated IFRS adoption. However, their study covered only two years, 2006 and 
200747. Further, they did not differentiate between earnings and book values; rather, they look 
                                                          
47 We explained in previous sections the limitations of studying the early years of IFRS adoption. See th  
discussion above in this chapter regarding the shortcomings of studying the first years of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
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at the accounting information in general using the residuals from the regression of return on 
earnings and the change in earnings.  
The current study adds to the extant literature by exploring the effect of investor protection, 
enforcement of accounting standards and the strength of capital market on value relevance of 
book values and earnings over the period from 2007 to 2010, the financial crisis period, across 
23 countries mandating IFRS. If the country specific factors still influence the value relevance 
after IFRS mandatory adoption, this raises a question about whether the notion that mandatory 
IFRS adoption alone improves the quality and comparability of financial reporting across 
countries. 
In a comparative study examining the effect of country-specific factors on value relevance of 
earnings, it would be misleading to draw conclusion  the effect of local environments on 
value relevance without looking at the presence of conservative accounting. As such, it is useful 
to examine both attributes of earnings quality, conservatism and value relevance of earnings. 
This is another contribution we add in the second empirical chapter.  
4.7. Investor protection, enforcement and strength of capital markets: definitions  
La Porta et al. (2000, p.4) defines investor protection as “the protection of shareholders and 
creditors by the legal system”. Investor protection is multidimensional and can be captured by 
several factors; in other words, several mechanisms can contribute to the strength of investor 
protection. Judicial independence, board independence, protection of minority shareholder 
rights, enforcement of accounting and auditing standards, enforcement of securities laws, and 
the importance of capital market are all mechanisms of investor protection as discussed later in 
this section48.  
Judicial independence 
                                                          
48 See Table 5-3 which describes the measures used to obtain investor protection variable.  
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Judicial independence measures the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it 
affects business” (La Porta et al., 1998, p.1124). The history and theory suggest an association 
between judicial independence and common law system, both of them predicting the same 
economic freedoms. When the government becomes a litig nt, for instance when the state takes 
property, judicial independence is of apparent importance to secure the property rights (La 
Porta et al., 2004). Thus, we posit that efficient judicial independence enhances the protection 
of investors. 
Board independence 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors, who do not have 
interests ties to the company, contribute positively to monitoring top management by ensuring 
that it acts in favour of shareholders. Independent directors are concerned with protecting the 
value of their professional reputation whereas managers could act to maximize their interests at 
the expense of shareholders’. Prior research suggests that earnings management is lower in the 
companies with a high number of independent directos on the board (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Ebrahim, 2007). 
Protection of minority shareholder rights 
Prior research supports the hypothesis that managers in countries providing weak protection of 
minority shareholder rights have greater incentives to engage in accounting practices to 
manipulate earnings (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al. 2003; Daske et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 
2006; Francis and Wang, 2008).  
Enforcement of accounting and auditing standards  
Enforcement of laws plays a crucial role in protecting the interests of investors by ensuring that 
the companies comply with these laws. What is the benefit of any law if the law enforcement 
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mechanisms are weak? With respect to IFRS, the enforcement of accounting standards is an 
essential factor to secure consistent accounting practices across the companies since the IASB 
has no power to enforce companies to comply with IFRS. In spite of the fact that countries 
across the world adopt IFRS, the enforcement of IFRS compliance remains a national matter. 
The FEE (2002, p.5) defines enforcement as the  
system to whenever possible protect, and thereafter identify and correct, 
material errors or omissions in the application of IFRS in financial 
information and other regulatory statements issued to the public. 
The enforcement of IFRS contributes to the transparency of financial statements, thereby 
protecting investors and promoting market confidence CESR (2003). Many code law countries 
applying Anglo American accounting standards are without the litigation enforcement of 
common law countries (Ball et al., 2000), which, in turn, affects the quality disclosure in code 
law countries. They suggest that common-code law dichotomy and the strength of enforcement 
are associated. Gassen et al. (2006) provide evidence that managers are less likely to engage in 
income smoothing in common law countries compared with those in code law countries. 
Investigating the European stock exchanges reactions o IFRS adoption, Armstrong et al. (2010) 
report a negative reaction to IFRS adoption in jurisdictions with weak enforcement of 
accounting standards. Byard et al. (2011) conclude that mandatory IFRS application enhances 
analysts’ forecast accuracy for firms domiciled in countries with strong accounting standards 
enforcement.  
Enforcement of securities laws 
Park and Park (2004) provide evidence that managers who trade in firm’s shares are more likely 
to adjust the accruals to inflate current earnings when they have the intention to sell their shares 
in the subsequent period. Consistent with this conclusion, McVay et al. (2006) report an 
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association between the tendency of managers to engag  in earnings management to meet the 
analysts’ forecasts and the sale of their own share in the subsequent quarters. When there is a 
lack of stringently enforced securities laws, managers’ incentives are to trade on information 
and thereby incorporate it into prices (Ball et al., 2000). As managers may trade in firm’s 
stocks, the enforcement of securities laws may discourage the managers from manipulating 
earnings to make profits (Hope, 2003). 
The importance of capital markets 
How companies are financed is one of the crucial factors that influenced accounting practices 
worldwide before IFRS adoption. Prior research suggests a link between the strength of equity 
market and the type of legal systems. Roman law countries have been characterized by the 
presence of insider systems of finance while common law countries have been dominated by 
outsiders financing systems with stronger investor pr tection in such countries (La Porta et al., 
1997; 1998). In the insiders systems, families, banks and governments have privileged access to 
accounting information while in the outsiders, share olders, who are the source of finance, lack 
such access. For this reason, financial accounting in outsiders systems has developed to fulfil 
the needs of shareholders whereas with the insiders systems there is no apparent need for 
financial reporting to provide information as required under outsiders systems. However, the 
minority shareholders in insiders systems may not be fully aware of the economic reality of the 
business as their counterparts are in outsiders systems. Therefore, we suggest that strong capital 
market complements investor protection; this is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Leuz et 
al., 2003). 
4.8. Hypotheses  
In chapter 3, three factors were identified as factors shaping accounting practices after IFRS 
adoption, namely investor protection, enforcement of accounting standards and the strength of 
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capital market. The current chapter has discussed earnings quality measures used in the thesis in 
addition to prior studies. Given the discussion in chapter 3 and chapter 4, eight hypotheses are 
formulated.  
Strong investor protection and strong enforcement curtail the ability of managers to manage 
earnings upwards via accruals. Similarly, in strong capital market, associated with higher 
shareholders litigation49, managers are less likely to manage earnings upwards via accruals. On 
the other hand, in such countries having strong institutions, managing earnings by taking real 
actions is greater than in countries with weak institutions. Real actions are in line with 
regulations and are difficult to detect; therefore, they are more popular when the litigation is 
higher. A CFO interviewed by Graham et al. (2005) mentioned the difficulty the auditors face 
in challenging the real economic actions, taken in the normal course of operations, to hit the 
target while they can easily criticize the accounting policies. Schipper (2003) points out that 
companies tend to take real economic actions with tighter standards; hence, strong institutions 
may have the same effect. Taken together, with strong investor protection and strong 
enforcement, mangers try to avoid managing earnings via accounting practices whereas they are 
more likely to take real actions to beat the target as it is difficult for regulators to second-guess 
them.  
Two hypotheses are derived to be tested in Chapter 6: 
Hypothesis1: accruals earnings management is less in countries w th strict investor 
protection, strong enforcement of accounting standards nd strong stock markets.  
                                                          
49
 Shareholder litigation is an important mechanism that limits managers’ opportunistic disclosure. Investors can 
take legal actions against the firm and its managers b cause of misleading information (Rogers et al., 2011).  
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Hypothesis2: real earnings management is greater in countries with strong 
investor protection, stringent enforcement of auditing and accounting standards and 
large capital markets.  
Managers become more conservative with higher litigation; therefore, strong investor 
protection and strong enforcement increase the conditi al conservatism. Strong investor 
protection and strong enforcement, which we expect to increase conservatism, do not increase 
the value relevance of earnings whereas they increase the vale relevance of book values. The 
last prediction is based on the literature showing that conservatism influences the value 
relevance of earnings (see section 4.4). Further, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) reported that strong 
corporate governance mechanisms50 increased the value relevance of book values during the 
crisis and had no effect on value relevance of book values. As we cover the period of financial 
crisis from 2007 to 2010, we expect that strong investor protection and strong enforcement to 
increase value relevance of book values and that those factors do not influence the value 
relevance of earnings.   
The demand for conservatism may be present in both types of capital markets, weak and strong. 
Nobes (1998) suggest that earnings in insider capital market are more conservative than in 
outsider equity market. However, Ball et al. (2000) suggest that conservatism is a feature of 
corporate governance in common law countries characterized by shareholders’ corporate 
governance model. For this reason, we expect no effect of the strength of capital market on 
conservatism. On the other hand, strong capital market increases the value relevance of 
earnings as in market oriented countries financial reporting is the main source of information 
for shareholders but in weak capital market banks and families have their own access to 
information. The following are the hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 7:  
                                                          
50 They operationalized corporate governance metric as a composite score of shareholder rights, creditor rights, 
rule of law, and ownership concentration from La Porta e al. (1998), and audit quality from Saudagaran and Diga 
(1997b). 
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Hypothesis3: strong investor protection increases conservatism in financial statements.  
Hypothesis4: there is a greater degree of conservatism in countries with more efficient 
enforcement of accounting standards. 
Hypothesis5: strength of capital market has no effect on the extent of conservatism 
across countries.  
Hypothesis6: strong investor protection has no effect on value relevance of 
earnings; instead, it increases the value relevance of book value of equity. 
Hypothesis7: strong enforcement of accounting standards increases the value 
relevance of book value and has no effect on value relevance of earnings.  
Hypothesis8: value relevance of earnings is greater in countries having strong 
capital market.  
4.9. Conclusion  
This chapter presented the literature review of earnings quality under IFRS. More 
specifically, it illustrated definitions and motives of earnings management, definitions 
of country-specific factors and the difference between the contracting perspective and 
the equity valuation perspective of accounting information. It also presented prior 
studies on earnings management, conservatism and value relevance to show the gap in 
the literature. Eight hypotheses were formulated to be tested in Chapters 6-7.  
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Chapter 5 Research Methodology  
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter describes and discusses the methodology and methods used in this investigation. It 
is composed of seven themed sections, including the introduction. The second section presents 
the research paradigm and philosophy. Section 3 describ  sample selection. Section 4 moves 
on to describe earnings management divided into four subsections dealing with accruals 
earnings management model, real earnings management odels, measurement of investor 
protection, and second stage models. Section 5 is devoted to models of conservatism and value 
relevance. Section 6 presents methodological issues. Section 7 concludes the chapter.  
5.2. Research paradigm and philosophy  
Kuhn (1996, p.109) stated that “[p]aradigms provide scientists not only with a map but also 
with some of the directions essential for map making. I  learning a paradigm the scientist 
acquires theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture”. 
Therefore, paradigms are considered as guidance on how to conduct the research. They also 
include philosophical assumptions about how one examines the world (Saunders et al., 2007).  
The positivist paradigm was used to achieve the aim of this study, which is exploring the effect 
of country-specific factors on accounting quality under IFRS employing a contingency 
approach on macro level to determine factors shaping accounting practices under IFRS, and 
agency theory to explain the effect of these factors on accounting quality. 
Under the positivist paradigm, studying social reality is the same as in the natural sciences in 
terms of methods applied in the study (Bryman and Bell, 2003). The underlying reason for this 
similarity is that the human and natural sciences deal with facts instead of values (Gray, 2009). 
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Moreover, the positivist paradigm states that what can be touched, seen and smelt formulates 
the reality, therefore the inquiry should be empirical or scientifically observed (Gray, 2009). 
These objective methods, scientific observation or empirical inquiry, rather than a subjective 
sensation, are used to measure the properties of the social world since it exists externally 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2004). The aim of the positivi t paradigm is to explain and predict 
phenomena, in addition to anticipating their occurrences depending on theories (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009).  In other words, the aim is to test theories or theoretical predictions by 
collecting data (Hallebone and Priest, 2009).  
There are four philosophical assumptions underpinning a research paradigm, namely, ontology, 
epistemology, axiology and methodology (Creswell, 1994; Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
The ontological assumption of the positivist paradigm states that reality is objective, singular 
and separate from the researcher (Creswell, 1994). In other words, the ontological assumption 
of the positive paradigm is realist (Blaikie, 2007). The epistemological assumption of the 
positivist paradigm presents the researcher as independent of that being researched (Creswell, 
1994). The axiological assumption of the positivist paradigm indicates that the researcher is 
unbiased and value free. The methodological assumption of the positivist paradigm states that 
the research is deductive (Creswell, 1994). Additionally, a quantitative method of analysis is 
used in the positivist paradigm to measure social phenomena (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
In this study reality is viewed as external, objective and independent of social actors and is 
therefore consistent with using the positivist paradigm.  A further assumption of the positivist 
paradigm is that the researcher is an impartial observer, is not biased and therefore is reflecting 
reality as it is. The researcher empirically investigated the data to determine if the results 
obtained were consistent with and supported the hypot eses that were being tested. More 
specifically statistical analysis was used to determine the relationship between an independent 
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variable (accounting quality) and a dependent variable (the country-specific factor).  In carrying 
out these statistical tests, consistent with using a positivist approach it is assumed that the data 
is value free and unbiased and has been accurately measured. 
5.3. Sample selection  
The sample consisted of 16328 observations from 23 countries, and excluded financial 
institutions and utilities since they were subject to other regulations in the preparation of 
financial statements. The sample period was from 2007 to 2010, as shown in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1 Sample 
 
The overall observation from 2007 to 2010  40724 
Less: Financials and utilities  -8584 
Less : Observations in industries lower than six firms -348 
Less: Observations with missing variables for dependent variable and independent 
variables  -15464 
Number of observations used in the test 16328 
We dropped observations in industries with fewer than six firms, as the estimations of earnings 
management could not be run, and excluded observations with missing variables for dependent 
and independent variables. We obtained the data for dependent and independent variables from 
WorldScope. All statistical analyses, in this study, were performed using Stata 12.1. 
The 23 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Jordan, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the UK51. These countries enforced 
IFRS adoption in 2005 or earlier52, and are different in geographical location, legal system, the 
extent of wealth, and culture. Such mixture of countries might illuminate the effect of country-
specific factors on earnings quality under IFRS.  
                                                          
51 See Table 2-1 for more information of the data of IFRS adoption and the version used.   
52 See chapter 2 for detailed information on IFRS adoption across countries including: the adoption process, year of 
adoption, and which firms should use IFRS.  
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In fact, the number of countries that switched to IFRS is greater than the 23 we included in our 
sample; however, we limited our sample to 23 countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 or before as 
we excluded the early years of IFRS adoption, 2005 and 2006 in this study53. Some other 
countries adopted IFRS in 2005, but were not included in our study because they did not have a 
sufficient number of listed companies to run the regression for the earnings management test. 
We also chose to cover the period from 2007 to 2010, the crisis period, when the economic 
circumstances were similar across this period54. By doing so, we isolated the possible effect of 
the economic circumstances change on earnings quality.  
WorldScope database provides a variable called "WS.AcctgStandardsFollowed" which shows 
which accounting standards a company uses in its financial statements. 
If the output is 23, it means that the company applies IFRS. For Australia, EU countries, 
Jordan, Oman and South Africa, companies were considered as IFRS adopters if 
"WS.AcctgStandardsFollowed" was 23. If the output of "WS.AcctgStandardsFollowed" was 01, 
the company applied local standards. 
In the case of Hong Kong, Philippines and Singapore, th  local standards were equivalent to 
IFRS (see Table 2-1); therefore, companies with 01 and 23 were considered to be applying 
IFRS for the purpose of this study. By doing so, we minimized the error associated with coding 
companies as IFRS adopters, the thing that was not dealt with properly in prior studies. In 
section 5.6, we discuss the limitations of prior studies in terms of specifying companies that use 
IFRS.
                                                          
53 As mentioned in the previous chapter, exploring the early years of IFRS adoption is of limitation due to 
accounting practices associated with first-time IFRS adoption and the possible continuation of traditional practices 
in the first years of adoption. 
54 The change of economic circumstances in the post IFRS adoption era compared with pre IFRS adoption period 
probably makes the comparison of earnings quality before and after the adoption difficult (Walker, 2013).  
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Table 5-2 Distribution of sample by industry and country 
Country Energy  Materials  Industrials  Cons.discre Cons.staples Health care infor.tec Infor.services Total 
Australia 100 172 344 276 88 140 152 36 1308 
Austria 0 0 60 32 0 0 0 0 92 
Belgium 0 36 36 32 36 40 68 0 248 
Bulgaria 0 32 92 60 48 0 0 0 232 
Denmark 0 24 128 68 0 52 36 0 308 
Finland 0 36 136 64 28 0 72 0 336 
France 32 132 336 412 136 116 416 0 1580 
Germany 0 88 384 324 72 156 396 0 1420 
Greece 0 136 192 192 104 28 56 0 708 
Hong Kong 48 200 424 744 164 112 452 40 2184 
Italy 28 52 160 236 44 36 88 0 644 
Jordan 0 56 52 88 44 0 0 0 240 
Netherlands 0 24 88 48 40 0 72 0 272 
Norway 124 0 120 28 40 32 68 0 412 
Oman 0 52 40 24 32 0 0 0 148 
Philippines  28 24 48 68 56 0 0 24 248 
Poland 0 64 148 144 64 0 64 0 484 
Portugal 0 28 36 52 0 0 0 0 116 
Singapore 56 128 452 208 132 36 252 0 1264 
S.Africa 0 124 108 116 64 0 48 0 460 
Spain 0 56 80 52 32 44 0 0 264 
Sweden 0 52 236 120 40 100 216 0 764 
Uk 148 204 772 628 156 180 472 36 2596 
Total 564 1720 4472 4016 1420 1072 2928 136 16328 
% 0.034 0.105 0.273 0.245 0.086 0.065 0.179 0.008 100 
Notes to Table 5-2: the firms in the sample are classified by 2-digits GICS. Financials and Utilities are excluded; therefor , there are eight broad 
industry groups.  
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The firms were classified following the 2-digits Global Industry Classifications Standard 
(GICS) to include eight broad industries: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Information Technology, and Information 
Services. 
Table 5-2 shows the distribution of the sample by country and industry. The industrial firms 
represented the majority of firms, roughly 27.3% of the sample. Consumer Discretionary firms 
followed the industrials, with approximately 24.5% of the sample. Information technology 
firms were the third major firms in our sample, representing 17.9%, followed by Materials, 
which represented 10.5%. The other firms altogether represented 20% of the sample.  
The highest number of observations was from the UK,(2596) observations for (649) firms, 
followed by Hong Kong, (2184) observations for (546) firms, France (1580) observations for 
(395) firms, Germany (1420) observations for (355) firms, and Australia (1308) for (327) firms. 
On the other hand, the lowest number of observations was from Austria, (92) observations for 
(23) firms, followed by Oman, (148) observations for (37) firms, Bulgaria (232) observations 
for (58) firms, Jordan (240) observations for (60) firms, and Belgium (248) observations for 
(62) firms. 
In the sections that follow, the estimations of theeff ct of country-specific factors on earnings 
management, conservatism, and value relevance are discussed.  
5.4. Earnings management  
In Chapter 6, we examined not only accruals earnings management, which is widely used in the 
literature, but also real earnings management driven by the argument that companies engage in 
both types of earnings management (Graham et al., 2005). This is the first study to 
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simultaneously look at accruals earnings management and real earnings management over 
2007-2010 across 23 countries using IFRS.  
To that end, we first estimated accruals earnings management and real earnings management 
and then we explored how they varied based on the country-specific factors. In the sections that 
proceed, we present the models employed to estimate bo h accruals and real earnings 
management.  
5.4.1. Accruals based earnings management estimation  
Accruals models are used in the literature to measur  the extent to which companies manage 
earnings, which is one of the dimensions of earnings quality. A considerable number of 
previous studies separate accruals into non-discretonary accruals and discretionary accruals.  
Non-discretionary accruals are mentioned as “normal accruals” while discretionary accruals are 
“abnormal accruals”. Scholars have employed a wide variety of accruals based models in their 
studies. The most popular models are: Healy (1985), Jones (1991), Modified Jones, Dechow 
and Sloan (1991), and Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
Healy (1985) equates discretionary accruals with total accruals without incorporating any 
determinants of non-discretionary accruals whereas Jones (1991) attributed non-discretionary 
accruals to the change in sales and the level of PPE. Accruals that are not associated with 
fundamental firm performance are considered as discret onary accruals that reduce earnings 
quality. However, the Jones (1991) model can be criticised in that it has a low explanatory 
power for the variation of accruals, explaining about 10% of it (Dechow et al., 2010). That is, 
fundamental firm attributes, such as sales growth and PPE, can be masked by managers who 
have considerable discretion over accruals.  
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Dechow and Sloan (1991) developed their industry model based on the assumption that all 
firms in the same industry experience the same variation and determinants of non-discretionary 
accruals which are constant over time. They equated non-discretionary accruals to the median 
total accruals of the firms in the same industry.  
Dechow et al. (1995) suggested a modification to the Jones model, by deducting the change in 
receivables from the change in revenues to adjust credit sales, in an attempt to eliminate the 
assumed error in measuring discretionary accruals when managers use discretion over revenues.  
However, firm performance attributes may cause the differences in estimated discretionary 
accruals rather than managing earnings by managers, as mentioned by McNichols (2000), who 
states: 
[R]esearchers comparing firms that differ in earnings performance or 
growth characteristics may well observe (or not observe) differences in 
estimated discretionary accruals that relate to the p rformance 
characteristics of these firms rather than their incentives to manage 
earnings. (p. 333) 
To eliminate the effect of firm performance on estimated discretionary accruals, Holthausen et 
al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) suggested the incorporation of return on assets (ROA) as a 
determinant of accruals in the modified Jones model.  
Alternatively, Dechow and Dichev (2002) offer a different approach by regressing the change 
in short term working capital accrual (AWC) on past, current and future cash flows from 
operation (CFO). The logic behind this perspective is that accruals anticipate cash outflows or 
inflows and reverse when cash, which is recognized n accruals before, is paid or received. 
Francis et al. (2005) augmented the DD (Dechow and Dichev) model with the fundamental 
variables from the Jones model; change in sales revenues and PPE.   
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Following Francis et al. (2005), this study modifies the DD model by adding to it the 
fundamental variables from the modified Jones model, including deducting the change in 
receivables from the change in revenues55.  





	 +	∆ − ∆ +	 + 		   (1)
56 
 
The metric of accruals earnings management are the residuals from the previous estimation. 
The residuals represent the accruals that do not result from cash flow, revenues and PPE. To put 
it differently, the residuals are the abnormal accruals. All variables are deflated by total assets at 
the beginning of the period, 	. 
Where:  
	    =   accruals in year t; the difference between earnings and operating cash flow in year t. 

	     = cash flow from operating in year t-1; 

         = cash flow from operating in year t; 

	     = cash flow from operating in year t+1; 
∆      =change in sales in year t; 
∆      =change in receivables from clients in year t 
        =Gross value of property, plant and equipment in year t.  
 
In this study, accruals were measured following the cash flow approach since Hribar and 
Collins (2002) report empirical evidence that accruals are potentially mismeasured when using 
the balance sheet approach. Further, this study employed the signed abnormal accruals since it 
is more accurate than the absolute discretionary accru ls. Hribar and Nichols (2007) argue that 
the use of these methods leads to different results as a consequence of the change in the 
probability distribution when using the absolute discretionary accruals.  
                                                          
55 Francis et al. (2005) did not deduct the change of receivables from changes in sales; however, we deduct  the 
change of receivables from the change of revenues based on the argument provided before to adjust credit sales.   
56 As a robustness test, we used the modified Jones model to measure accruals earnings management as in Dechow 
et al. (1995) (see section 6.5).  
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Prior comparative studies (e.g. Leuz et al., 2003) on earnings management and voluntary 
adoption of IFRS did not employ the residuals models b cause of the low number of companies 
in each industry, but they used the residuals as a metric when the number of observations was 
sufficient. The average number of observations used in the literature is 8 to 10 observations per 
industry in a year when running the regression. Subramanyam (1996) excluded the industries 
with a fewer than six observations in every calendar ye r. Since the number of observations was 
low in some countries, we followed the broad industry classification, 2 digits GICS, which 
allowed us to use this model. 
In this study, the minimum number of firms in each industry was at least six; however, most of 
the industry groups had far more than six observations per calendar year as in Table 5.2. Fifty 
two firms would have been dropped if we had chosen to include only industries with 8 
observations at least. As a robustness check, we excluded industries with fewer than 8 
observations per year, and the results we obtained were the same as the ones we obtained in the 
initial model. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) included the industries with at least 8 observations per 
year.  
5.4.2. Real earnings management estimation 
Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), this study 
employed three metrics to estimate the level of real actions to manage earnings, 
namely the abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (CFO), production costs and 
discretionary expenses; it concentrated on three ways that affect the abnormal level of 
the aforementioned variables.  
Abnormal cash flow from operation (CFO) 
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The first method of real actions is manipulating sale  by generating additional 
unsustainable sales revenue, or accelerating the timing of sales, via increased periodic 
price reductions or through more lenient credit terms. By doing so, the sales volume 
increases temporarily in the current year; however, such increased sales disappear 
once the managers revert to the old prices. However, greater credit sales and discounts 
will result in lower cash flow.     
To measure the abnormal cash flow, we used the following estimation as in Roychowdhury, 














+ 	 !								 
 
	= lagged total assets in year t–1.  
Abnormal CFO is actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO calculated using the estimated 
coefficients. In other words, the residuals from the regression (2) represent the abnormal CFO. 
Abnormal production costs (PROD) 
Another way of real economic actions is increasing production levels to lower the cost 
of sold goods (COGS). In an attempt to reduce fixed costs per unit, managers would 
produce more units spreading the fixed costs on a larger number of units. As the 
marginal cost per unit does not change, the total cost per unit declines. As a result, the 
cost of sold goods declines and the reported operating margins increase. Nonetheless, 
the firm will still incur the costs of over-produced units that are probably not going to 
be sold in the current period, leading to lower cash flow from operation.  
To measure the abnormal production costs, we employed the following model, as in 
Roychowdhury (2006), and Cohen and Zarowin (2010): 
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Abnormal PROD is the actual PROD minus the normal level of PROD calculated using the 
estimated coefficient. More specifically, the residuals from the regression (3) represent the 
abnormal PROD. Production costs (PROD) are defined as the sum of change in inventory and 
COGS during the period. 
Abnormal discretionary expenditures (DISX) 
Managers may choose to reduce discretionary expenditures such as advertising, R&D, and 
maintenance. Such decreases in discretionary expenditures will lead to reporting greater 
earnings and cash flow in the current period. 
To measure the abnormal discretionary expenditures, w  used the following model, as in 









+ 	 !									 
 
Abnormal DISX is the actual DISX minus the normal level of DISX calculated using the 
estimated coefficient. DISX discretionary expenses are the difference between operation 
income and gross income from WorldScope. We ran these r gressions for each combination of 
2-digits GICS and year in each country.  
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), RM1 was our first measure of real earnings 
management computed by adding the abnormal production osts to the abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying the latter by negative on . We multiplied the abnormal discretionary 
expenses by negative one because the greater cut inthese expenses, the higher the earnings. 
Therefore, the higher RM1 is, the more likely it is for firms to manage earnings upwards.  
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RM2 is the second measure of real earnings management, which is the aggregation of both 
abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying both of them by 
negative one. We multiplied the abnormal cash flow because the lower cash flow, the greater 
manipulation of sales. Thus the higher RM2 is, the greater real earnings management is.  
5.4.3. Measurement of country-specific factors  
Most prior studies employed the anti-director rights index created by La Porta et al. (1998) to 
test the effect of investor protection on accounting quality (e.g. Leuz et al., 2003; Callao and 
Jarne, 2010; Filip and Raffournier, 2014). However, Spamann (2010) doubts the validity of 
anti-director rights index, as there are mistakes in coding leading to incorrect values for 33 
countries of the overall 49 countries La Porta et al. (1998) studied. Furthermore, Kaufmann et 
al. (2007) argue that substantial changes in governance structure occurred during the period 
from 1996 through 2007. Therefore, this study uses different indicators of institutions since it 
covers the period after 2007 when La Porta et al. (1998) index might be out of date, keeping in 
mind that there is neither a straightforward nor an uncontroversial way to measure the 
institutions57. 
In section 4.7, we argued that higher judicial independence, large board independence, strong 
protection of minority shareholder, rigorous enforcement of accounting standards, strict 
enforcement of security laws and strong capital market enhanced investor protection. We ran a 
Factor Analysis (Principle Component) of the six country-level variables described in Table 5-
3, five adopted from the World Economic Forum from 2008 to 2011 and one from the World 
Bank. Then we used one-factor loadings as a metric of nvestor protection; in chapter 6, we 
discuss in more details the factor loadings.   
                                                          
57 Houqe et al. (2012) used World Economic Forum (2008) in addition to Kaufman et al.’s (2007) data for the 
freedom of the press to measure investor protection, and tested the variables one by one.  
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Table 5-3 Descriptions of country-specific factors  
Variables Description Data source 
  
JUD= Judicial 
Independence                                                 
 
To what extent is the judiciary in a country 
independent from influences of members of 
government, citizens, or firms? (1 = heavily 






BIND = Board 
Independence         
 
The characteristics of corporate governance 
by investors and boards of directors in a 
country? (1 = management has little 
accountability to investors and boards; 7 = 
investors and boards exert strong 







SEC = the enforcement of 
securities laws                                    
  
The regulation and supervision of securities 
exchanges in a country? (1 = less effective; 







ENF= enforcement of 
auditing and accounting 
standards            
 
 
Financial auditing and reporting standards 
regarding company financial performance? 








MIN= protection of 
minority shareholders                              
 
 
to what extent are the interests of minority 
shareholders protected by the legal system? 









Market size= Market 
capitalization of listed 
companies (% of GDP).    
 
 




The World Bank 
(2007-2010) 
 
5.4.4. Second stage models  
In the second stage regressions, we investigated the effect of investor protection, enforcement 
of accounting standards, and strength of capital market on both accruals and real earnings 
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management. We ran the regression for each of them separately as there was a high correlation 
between them (see Table 6-4). 
To measure the effect of investor protection on earnings management, we ran the following 
regression: 
&! = ' + '	! + '$#(! + ')! + '*+,-! + '$-$! + '.#/ + 																	 
Where:  
EM 58              = earnings management metric (DAACR, RM1, RM2) 
INV               = investor protection metric obtained from the principle component analysis of six variables  
ROA               = net income divided by total assets firm i in year t 
SIZE              = natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t 
LEV               = end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value for firm i in year t 
GROWTH     = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales      
in year t-1 
SHARES     = natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. 
We included ROA, SIZE, LEV, GROWTH and SHARES to contr l for profitability, size, 
capital structure, performance and capital incentivs respectively as earnings management 
measures may include errors correlated with firm characteristics. In section 4.3.6, we provided 
an explanation of the effect of firm characteristic on both accruals and real earnings 
management.  
To measure the effect of enforcement of accounting standards on earnings management, we ran 
the following regression: 
&! = ' + '	! + '$#(! + ')! + '*+,-! + '$-$! + './
 + 																. 
                                                          
58 DAACR is the residuals from the accruals model. RM1 and RM2 are the metrics of real earnings management. 
DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are estimated using modified DD; RM1 is the first 
measure of real earnings management computed by adding abnormal production costs to the abnormal 
discretionary expenses after multiplying the latter by negative one. RM2 is the second measure of real earnings 
management, which is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses after 
multiplying them by negative one.  
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 ENF is enforcement of auditing and accounting standards                                   (WEF, 2008-2011) 
 Other variables as defined before. 
To measure the effect of strength of capital market on earnings management, we ran the 
following regression: 
&! = ' + '	! + '$#(! + ')! + '*+,-! + '$-$! + '.&$ + 																			0 
Where:  
MS   = Market size or capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of   
shares outstanding lagged by GDP                                         (The World Bank, 2007-2010)  
Other variables as defined before. 
5.5. Conservatism and value relevance  
In Chapter 7, we investigated the effect of investor protection, enforcement of accounting 
standards, and strength of capital market on conservatism and value relevance to capture 
earnings quality from equity valuation perspective and contracting perspective, which is the 
first study to do so. This is important because earnings quality means different things to 
different stakeholders. Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue that the value relevance research is 
of value from equity valuation perspective but this does not apply to contracting perspective 
and therefore it is of less value in measuring earnings quality. Watts (2003) and Leone et al. 
(2006) consider that earnings conservatism may be an optimal attribute from contracting 
perspective.  
In the sections that follow, we present the models employed to estimate the effect of country-
specific factors on conservatism first and then on value relevance.  
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5.5.1. Conservatism  
We did not use Basu’s (1997) model due to the biases in the model, which make the differential 
timeliness measure (DT) unreliable as argued by Givoly et al. (2007), Dietrich et al. (2007) and 
Patatoukas and Thomas (2011). Ball and Shivakumar (2005) provide a measure of timely loss 
recognition (conditional conservatism) based on the correlation between current accruals and 





	 + 																																																															3 
Where: 
														!,						= total accruals in year t lagged by the total assets at he beginning of year t. Total accruals are 
the difference between earnings and operating cash flow in year t. 

!,   = cash flow from operations for firm i in year t deflated by total assets at the beginning of year t.  
													"
!, 	=	 Dummy variable set equal to 1 if CFO <0 and 0 otherwise. 
            '  > 0 means more timely recognition of losses and thus higher conservatism.  
To investigate the effect of investor protection, we ran the following regression based on Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005): 
!, =	' +	'	"
!, + '
!, + '#/ +	'"
!, ∗ 
	 + '"




!, ∗ #/ + 																																																																															4 
If '0	> 0, strong investor protection increases the conditional conservatism.  
To test the effect of the enforcement of accounting standards on the extent of conservatism, we 














 + 																																																					 
If '0	> 0, this means that strong enforcement of accounting standards increases the conditional 
conservatism. 
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If '0	> 0, this means that strong capital market increases th  conditional conservatism. 
5.5.2. Value relevance  
The initial model for investigating value relevance, developed by Ohlson (1995), regresses 
stock price on book value per share and earnings per share. We built on the Ohlson (1995) 
model by using a model similar to that in Barth et al. (1998) and Davis-Friday et al. (2006). We 
added to Ohlson’s model three variables to capture he effect of institutional factors: the 
institutional factor variable, the interaction betwen the institutional factor and book value per 
share, and the interaction between earnings per share and the institutional factor:  
First, we examined the value relevance of book value and earnings conditional on investor 
protection.  
&! = ' +	'		5$! + '	$! + '#/ + '#/ ∗ 5$! + '#/ ∗ $! 	+ 																 
Where: 
             67!	        = stock price after 3 months of fiscal year nd 
														879!      = book value per share of firm i in year t 
														9!   = earnings per share of firm i in year t 
														:;7          =  investor protection 
If <= and <> are significantly positive, the increase in value relevance on information measures will 
be attributed to the level of investor protection.  
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Second, we investigated the effect of enforcement of accounting standards on the value relevance of 
book value and earnings.  
&! = ' +	'		5$! + '	$! + '/
 + '/
 ∗ 5$! + '/
 ∗ $! + 																			 
If <= and <> are significantly positive, the enforcement of accounting standards improves the 
relevance of book value and earnings.  
Third, we explored whether the strength of capital m rket enhanced the value relevance of book 
value and earnings.  
& = ' +	'		5$! + '	$! + '&$ + '&$ ∗ 5$! + '&$ ∗ $! + 																					14					 
If <= and <> are significantly positive, the stronger capital market, the more value relevance of 
book value and earnings. 
5.6. Methodological issues  
As mentioned before, WorldScope database provides a v riable called 
"WS.AcctgStandardsFollowed" which shows whether the company is applying IFRS or not. If 
the output is 23, it means that the company is applying IFRS. However, there are shortcomings 
and a classification error in the field as reported by Daske et al. (2007)59. Moreover, Thomson 
Reuters classifies a company as an IFRS adopter if i  mentions that in its annual report. In some 
countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Philippines, the local accounting standards 
applied are identical to IFRS but are under different names. In such countries, companies which 
apply the national standards are considered as non-ad pters by WorldScope; therefore, in this 
study companies in these countries were considered as IFRS adopters if 
"WS.AcctgStandardsFollowed" gave 01(local standards) or 23 (IFRS).  
                                                          
59 In their published paper in 2013, they did not mention this clearly (see Daske et al., 2013).  
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It is important to refer to a methodological issue regarding prior studies in terms of coding a 
company as an IFRS adopter or not. Houqe et al. (2012) used a dummy variable taking 1 for a 
given country in the years of mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise based on the report of 
Deloite in 2009 ‘Use of IFRS by jurisdiction’. This way of coding countries as mandating or 
not mandating IFRS adoption has shortcomings in that i  presumes that all listed companies in a 
given country use IFRS in the preparation of their financial statements. However, in Germany 
and France, for example, domestic listed companies mu t use the local accounting standards in 
the preparation of their standalone financial statements (see section 2.3). Hence, companies 
without subsidiaries do not use IFRS in their financi l statements even though the authors 
would consider them as IFRS adopters. Some firms in the EU did not adopt IFRS until 2007; 
therefore, it is misleading to consider all listed companies in the EU as IFRS adopters since 
2005. Some other firms switched to IFRS before it became mandatory but were coded as IFRS 
adopters starting from 2005, so it is not surprising if those companies do not experience a 
significant change after mandatory IFRS adoption.  
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) used the accounting standards followed in DataStream available 
through WorldScope. However, such methodology ignores that some countries were adopting 
national accounting standards identical to IFRS but under different names. Firms in that case 
would be classified as non-IFRS adopters before IFRS became mandatory, even though they 
were applying accounting standards identical to IFRS. For instance, as from 2003, South Africa 
mandated the implementation of SA GAAP, which are the same as IFRS but named SA GAAP. 
Then it mandated IFRS as issued by the IASB starting from 2005. One may ask, is there a 
significant change when moving from national standards, fully based on IFRS and issued under 
a national name, to IFRS as issued by the IASB?  
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Our work overcomes the limitations discussed above by dropping the early years of adoption, 
focusing on the effect of country-specific factors rather than the effect of standards, and looking 
in more depth at the context of countries involved in the study as explained in details in section 
2.3.  
Turning now to how previous studies corrected for cr ss-sectional and time-series dependence. 
Gow et al. (2010) investigated the methods employed in the literature on earnings quality, cost 
of debt, equity capital, and conservatism of correcting for cross sectional dependence and time 
series dependence. Their sample included 121 papers published in Journal of Accounting 
Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics and The Accounting Review during the years 
from 2002 to 2006.The results revealed that 25 % of the papers investigated had ignored the 
existence of cross sectional and/or time series dependence. On the other hand, the other 75 % 
had shown some attempts to deal with both types of dependence following three methods from 
econometrics or other three approaches developed by accounting scholars, but these had not 
been assessed. They found that the methods used in the literature did not correct for both 
dependences. That is Newey-West, Fama-MacBeth, and Z2 Statistic correct either for cross 
sectional or over time dependence. Interestingly, they concluded that the inferences of studies 
on earnings quality, governance, and idiosyncratic risk were not robust to the use of ‘well 
specified test statistics’ (p.486).  
In contrast to Petersen (2009), who concludes that clustering by both firm and time is not 
required in asset pricing and capital structure studies, Gow et al. (2010) find them necessary in 
a variety of accounting applications to reach valid inferences. They argue that both types of 
dependence are greater in accounting variables compared to finance variables. Clustering two 
dimensions, entity and time, corrects for both dependencies.  
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In this study, we ran pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) clustered by firm and year to correct 
for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross sectional dependence. Clustering by two 
dimensions (firm and year) produces unbiased standard errors in the presence of serial 
autocorrelation and cross sectional dependence. 
5.7. Conclusion  
This chapter has described the methods used in this investigation. More specifically, it has 
discussed sample selection, the models of accruals e rnings management, real earnings 
management, conservatism and value relevance. It also presented in detail the measurement of 
institutional factors included in the study. Some mthodological issues such as whether using 
signed or unsigned accruals and the assumption of market efficient were discussed. In addition, 
this chapter has described some methodological issues ch as the market efficiency assumption 
and shortcomings of determining IFRS adopters in previous studies.  
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6.1. Introduction  
The turning point in the history of international accounting was in 2005 with the adoption of 
IFRS in the EU, Australia and South Africa. Since th n, the number of countries using IFRS 
has increased significantly. The IASB, the successor to the IASC, aims to develop a single set 
of high quality accounting standards that are applicab e internationally but has no power to 
enforce IFRS, which is in the hands of local authori ies. Country-specific factors interact with 
IFRS in shaping accounting practices so that accounting quality under IFRS may differ across 
countries.  
Earnings quality, captured by different metrics, has been studied in the literature to draw 
conclusions on the effect of IFRS adoption on accounting practices. Prior research employs 
accruals earnings management to test the effect of IFRS on accounting quality. However, recent 
studies (e.g. Graham et al., 2005) suggest that managers may manage earnings via real 
activities. Country-specific factors may drive different types of earnings management in that 
strong institutions may decrease the ability of managers to manipulate earnings via accruals but, 
at the same time, increase real earnings management whose effects might be negative. The 
present work fills this gap in the literature by investigating the effect of country-specific factors 
on both accruals and real earnings management underIFRS. 
Exploring the effect of country-specific factors onearnings quality under IFRS is of great 
importance to determine whether IFRS alone is enough to secure consistent accounting 
practices. Further, it can be noted how country-specific factors may drive different earnings 
quality characteristics.  
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This chapter is concerned with the first empirical study of the thesis, earnings management. It 
investigates whether investor protection, enforcement and the strength of capital market 
influence earnings captured by accruals and real earnings management across 23 countries that 
mandated IFRS adoption in 2005 or before.  
The remaining part of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the descriptive 
statistics. Section 3 includes the results. This is followed by the discussion in section 4. Section 
5 deals with additional tests. Section 6 concludes th  chapter.  
6.2. Descriptive statistics 
Chapter 2 provided an explanation of the countries of the present study, including information 
about the IFRS version, the year of adoption, and the companies that are required to comply 
with IFRS (see section 2.3). Chapter 5 included a detailed discussion of sample construction 
and the distribution of firms by country and industry (see section 5.3). This section presents 
descriptive statistics that are not highlighted in prior chapters.  
Table 6-1 presents median values of accruals and real earnings management metrics on country 
level. Median values of DAACR, A_PROD, A_DISX, and A_CFO, are near to zero because 
they are the residuals from accruals and real earnings management models. RM1 is computed 
by adding abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by 
negative one. RM2 is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying them by negative one. Therefore, the median values of RM1 and 
RM2 are relatively larger than those of A_PROD, A_DISX, and A_CFO.  
Table 6-2 presents descriptive statistics for firm level variables used in the regression including 
accruals earnings management metric, real earnings management metrics and the control 
variables. All variables are winsorized at (p=0.01) to remove the effect of outliers in the 
regression.  
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Table 6-1 The medians of country-level variables  
country DACCR A-PROD A-DISX A-CFO RM1 RM2 
Australia 0.0064 0.0303 -0.0523 0.0012 0.0774 0.0385 
Austria 0.0028 -0.0012 -0.0258 0.0003 0.0376 0.0311 
Belgium 0.00002 0.0061 -0.0011 -0.0051 0.0116 0.0057 
Bulgaria 0.0015 0.0053 -0.0064 -0.0016 0.0071 -0.00007 
Denmark -7.99E-10 0.0034 -0.0038 -0.0034 0.0169 0.00981 
Finland 1.40E-09 0.0004 -0.0075 0.0022 0.0037 0.0097 
France 0.002631 0.0281 -0.0432 -0.0028 0.0743 0.0352 
Germany 0.004076 0.0202 -0.0321 -0.0048 0.0550 0.0297 
Greece 0.000899 0.0027 -0.0184 -0.0026 0.0121 0.0093 
Hong Kong -0.000115 0.0173 -0.0211 -0.0063 0.0414 0.0228 
Italy 0.000888 0.0082 -0.0245 -0.0004 0.0485 0.0289 
Jordan 0.000758 0.0009 -0.0061 0.0055 0.0117 0.0024 
Netherlands 7.07E-10 0.0071 -0.0366 0.0005 0.0382 0.0247 
Norway 0.000361 -0.0046 -0.0192 -0.0023 0.0092 0.0106 
Oman 6.52E-10 0.0013 -0.0036 -0.0006 0.0016 0.0049 
Philippines 5.30e-10 0.0046 -0.0083 -0.0034 0.0286 0.0064 
Poland 0.002268 -0.0009 -0.0090 -0.0010 0.0221 0.0127 
Portugal 3.34E-10 0.0005 -0.0017 0.0006 0.0057 0.0029 
Singapore 0.001213 0.0066 -0.0149 0.0004 0.0185 0.0155 
South Africa -0.00069 0.0117 -0.0022 -0.0069 0.0151 0.0141 
Spain 0.000071 0.0033 -.01422 .00010 0.0286 0.0072 
Sweden 0.004922 0.0078 -.02703 0.0067 0.0436 0.0125 
UK 0.005320 0.0252 -0.0385 0.0006 0.0676 0.0394 
Notes to Table 6-1: 
DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are estimated using the modified 
DD model; A_PROD represents abnormal production costs, where production costs are the sum 
of cost of goods sold, and the change in inventories. A_DISX is abnormal discretionary 
expenses, where discretionary expenses are the difference between operation income and gross 
income from WorldScope (SG&A expenses, R&D expenses and advertising expenses are 
included). A_CFO represents the level of abnormal cash flow from operations. RM1 is the first 
measure of real earnings management. RM1 is the first measure of real earnings management 
computed by adding abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after 
multiplying the latter by negative one. RM2 is the s cond measure of real earnings 
management, which is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying them by negative one. 
The mean values of DAACR, A_PROD, A_DISX, and A_CFO are zero because the abnormal 
values are the residuals of the regression equations of accruals earnings management and real 
earnings management. The accruals earnings management metric is ADCCR with a median 
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equal to 0.001. The 25th percentile value of abnormal accruals is (-0.0287) and the 75th 
percentile value is .033. The median of abnormal production costs (A_PROD) is 0.013. The 
25th percentile value of abnormal production costs is (-0.080), and the 75th percentile value is 
0.108. The A_DISX median equals (-0.024). The 25th percentile value of abnormal 
discretionary expenses is (-0.091) and the 75th percentile is 0.051. The median of A_CFO is (-
.001). The 25th percentile value of abnormal cash flow rom operations is (-.0535) and the 75th 
percentile is .052. 
Table 6-2 Descriptive statistics for firm-level regression variables (N = 16328) 
Variables Mean Std.Dev 25%Percentiles Median 75%Percentiles 
DACCR .000 .065 -.0287 .001 .033 
A_PROD .000 .221 -.080 .013 .108 
A_DISX .000 .206 -.091 -.024 .051 
A_CFO .000 .125 -.0535 -.001 .052 
RM1 .003 .359 -.120 .038 .192 
RM2 .001 .212 -.082 .022 .119 
ROA .018 .136 .0004 .038 .078 
SIZE 2.32 .875 1.72 2.24 2.87 
LEV 2.44 7.10 .424 .994 1.93 
GROWTH .122 .389 -.080 .0675 .243 
SHARES 1.83 .92 1.145 1.873 2.53 
Notes to Table 6-2: 
DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are estimated using the modified 
DD model; A_PROD represents abnormal production costs, where production costs are the sum 
of cost of goods sold, and the change in inventories. A_DISX is abnormal discretionary 
expenses, where discretionary expenses are the difference between operation income and gross 
income from WorldScope (SG&A expenses, R&D expenses and advertising expenses are 
included). A_CFO represents the level of abnormal cash flow from operations. RM1 is the first 
measure of real earnings management computed by adding abnormal production costs to the 
abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying the latter by negative one. RM2 is the second 
measure of real earnings management, which is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and 
abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying them by negative one. ROA is return on 
assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity 
book value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t 
minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural logarithm of 
outstanding shares for firm i in year t. All variables are winsorized at p=0.01 
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The first measure of real earnings management is RM1 with a median equal to .038 and a 
standard deviation equal to 0.359. The 25th percentile of RM1 is -.120 while the 75th percentile 
is .192. RM2 is the second earnings management measure with a median equal to .022. The 
25th percentile of RM2 is -.082 whereas the 75th percentile is 0.119. The mean and standard 
deviations of ROA are respectively (0.018, 0.136), SIZE (2.32, 0.875), LEV (2.44, 7.10), 
GROWTH (0.122, 0.389) and SHARES (1.83, 0.92). These values are consistent with previous 
studies (e.g. Francis and Wang, 2008; Hope et al., 2008; Houqe et al., 2012). 
Table 6-3 provides the medians for six country-specific factors variables. Board 
independence, enforcement of securities laws, protecti n of minority shareholders, 
enforcement of accounting & auditing standards, and judicial independence are 
adopted from the World Economic Forum with scores fom 1 (weak) to 7 (strong).  
For the board independence variable, Sweden (5.95) followed by South Africa (5.75), 
Australia (5.67) and Singapore (5.62) have the highest scores, whereas Bulgaria 
(4.12), Greece (4), and Italy (3.97) have the lowest scores. South Africa (6.1), Sweden 
(6), Singapore (5.87), and Norway (5.8) have strong enforcement of securities laws 
while Italy (4.27), Spain (4.15), and Bulgaria (3.62) have the weakest enforcement of 
securities laws. In terms of the minority protection variable, Sweden (6.02), Finland 
(5.87), Norway (5.8) and South Africa (5.62) have the highest scores. On the other 
hand, Italy (3.57) and Bulgaria (3.57) have the lowest scores on minority protection.   
For enforcement of accounting and auditing standards, South Africa (6.32), Sweden 
(6.2), Finland (6.15), and Singapore (6.15) have the strongest enforcement of 
accounting and auditing standards. Philippines (4.2), Bulgaria (4.3) and Italy (4.17) 
have the weakest enforcement of accounting and auditing standards. 
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Table 6-3 Medians of country-specific factors variables 
Country BIND SEC MIN ENF JUD MS 
Australia 5.67 5.77 5.35 5.97 6.3 1.20 
Austria 5.17 4.97 5.15 5.9 5.87 0.28 
Belgium 5.15 5.15 5.12 5.7 5.4 0.57 
Bulgaria 4.12 3.62 3.57 4.3 2.92 0.25 
Denmark 5.42 5.65 5.62 5.82 6.5 0.65 
Finland 5.57 5.75 5.87 6.15 6.45 0.74 
France 5.12 5.45 4.9 5.65 4.95 0.78 
Germany 5.32 5.12 5.3 5.7 6.4 0.44 
Greece 4 4.45 4.9 4.77 3.65 0.39 
Hong Kong 4.92 5.62 5.1 6.02 6.05 5.14 
Italy 3.97 4.27 3.57 4.17 3.55 0.26 
Jordan 4.55 5.02 5.07 5.32 4.75 1.64 
Netherlands 5.4 5.45 5.25 5.92 6.35 0.80 
Norway 5.55 5.8 5.8 6.07 6.2 0.60 
Oman 4.92 5.3 5.25 5.25 5.15 0.38 
Philippines 4.75 4.2 4.2 4.85   3 0.58 
Poland 4.42 4.92 4.35 4.95 4.1 0.34 
Portugal 4.4 5 4.67 5 4.52 0.41 
Singapore 5.62 5.87 5.62 6.15 5.72 1.67 
South Africa 5.75 6.1 5.62 6.32 4.97 2.24 
Spain 4.6 4.15 4.4 5.02 4.02 0.90 
Sweden 5.95 6 6.02 6.2 6.57 1.04 
UK 5.27 5.05 5.25 5.77 6.07 1.18 
Notes to Table 6-3: 
BIND is the board independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). SEC is 
the enforcement of securities laws scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MIN 
is the protection of minority shareholders interest scores from the World Economic Forum 
(2008-2011). ENF is the enforcement of accounting & auditing standards scores from the 
World Economic Forum (2008-2011). JUD is the judicial independence scores from the World 
Economic Forum (2008-2011). MS is the market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) 
from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as the share price times the number of shares 
outstanding.     
 
Sweden (6.57), Denmark (6.5), Finland (6.45), and Germany (6.4) have the highest scores on 
judicial independence whereas Philippines (3), Italy (3.55), and Bulgaria (2.92) have the lowest 
scores on judicial independence.   
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MS, in Table 6-3, is the market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP), which 
is adopted from the World Bank (2007-2010), and is defined as the share price times 
the number of shares outstanding. From Table 6-3, it can be seen that Hong Kong 
(5.14), South Africa (2.24), Singapore (1.67), and Jordan (1.64) are the largest equity 
markets. Poland (0.34), Austria (0.28), Italy (0.26), and Bulgaria (0.25) are the 
smallest equity markets. 
Table 6-4 Correlation matrix for country-level regression variables 
 BIND SEC MIN ENF JUD MS 
BIND 1      
SEC .800***  1     
MIN .869***  .805***  1    
ENF .888***  .864***  .894***  1   
JUD .805***  .628***  .779***  .835***  1  
MS .085***  .388***  .181***  .438***  .307***  1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes to Table 6-4: BIND is the board independence scores from the World Economic Forum 
(2008-2011). SEC is the enforcement of securities laws scores from the World Economic 
Forum (2008-2011). MIN is the protection of minority shareholders interest scores from the 
World Economic Forum (2008-2011). ENF is the enforcement of accounting & auditing 
standards scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). JUD is the judicial 
independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MS is the market 
capitalisation from the World Bank (2008-2011), defin d as the share price times the number 
of shares outstanding.  
Table 6-4 presents the correlations between country-level variables. It indicates that 
the correlations are all positive; significant at level 0.01 and high, except for two cases 
where the correlations are 0.085 and 0.181. Since th  correlations among the six 
institutional variables are relatively high and each of them refers to the strength of 
investor protection (see section 4.7), we run Factor Analysis (Principle Component) of 
the six country-level variables, five adopted from the World Economic Forum from 
2008 to 2011, and one from the World Bank (see Table 5-3). Then we use the 
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loadings of Factor 1 as a metric of investor protection as in Panel B in Table 6-5 
shows60.  
Table 6-5 Investor protection variable 
Panel A: Factor analysis/correlation 
Number of comp.  =         6    
Trace            =          6    
Rotation: (unrotated )          
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 4.30653 3.27801 0.7178 0.7178 
Factor2 1.02852 0.648666 0.1714 0.8892 
Factor3 0.379858 0.229325 0.0633 0.9525 
Factor4 0.150533 0.0537963 0.0251 0.9776 
Factor5 0.0967371 0.0589202 0.0161 0.9937 
Factor6 0.0378169 . 0.0063 1 
 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 1.1e+05 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Panel B: Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances  
Variable Factor 1      Uniqueness 
BIND 0.9083     0.175 
SEC 0.9056     0.018 
MIN 0.9228       0.1485 
ENF 0.9772     0.045 
JUD 0.8565       0.2663 
MS 0.3483        0.8787 
 
Panel C: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable                                              kmo 
BIND                                                   0.7303 
SEC                                                   0.8599 
MIN                                                   0.8329 
ENF                                                0.7329 
JUD                                                0.8668 
MS                                                 0.2533 
Overall                                              0.7468 
 
Table 6-5 presents principle component factors from which we obtain our measure of investor 
protection. We chose Factor 1, which explains 71.78% of the total variation in the original 
variables, as the eigenvalue value equals 4.306, which is much larger than one as shown in 
Panel A of Table 6-5. Panel B of Table 6-5 presents the factors loading used as a measure of 
                                                          
60 As a robustness check, we used the rotated loadings of Factor1 and Factor2 as a measure of investor protection 
(See Appendix 1 Table XI and Appendix 1 Table XII).  
Chapter 6. First Empirical 
 
        
 
154 
investor protection in this study. Panel C shows that Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy of our investor protection factor using six country-specific factors. The mean Kaiser-
Myer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.7468, greater than 0.5, which indicates that the 
investor protection factor captures the common factor of the six country-specific factors we 
used (Stewart, 1981).    
The correlation matrix for firm-level regression variables is presented in Table 6-6. It indicates 
a weak correlation between most of them, which means the absence of the multicollinearity 
problem in the model. The highest correlation is betwe n size and number of shares at 
0.4006.The lowest is between growth and leverage at -0.009.  
Table 6-6 Correlation matrix for firm-level regression variables 
 ROA SIZE LEV GROWTH SHARES  
ROA 1     
SIZE 0.20*** 1    
LEV -0.1399*** -0.083*** 1   
GROWTH 0.1313*** -0.0129 0.0097 1  
SHARES  0.1063*** 0.4006*** -0.072*** 0.0634*** 1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 6-6: 
 ROA is the return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by 
end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as 
the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural 
logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t.  
6.3. Results  
Table 6-7 shows the correlation between earnings management proxies, accruals and real. The 
Pearson correlation between discretionary accruals (DACCR) and the first measure of real 
earnings management (RM1) is insignificant (0.004) while the Spearman correlation is 
significantly positive (0.021). The correlation betw en DAACR and RM2 is significantly 
positive (Pearson 0.059; Spearman 0.083). Hence, firms engag in both accruals earnings 
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management and real activities manipulation at the same time and this is consistent with 
previous studies (Zang, 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010)61. While real earnings management 
actions are exercised across the year, accruals earnings management takes place at the end of 
the year when preparing financial reporting (Zang, 2012).  
Table 6-7 Correlation matrix among earnings management proxies 
 DACCR RM1 RM2 
DACCR 1 0.0203*** 0.0813*** 
RM1 0.0045 1 0.864*** 
RM2 0.059*** .9108*** 1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes to Table 6-7:  
This table reports Pearson (lower triangle) and Spearman (upper triangle) correlation. 
DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are estimated using modified 
DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings management computed by adding abnormal 
production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying the latter by 
negative one. RM2 is the second measure of real earnings management, which is the 
aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses after 
multiplying them by negative one.  
The investor protection analysis is reported in Table 6-8. The relationship between DACCR and 
investor protection is significantly negative (<A=-0.0009) while the relationship between real 
earnings management measures and investor protection is significantly positive (<A= 0.0087 & 
0.0057). This means that managers are less likely to overstate earnings via accounting policies 
in countries having relatively strong investor protection, whereas in such countries, managing 
earnings upwards by real actions is greater than in countries with weak investor protection. 
With regard to control variables, it can also be noticed that while accruals earnings management 
is lower in large firms, real earnings management is greater in large firms. Large firms are more 
scrutinised by regulators and external investors, therefore, they tend to engage in real earnings 
management.  
                                                          
61 I ran the regression of accruals and included the real earnings management as an independent variable (See 
Appendix 1 Table XIII and Appendix 1 Table XIV). I found a positive and significant relationship between 
accruals and real earnings management.  
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Table 6-8 Investor protection and earnings management  
 
&! = ' +'	! + '$#(! + ')! + '*+,-! + '$-$! + '.#/ + 		 
 (1) (2) (3) 









    
ROA                      '	 0.230 -0.3159 -0.334 
 27.62*** -7.90*** -13.72*** 
SIZE                      ' -0.0049 0.0165 0.011 
 -4.65*** 2.45*** 3.21** 
LEV                      ' 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 2.00**   -0.72 -0.38 
GROWTH            ' -0.0012 -0.0325 -0.066 
 -0.59 -4.34*** -3.96*** 
SHARES              ' -0.0017 -0.0133 -0.0066 
 -3.15** -3.02** -2.31** 
INV                      '. -0.0009 0.0087 0.0057 
 -2.31**   2.83 **  2.67** 
Constant               ' 0.010 -0.00009 -0.004 
 2.48** 1.25 -0.27 
Observations 16,328 16,328 16,328 
 Adj. BC 0.227 0.0172 0.0491 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 6-8: DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are 
estimated using modified DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings management computed 
by adding abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying 
the latter by negative one. RM2 is the second measur  of real earnings management, which is 
the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses after 
multiplying them by negative one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by 
total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of 
year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is 
the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in 
year t-1. SHARES is the natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. INV is the 
investor protection computed by component principle analysis of six variables. These variables 
are: BIND is the board independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). 
SEC is the enforcement of securities laws scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-
2011). MIN is the protection of minority shareholders interest scores from the World Economic 
Forum (2008-2011). ENF is the enforcement of accounting & auditing standards scores from 
the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). JUD is the judicial independence scores from the 
World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MS is the market capitalisation of listed companies (% of 
GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as the s are price times the number of shares 
outstanding.   
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The relationship between profitability and accruals earnings management is positive and 
significant (<D = 0.230 whereas it is negative with real earnings management (<D =
−7.90	&	13.72. This indicates that profitable firms engage in overstating earnings by accruals 
while less profitable firms take real actions. This finding can be justified by the fact that the 
sustained weak performance can provide less opportunity for accounting earnings management 
(DeAngelo et al., 1994), and that real earnings management has negative effects on future 
operating performance. For example, increasing current sales by granting discounts may 
influence future profitability once the companies rtu n to old prices (Gunny, 2005).  
Greater leverage is associated with greater accruals e rnings management <L = 	0.0002 
whereas there is no relationship between leverage and real earnings management. Firms with 
higher leverage are more likely to boost earnings via accruals earnings management. GROWTH 
is negatively associated with real earnings management (-0.0325 & -0.066), which is consistent 
with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2015), while there is no relationship 
between firms growth and accruals earnings management.  
Finally, the relationship between SHARES and both accruals and real earnings management is 
negative and significant. This means that firms with a higher number of shares engage in less 
earnings management.  
From Table 6-9, it is apparent that the relationship between DACCR and enforcement is 
significantly negative; in contrast, the relationship between enforcement and real earnings 
management activities is significantly positive. Assuch, strong enforcement of accounting 
standards curtails accruals earnings management, but increases real earnings management. In 
addition, the relationship between both streams of earnings management and the control 
variables is the same as reported in the analysis of investor protection. 
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Table 6-9 Enforcement of accounting standards and earnings management  
 
&! = ' + '	! + '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ROA                    '	 0.230 -0.3165 -0.3347 
 27.58*** -7.94*** -13.83*** 
SIZE                    ' -0.0049 0.0166 0.0111 
 -4.77***   2.49** 3.27** 
LEV                    ' 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 1.98** -0.66 -0.33 
GROWTH          ' -0.0012 -0.0322 -0.0225 
 -0.60 -4.45*** -4.03*** 
SHARES            ' -0.0016 -0.0139 -0.007 
 -2.93** -3.13**   -2.46**   
ENF                   '. -0.0021 0.0172 0.0115 
 -3.42**   3.05** 3.08** 
Constant            ' 0.022 -0.0976 -0.0676 
 4.67*** -2.76** -3.29*** 
Observations 16,328 16,328 16,328 
 Adj. BC 0.2209 0.0173 0.0492 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes to Table 6-9:  
DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are estimated using modified 
DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings management computed by adding abnormal 
production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying the latter by negative 
one. RM2 is the second measure of real earnings management, which is the aggregation of both 
abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying them by negative 
one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by 
end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as 
the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural 
logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. ENF is the enforcement of auditing and 
accounting standards scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011).   
For the effect of strength of capital market, the results are similar to those for investor 
protection and enforcement as reported in Table 6-10. That is, accruals earnings management is 
lower in big capital markets where real earnings management is greater.   
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The overall results suggest that: 
I. Using accruals to manage earnings upwards is less in countries of relatively strict 
investor protection, stronger enforcement of accounting and auditing standards and large 
capital market. This finding supports Hypothesis1.  
II.  At the same time, managing earnings upwards via real actions is more likely in 
countries having rigorous investor protection, strong enforcement, and large capital 
market. This result confirms Hypothesis2.  
6.4. Discussion  
In comparison with accruals earnings management studies, there has been a lack of prior 
research into real earnings management, especially comparative studies across countries. 
Managers tend to manipulate real activities instead of accruals manipulation to avoid coming 
under regulatory scrutiny (Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). Country-specific factors 
may drive different streams of earnings management. 
In addition, the focus in previous studies was mainly o  the effect of the introduction of IFRS 
on earnings management. Our study investigates the effect of country-specific factors, namely 
investor protection, enforcement of accounting standards and market equity size, on both 
accruals and real earnings management across 23 countries mandating IFRS application.                 
In general, there is an indication that companies engage in both types of earnings management, 
accruals and real. At the same time, the findings reveal that strong investor protection, strong 
enforcement and large equity markets are associated wi h lower accruals earnings management 
and greater real earnings management and vice versa. Arguably, companies in countries with 
strong investor protection, strong enforcement and l rge equity markets boost earnings by using 
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real earnings management activities to a greater ext nt whereas accruals management is used to 
a lesser extent and vice versa. 
Table 6-10 Strength of capital market and earnings management  
 




(1) (2) (3) 









    
ROA                   '	 0.2313 -.2802 -0.339 
 28.96*** -8.31*** -14.20*** 
SIZE                  ' -0.0056 .0153 0.0138 
 -5.41*** 2.72** 3.63*** 
LEV                  ' 0.0002 -.0002 -0.000 
 1.85* -0.43 -0.05 
GROWTH        ' -0.0012 -.0276 -0.022 
 -0.60 -4.25*** -4.05*** 
SHARES          ' -0.001 -.0198 -0.0132 
 -0.19 -3.40** -3.17** 
MS                   '. -0.00001 .00003 0.00007 
 -2.93** 2.55** 2.91** 
Constant          ' .0115 .0069 -0.011 
 2.91** 0.59 -1.01 
Observations 16,328 16,328 16,328 
Adj. BC 0.221 0.0179 0.05 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes to Table 6-10:  
DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are estimated using modified 
DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings management computed by adding abnormal 
production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying the latter by negative 
one. RM2 is the second measure of real earnings management, which is the aggregation of both 
abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying them by negative 
one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by 
end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as 
the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural 
logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. MS is the market capitalisation of listed 
companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as the share price times the 
number of shares outstanding.    
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Indeed, Zang (2012) finds that while companies in the post SOX period engage in both streams 
of earnings management, accruals earnings management actions have been taken to a minimal 
degree, and real earnings management to a large degr e.  
Schipper (2003), among others, noted that with tighter accounting standards, real earnings 
management might substitute accruals earnings management. In the same vein, managers would 
choose to switch to real activities instead of taking accounting actions to manage earnings in the 
presence of relatively tighter institutions.  
Table 6-8 reports the investor protection analysis. The relationship between accruals earnings 
management and investor protection is significantly egative while the relationship between 
real earnings management measures and investor protection is significantly positive. As we 
posit, investor protection plays a key role in the outcomes of IFRS application. That is, 
accounting standards are only one of the determinants of accounting quality. Although all 
countries included in the sample have IFRS in place, better protection of outside shareholders is 
associated with lower accruals earnings management. This study used the signed accruals since 
the concern is overestimating the earnings rather than decreasing them. Therefore, the negative 
relationship between investor protection and accruals metric means that firms domiciled in 
countries with rigorous investor protection are less likely to boost reported earnings via accruals 
manipulation. This conclusion ties in with prior studies that emphasized the importance of 
protection of outside shareholders to secure high quality earnings after IFRS adoption (Leuz et 
al., 2003; Houqe et al., 2012). On the other hand, the positive relationship between investor 
protection and real earnings management metric suggests that managers of companies in 
countries with better investor protection tend to take real actions to beat earnings targets. 
Investor protection, which is deeply rooted in the legal system of the country as argued by La 
Potra et al. (2000), does not prohibit cutting some expenses or delaying some projects to meet 
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earnings benchmarks. Strong investor protection increases litigation; therefore, managers tend 
to increase earnings by real activities.  
Moreover, conservative accounting practices are more c mmon in countries with strong judicial 
systems, where firms report bad news faster than firms n countries with weak judicial regimes 
do (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). The existence of conservative accounting, that constrains 
the opportunistic behaviour of managers; reducing ivestments can increase the reported 
earnings (e.g. Penman and Zhang, 2002). Ball et al, (2000) found that greater conservatism was 
associated with strong investor protection systems. Taken together, strong investor protection, 
which is more likely to be accompanied with conservative accounting, prevents accruals 
earnings management but does not prohibit the managers from taking real actions to beat the 
target.  
For enforcement of accounting and auditing standards, the analysis revealed that accruals 
earnings management was less pronounced in countries with strong enforcement of accounting 
and auditing standards. At the same time, rigorous enforcement of accounting and auditing 
standards is positively associated with real earnings management. Strong enforcement 
mechanisms constrain opportunistic behaviour of managers, accounting actions, but do not 
impede the real accounting activities to increase the reported earnings. It is a logical finding that 
managers increase earnings through real actions when there is strong enforcement of accounting 
standards, in which case using accruals to increase rnings might be detected. Real earnings 
management activities do not infringe rules but influence future performance. This indicates the 
important role which local factors play in determining accounting practices under IFRS.  
This finding is consistent with prior research that suggests an effect of enforcement on earnings 
quality (e.g. Houqe et al., 2012), and on the compliance with IFRS (e.g. Glaum et al., 2013). 
The IASB’s objective is to issue enforceable and globa ly accepted accounting standards based 
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on principles, and, supposedly, these standards improve transparency, comparability, and 
quality of financial reporting. If we assume that IFRS adoption improves comparability and 
transparency of financial reporting, as the IASB claims, the enforcement of standards is 
important to ensure compliance with these standards.  
The importance of enforcement of accounting standards fter IFRS adoption stems from the 
fact that IASB has no power to enforce its accounting standards. The IASB, even though it is 
called international, is not as the United Nations Security Council, which has the power to 
oblige the members to implement its decision and ensure the compliance. In addition, IFRS are 
claimed to be principles based accounting standards; hence there is great room to exercise 
judgement by the preparers and auditors of financial reporting. The enforcement of IFRS 
remains the responsibility of local authorities and thus varies from one country to another 
causing potential difference in the outcomes of IFRS application. In fact, it would be more 
misleading to investors when companies in a country claim to apply IFRS where the 
compliance with IFRS is weak because of the poor quality enforcement in such a country. This 
demolishes the cornerstone the IASB depend on to legitimise the adoption of its accounting 
standards worldwide. These findings highlight the fact that adopting IFRS should coincide with 
some enhancements in the quality of local enforcement chanisms.  
With regard to the strength of equity market, the findings reveal that accruals earnings 
management is less pronounced in countries with large equity markets whereas real earnings 
management is more prevalent in such countries. In contrast, companies in countries with 
relatively small equity markets tend to manage their earnings via accruals instead of taking real 
actions. This conclusion is in line with prior research that concludes a relationship between the 
strength of equity markets and the outcomes of IFRS adoption (e.g. Leuz et al., 2003; Glaum et 
al., 2013). The source of capital fund can affect the quality of financial reporting. In large 
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equity markets, outsider-financing systems, sharehold rs who are the main source of finance do 
not have the same access to accounting information their counterparts in insider financing 
systems do. In small equity markets, the providers of capital such as banks, families or 
governments have privileged access to accounting information. Therefore, the need for 
financial reporting to fulfil the needs of shareholders is greater in large equity markets than in 
small equity markets. Such need to protect the interes s of shareholders might require stronger 
legislation in countries with a large equity market resulting in better earnings quality. 
Empirically, our findings show that there is a significant strong correlation between market 
capitalisation and enforcement of accounting and auditing standards (0.438). Countries with a 
large capital market are characterised with stronger enforcement of accounting standards. In 
addition, prior research suggests that outsider-financing systems are more prevalent in common 
law countries, where the investor protection is strong, while insiders systems are more common 
in Roman law countries (La Porta et al., 1997 and 1998). It seems that large equity market 
enhances the protection of investors, which in turnleads to less earnings manipulation. Leuz et 
al. (2003) suggests that strong equity market comple ents investor protection. Ball et al. (2000) 
argue that the shareholder corporate governance model is associated with higher litigation 
enforcement.  
It is important to mention that real earnings management has some negative effects and is costly 
(Graham et al., 2005). In large capital markets, firms manage earnings upward via real earnings 
management activities despite the possible negative effect of real earnings management on the 
subsequent performance. In our regressions on the effect of country-specific factors on real 
earnings management, the relationship between firms’ growth and real earnings management is 
significant and negative (see Table 6-8, Table 6-9 and Table 6-10). This means that managing 
earnings upward through real activities is associated with lower growth. Graham et al. (2005) 
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suggest that managers may choose to sacrifice the fu ure performance for meeting the target as 
missing it would be costly. There appears to be a trade-off between short-term turmoil and 
long-term performance when managers become under the pressure of overreactions and 
financial markets. Such pressure motivates managers to undertake real actions to hit the targets 
even though they may negatively influence future performance.  
The work by Doukakis (2014) found no significant effect of mandatory adoption on real or 
accrual-based earnings management while our results revealed that both accruals and real 
earnings management are influenced by country-specific factors. Taken together, the adoption 
of IFRS alone is not enough to secure consistent accounting practices.  
Prior studies that reported better accounting quality fter IFRS adoption ignore the fact that the 
changes in local circumstances may be attributed to the better earnings quality they found. 
Barth et al. (2008) did not confirm whether the better accounting quality they reported after IAS 
adoption was because of the adoption alone or becaus  of the change in the firms’ incentives 
and economic circumstances. To allow for the error associated with the effect of the change in 
economic circumstances, we covered the period of the inancial crisis from 2007 to 2010, and 
focused on the effect of local factors on accounting quality. We do not claim that the crisis 
period is stable but we covered a period where there was no significant change in the economic 
circumstances as it would be if we covered both periods before and after the crisis. We confirm 
that country-specific factors shape accounting quality under IFRS; this answers the remaining 
questions left from the work of Barth et al. (2008).  
Overall, earnings management under IFRS varies across c untries due to the differences in 
country-specific factors governing the implementation of IFRS and the fact that country-
specific factors drive different types of earnings management. On the face of it, earnings quality 
is better in countries with strong enforcement mechanisms, strong investor protection and 
Chapter 6. First Empirical 
 
        
 
166 
strong capital market since accounting earnings management is lower. However, tighter 
country-specific factors may increase the litigation associated with non-compliance with IFRS; 
therefore, there is a higher degree of real earnings management, which might have negative 
effects on future operating performance.  
These results are important in that they shed lighton an unexplored area, which is real earnings 
management across countries. Less accounting earnings management resulting from higher 
compliance with IFRS, which in turn is higher in strong institutions, is an indication of better 
earnings quality. The compliance with IFRS is necessary to secure consistent accounting 
practices across countries, although there would be higher real earnings management. To 
mitigate the effects of real earnings management, auditors and local regulators should look at 
the negative effects of real earnings management as the negative effects resulting from real 
earnings management might outweigh the benefits of less accounting earnings management.  
6.5. Additional tests  
In this section, we conduct a number of sensitivity checks; these include using a different model 
to capture accruals-earnings management, examining real earnings management strategies, and 
using an alternative metric for investor protection and enforcement of accounting standards. 
Most of the findings from using those alternatives are the same as reported above.  
First, we used the modified Jones (1991) model to measure accruals earnings management as in 
Dechow et al. (1995): 

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We used the residuals from the equation above as a measure of earnings management. The 
results we found are the same as those we obtained with the modified DD model in terms of the 
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significance and the relationship between abnormal accruals and the independent variables (see 
Appendix 1 Table I, Table II, and Table III). Strong investor protection, strict enforcement of 
accounting standards and large capital market are associated with less accruals earnings 
management and greater real earnings management. For his reason, our results are robust 
enough to conclude that strong institutions decrease managing earnings upwards via accruals.    
Second, we ran the regression for real earnings management metrics Abnormal Production 
Costs, Abnormal Discretionary Expenditures, and Abnormal Cash Flows, separately to address 
how country-specific factors shape real earnings management strategies. The results for 
abnormal production costs and discretionary costs were the same as the initial metrics with 
regard to significance and the relationship in that stronger country-specific factors are 
associated with higher real earnings management. As regards abnormal cash flows, their 
statistical relationship with investor protection was not significant but positive whereas their 
relationship with enforcement and capital market was significant and positive (See Appendix 1 
Table IV, Table V, and Table VI). These findings indicate that managing earnings utilizing 
production costs and discretionary expenditures is greater in the settings of strong investor 
protection, strong enforcement, and large capital mrkets. Taking sales actions to manage 
earnings upwards is greater with strong enforcement and large capital markets while there is no 
significant relationship with investor protection. Therefore, we conclude that real earnings 
management is driven by production costs and discret onary expenditures.  
Third, we further tested the effect of the protection of minority shareholders rights as an 
alternative measure of investor protection because it is widely used in the literature as a 
measure of investor protection (Houqe et al., 2012). We found that with stronger protection of 
minority rights, the lower the accruals earnings management, whereas real earnings 
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management was greater (See Appendix 1 Table VII). This is in the line with our findings of 
the effect of investor protection on earnings management. 
Fourth, we also used the Anti-Self-dealing index62 developed by Djankov et al. (2008) as a 
measure to capture investor protection. A higher value of Anti-self means that a transaction 
between two firms controlled by the same person is tightly regulated and is thereby an indicator 
of stronger investor protection. This index is compsed of two indexes, the first is an ex ante-
self-dealing index and the second is an ex post anti-self-dealing index. While the former 
captures the strength of anti-self-dealing laws, the latter captures their enforcement. The results 
we obtained were similar to that we found when using our investor protection measure (See 
Appendix 1 Table VIII). Stronger investor protection, captured by anti-self-dealing, decreases 
managing earnings via accruals but increases taking real actions to manage earnings. This 
further confirms our results on the effect of investor protection on accruals and real earnings 
management.  
Fifth, we did principle component analysis of the five variables, JUD, BIND, SEC, ENF, and 
MIN, excluding the variable of capital market strength to obtain alternative metric of investor 
protection. We ran the regression by including the factor variable we obtained from the five 
aforementioned ones, and the capital market variable in the model. The findings show that 
accruals earnings management are less in countries with strong investor protection and strong 
capital market, where real earnings management is more pronounced (See Appendix 1 Table 
IX). The above results of using alternative measures of investor protection confirm our results 
when we used the loadings of Factor1 in our analysis.  
Sixth, we also tested the effect of enforcement of securities laws as an alternative measure of 
enforcement. The results showed that strong enforcement of securities laws decreased accruals 
                                                          
62 The data was available for all countries except Oman. However, we used the average of Egypt and Jordan for 
Oman since Arab World countries are similar with no great difference.  
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earnings management while real earnings management was greater (See Appendix 1 Table X). 
These findings are the same as we obtained when using the enforcement of accounting 
standards. For this reason, our results are robust enough to conclude that strong enforcement of 
accounting standards decreases overstating earnings via accruals, but increases them by real 
actions.  
Finally, as a robustness check, we used the rotated loa ings of Factor1 and Factor2 as a 
measure of investor protection, instead of Factor1 which we used in our initial analysis. In our 
initial analysis, we used Factor1 because the Eigenvalue was 4.306, much larger than 1, and did 
not use Factor2 as it was not much larger than 1. Appendix 1 Table XI presents descriptive 
statistics of the two factors while Appendix 1 Table XII illustrates the analysis of investor 
protection captured by two factors. Appendix 1 Table XII shows that both factors were 
negatively associated with accruals earnings management, and positively with real earnings 
management. This result is the same as obtained when using only Factor1 as a measure of 
investor protection.  
6.6. Conclusion  
This chapter examined the effect of country-specific factors on both accruals and real earnings 
management across 23 countries that mandate IFRS based accounting standards. Although prior 
research has investigated the effect of some institutions on accruals manipulation across 
different countries (e.g. Houqe et al., 2012; Ahmed et al., 2013) with a focus on the effect of 
IFRS, this is the first paper to examine the effect of country-specific factors on both accruals 
and real earnings management under IFRS. 
To capture discretionary accruals, we used the modified Dechow and Dichev model. To capture 
real earnings management, we followed Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
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and measured the abnormal level of cash flow from operations, discretionary production costs 
and discretionary expenses.  
The overall results suggest that accruals earnings management is less likely in countries with 
stringent investor protection, strong accounting standards enforcement, and a large capital 
market. With respect to real earnings management, the results indicate that firms in countries 
with strong institutions tend to overstate earnings via real activities more than via accruals.  
The study indicates that applying a common set of accounting standards is not enough to obtain 
consistent accounting outcomes across different jurisdictions, and that different country-specific 
factors drive different types of earnings management. Tighter investor protection, stricter 
enforcement of accounting standards, and a large capital market all lead to less accounting 
earnings management, which means better earnings quality. The possible negative effects of 
real earnings management resulting from the aforementioned three factors do not mean that 
these factors cause earnings to be of less quality. Rather, they mean that auditors and local 
regulators should assure that the negative effects of real earnings management do not outweigh 
the benefits of less accounting earnings management. Investigating the net effect of accruals 
and real earnings management is beyond the scope of this study.  
Our findings are important in that they highlight te effect of country-specific factors on both 
accruals and real earnings management across 23 countries mandating IFRS application. To the 
best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine the effect of country-specific factors on 
real earnings management worldwide. Prior research has mainly focused on whether the switch 
to IFRS has enhanced earnings quality, captured by accruals earnings management, whereas 
this study concentrates on the effect of country-specific factors on both accruals and real 
earnings management. The findings provide new insight  on the role of country-specific factors 
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after IFRS adoption across countries in terms of the switch to real earnings management with 
the presence of strong institutions.  
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7.1. Introduction  
Given that earnings quality is contingent on decision context (Dechow et al., 2010), exploring 
earnings quality from both contracting perspective and equity valuation perspective, conditional 
on country specific factors, will provide a better picture of how earnings quality differs under 
IFRS due to local factors differences. By doing so, conclusions can also be derived on whether 
earnings quality differs under IFRS. If accounting quality is not consistent across countries 
because of the differences in country-specific factors, then this means that IASB did not 
achieve its aim of developing high quality accounting standards applicable internationally and 
thus comparable financial statements. That is, the accounting standards are inconsequent 
without a proper enforcement.  
This part of the thesis presents and discusses the findings of the second empirical study. It deals 
with the effect of investor protection, strength of enforcement of accounting standards, and 
strength of capital market on conservatism across 23 countries that enforced IFRS in 2005 or 
before. Along with conservatism, it describes the eff ct the above-mentioned factors have on 
the value relevance of book values and earnings. That is, conservatism captures earnings quality 
from a contracting perspective while value relevance measures the quality from an equity 
valuation perspective (see section 4.4). 
This chapter is composed of six themed sections, including the introduction.  Section 2 provides 
the descriptive statistics. Section 3 moves on to present the findings. Section 4 presents the 
discussions. This is followed by additional tests in ection 5. Section 6 concludes the chapter.  
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7.2. Descriptive statistics 
In Chapter 5, Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 provide information on the sample and its distribution by 
country and industry, and in Chapter 6 Table 6-3 shows the summary statistics of country-
specific factors. Table 6-4 presents the descriptive statistics for the factor analysis we ran to 
obtain the investor protection measure. In this section, we will focus on descriptive statistics 
that are unique to the statistical analysis of the current empirical chapter.   
Table 7-1 provides additional descriptive statistics of the market value, book value per 
share and earnings per share of the sample firms across the 23 countries. To eliminate 
the effect of outliers, we winsorized all variables at 2%. The highest mean of the 
market value per share is in Belgium (38.04), followed by Austria (37.76), Denmark 
(36.57), France (35.92), Netherlands (30.66), Germany (27.02), Norway (25.18), 
Spain (16.73), Finland (14.055), Sweden (13.56), Bulgaria (12.97) and Italy (12.94). 
The lowest mean of the market value per share is in Philippines (0.358), followed by 
Singapore (0.673), Hong Kong (1.879), Oman (2.362), Portugal (3.597), Jordan 
(4.98), Australia (5.48), South Africa (6.108), Greec  (7.160) and the UK (8.08).  
Almost the same ranking of market value per share, the highest average book value per share is 
in Austria (31.44), followed by Denmark (30.336), Belgium (29.20), France (29.03), and 
Netherlands (23.32). The lowest average book value per share is in Philippines (0.183), 
followed by Singapore (0.647), Oman (1.99), and Hong Kong (2.044).  
The highest average earnings per share is in Belgium (2.47), followed by France (1.882), 
Austria (1.447), Denmark (1.291), Germany (1.211), and Netherlands (1.151). The lowest 
average earnings per share is in Philippines (0.019), followed by Hong Kong (0.035), Singapore 
(0.036), Greece (0.063), and Australia (0.144).  
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The difference between the standard deviations and means of all variables is reasonable. Taking 
the pooled sample, the standard deviation is greater than the mean by (2.26) for the stock price, 
by (2.55) for the book value and by (3.55) for the earnings per share. This is consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Davis-Friday et al, 2006; Agostino et al., 2010).  
Table 7-2 shows the summary statistics for accruals and cash flow. Both variables are deflated 
by the total assets at the beginning of the period. The highest mean of the lagged total accruals 
is in Poland (-.0055) followed by Oman (-.0098), Bulgaria (-0.0125), Singapore (-0.0176) and 
Hong Kong (-.0198). On the other hand, Austria (-.0625), Norway (-.0609), Netherlands (-
.0586), Denmark (-.0559), Australia (-.0545) and Germany (-.0513) have the lowest average of 
total accruals. The average value of pooled lagged total accruals is (-.0385) while the standard 
deviation is (.0986).   
It can be seen from the data in Table 7-3 that South Africa has the largest mean of the lagged 
operating cash flows (0.1333). Oman comes after with (0.1106), followed by Philippines 
(0.0953), Netherlands (0.0934), Austria (0.0831), and Belgium (0.0825). On the contrary, 
Bulgaria (0.03), Greece (0.0334), Poland (0.0411), Norway (0.0432), and Portugal (0.044) have 
the lowest mean values of the lagged operating cashflows. The mean value of the pooled 
lagged cash flows from operation is (.0720) whereas the standard deviation is (.1315). We 
winsorized both total accruals and operating cash flows at top and bottom at 1% to remove the 
effect of outliers.   
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Table 7-1 Summary of MV, BVPS and EPS
Country  MV BVPS EPS 
Mean SD 25% Median 75%  Mean SD 25%  Median 75%  Mean SD 25%  Median 75% 
 
Australia 5.480 17.949 .221 .850 3.320 3.846 16.285 .206 .723 1.982 .144 .717 -.009 .048 .215 
Austria 37.763 43.904 12.493 23.461 39.371 31.449 41.500 10.550 18.096 30.742 1.447 3.409 -.253 1.744 2.980 
Belgium 38.048 45.125 5.443 18.974 57.755 29.201 40.633 3.192 10.191 37.775 2.472 3.371 .095 1.114 4.967 
Bulgaria 12.973 25.382 1.172 4.053 12.580 16.292 22.423 1.679 8.469 21.992 .347 2.378 -.343 .069 .547 
Denmark 36.571 49.954 2.731 12.997 54.255 30.336 44.977 1.587 9.631 38.528 1.291 3.464 -.287 .401 2.703 
Finland 14.055 18.351 3.559 9.293 18.289 9.858 17.899 1.996 5.417 11.190 .626 1.415 -.0286 .446 1.293 
France 35.920 43.865 6.416 18.318 47.380 29.033 39.109 4.779 13.403 34.266 1.882 3.117 .0417 1.139 3.425 
Germany 27.028 37.910 4.766 11.628 32.847 17.900 27.870 3.435 8.601 20.802 1.211 2.760 -.0715 .585 2.146 
Greece 7.160 16.165 .812 1.906 6.014 9.394 22.526 1.662 3.265 5.891 .063 1.056 -.201 .030 .279 
Hong Kong 1.879 13.415 .057 .164 .528 2.044 15.262 .063 .170 .394 .035 .402 .001 .0136 .039 
Italy 12.945 27.404 1.591 4.298 12.01 10.250 24.439 1.401 3.465 7.800 .269 1.369 -.115 .160 .607 
Jordan 4.985 11.098 1.537 2.670 4.164 2.315 1.862 1.397 1.750 2.534 .243 .626 .011 .115 .284 
Netherlands 30.669 39.850 8.658 18.497 34.417 23.327 38.120 5.562 10.176 22.130 1.151 2.379 .148 1.287 2.279 
Norway 25.180 47.585 1.897 5.819 19.675 21.370 42.682 1.265 3.844 16.225 .207 2.169 -.311 .110 .743 
Oman 2.362 4.485 .402 1.115 2.578 1.991 4.438 .155 .627 1.428 .195 .450 .0360 .096 .196 
Philippines .358 1.516 .023 .065 .191 .183 .364 .026 .050 .132 .019 .053 .001 .006 .0184 
Poland 10.913 27.508 1.035 3.270 8.360 9.409 25.756 .908 2.441 5.905 .257 1.142 .003 .118 .482 
Portugal 3.597 3.461 1.042 2.148 5.291 3.483 4.143 .911 2.271 4.145 .013 1.090 -.063 .155 .412 
Singapore .673 2.463 .078 .154 .374 .647 4.764 .106 .174 .367 .036 .153 .003 .018 .042 
South Africa 6.108 12.875 .457 1.857 6.283 2.417 3.424 .306 1.098 3.093 .393 .909 .027 .143 .437 
Spain 16.379 29.873 3.399 8.332 16.331 12.169 26.317 2.066 4.636 9.816 .892 1.913 .012 .500 1.302 
Sweden 13.560 31.638 1.043 4.414 11.225 9.969 29.838 .500 2.267 5.539 .252 1.287 -.0184 .183 .713 
UK 8.08 23.197 .525 1.869 6.128 4.819 18.375 .334 1.199 2.904 .196 .950 -.0034 .097 .357 
Pooled  13.252 29.988 .366 2.426 10.464 10.159 25.925 .280 1.677 6.724 .513 1.822 -.0003 .065 .555 
Notes to Table 7-1: MV  is stock price per share. BVPS is book value per share. EPS is earnings per share. All variables are winsorized at top and bottom 2% to remove the 
effect of outliners. All variables are in US Dollars.  
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 Table 7-2 Summary of ACC and CFO  
Country  ACC CFO 
Mean SD 25% Median 75%  Mean SD 25%  Median 75%  
Australia -.0545 .107 -.104 -.045 -.0010 .0797 .180 .0137 .0910 .172 
Austria -.0625 .0651 -.098 -.0553 -.0308 .0831 .0706 .0334   .0827 .121 
Belgium -.0469 .100 -.0858 -.0450 -.0004 .0825 .1246 .0377 .0858 .1421 
Bulgaria -.0125 .114 -.0718 -.0135 .0465 .030 .1088 -.0195 .0177 .0808 
Denmark -.0559 .1049 -.0994 -.0592 -.0118 .0513 .1633 -.0016 .0750 .1426 
Finland -.0482 .0801 -.0914 -.0437 -.0025 .0744 .116 .0265 .0813 1421 
France -.0445 .08292 -.0806 -.0444 -.0061 .0729 .0963 .0289 .0722 .117 
Germany -.0513 .0877 -.0933 -.0450 -.0048 .0749 .119 .0246 .0772 .128 
Greece -.0305 .0870 -.076 -.0316 .0105 .0334 .0909 -.0153 .0294 .0732 
Hong Kong -.0198 .0944 -.0751 -.0210 .0304 .0781 .1186 .0143 .0710 .140 
Italy -.0428 .0769 -.0792 -.0433 -.0032 .0559 .0883 .0110 .0513 .1036 
Jordan -.0264 .0992 -.0858 -.0313 .0200 .0738 .1149 .0125 .0688 .138 
Netherlands -.0586 .0889 -.0964 -.0475 -.0115 .0934 .0967 .0469 .0937 .1373 
Norway -.0609 .1132 -.1081 -.0554 -.0082 .0432 .1730 -.00515 .0653 .1288 
Oman -.0098 .1240 -.0697 -.0228 .0427 .1106 .1459 .0313 .1030 .2027 
Philippines -.0212 .1143 -.0838 -.0310 .0180 .0953 .1407 .0216 .0779 .1683 
Poland -.0055 .1334 -.0762 -.0202 .0517 .0411 .1332 -.0074 .0421 .1043 
Portugal -.0387 .0932 -.0716 -.0411 -.0022 .0440 .0953 -.0043 .0539 .0883 
Singapore -.0176 .1064 -.0780 -.0229 .0376 .0811 .1144 .0177 .07126 .1459 
South Africa -.0338 .0923 -.0814 -.0327 .0197 .1333 .1159 .0628 .1213 .1905 
Spain -.0447 .0842 -.0804 -.0413 -.0055 .0805 .1139 .0238 .0728 .1202 
Sweden -.0439 .1036 -.0877 -.0396 .0048 .0599 .1756 .0115 .0819 .1448 
UK -.0479 .0981 -.0900 -.0430 -.0032 .0719 .1430 .0223 .0792 .1401 
Pooled  -.0385 .0986 -.0850 -.0381 .0077 .0720 .1315 .0159 .0727 .1355 
Notes to Table 7-3: ACC is total accruals calculated as the difference betwe n earnings and cash flow from operations. CFO is cash flow from operations. 
Both variables are deflated by total assets at the beginning of the period and winsorized at top and bottom 1% to remove the effect of outliners. All variables 
are in US Dollars.  
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7.3. Results  
We assessed the effect of investor protection on the timeliness of loss recognition through the 
regression in Table 7-3. The results concerning the eff ct of investor protection on 
conservatism, as shown in Table 7-3, indicate that strong investor protection increases the 
timely loss recognition. That is, the coefficientβW = 0.110) on the effect of investor protection 
on the timeliness of loss recognition is positive and significant.  
Table 7-3 The effect of investor protection on conservatism measured as the relative timeliness of loss 
recognition 
 
Similarly, Table 7-4 shows a positive and significant coefficient βW=0.479), which captures the 
effect of accounting standards enforcement on the tim liness of loss recognition. The timely 
ACCZ,[ =	β\ +	βDDCFOZ,[ + βCCFOZ,[ +	βLDCFOZ,[ ∗ CFOD + β=INV + β>DCFOZ,[ ∗ INV +
βACFOZ,[ ∗ INV + βWDCFOZ,[ ∗ 	CFOZ,[ ∗ INV + 		ε     (9) 
 β\ βD βC βL β= β> βA 0 
Coefficient -.0110 .021 -.359 .255 .002 .004 .0202 .110 
(t-statistic) -1.34 4.32*** -36.82*** 3.95*** 1.73* 6.65*** 2.44  ** 6.01***  
Adj. BC 17.69 % 
Obs.              16328 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 7-3:  
ACC is total accruals in year t lagged by the total assets at the beginning of year t. CFO is cash 
flow from operations for firm i in year t. DCFO is a Dummy variable set equal to 1 if CFO <0 
and 0 otherwise. INV is the investor protection fora country. INV is the investor protection 
computed by component principle analysis of six variables. These variables are: BIND is the 
board independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). SEC is the 
enforcement of securities laws scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MIN is 
the protection of minority shareholders interest scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-
2011). ENF is the enforcement of accounting & auditing standards scores from the World 
Economic Forum (2008-2011). JUD is the judicial independence scores from the World 
Economic Forum (2008-2011).  MS is the market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) 
from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as the share price times the number of shares 
outstanding.    
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loss recognition increases marginally in countries with strong enforcement of accounting 
standards.   
Table 7-4 The effect of enforcement on conservatism easured as the relative timeliness of loss recognition 
ACCZ,[ =	β\ +	βDDCFOZ,[ + βCCFOZ,[ +	βLDCFOZ,[ ∗ CFOD + β=ENF + β>DCFOZ,[ ∗ ENF +
βACFOZ,[ ∗ ENF + βWDCFOZ,[ ∗ 	CFOZ,[ ∗ ENF + 		ε      (10) 
 β\ βD βC βL β= β> βA 0 
Coefficient -.0609 -.0851 -.686 -2.451 .0087 .0190 .05827 .479 
(t-statistic) -2.90** -3.76*** -3.65*** -4.20 1.96** 5.47***  1.79* 5.16***  
 Adj. BC 17.62 %        
Obs. 16328        
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 7-4:  
ACC is total accruals in year t lagged by the total assets at the beginning of year t. CFO is cash 
flow from operations for firm i in year t. DCFO is a Dummy variable set equal to 1 if CFO <0 
and 0 otherwise. ENF is the enforcement of auditing a d accounting standards scores from the  
World Economic Forum (2008-2011).   
  
On the question of the effect of the strength of capital market, the study found no 
significant effect of capital markets on the timelin ss of loss recognition as shown in 
Table 7-5, in which the coefficient βW=0.0001) is not significant. This is consistent 
with Ball et al. (2008) who found no effect of equity market size on conservatism. 
These findings support the notion that the demand for conservative accounting is 
driven by legal factors.  
Our findings indicate that strong investor protection and strong enforcement of accounting 
standards are associated with greater degree of conditional conservatism; however, the 
desirability of higher conservatism is dependent on he perspective it serves. From a contracting  
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perspective, we may conclude that there are better arnings quality in countries with strong 
investor protection and strong enforcement of accounting standards.  
Table 7-5 The effect of strength of capital market on conservatism measured as the relative timeliness of loss 
recognition 
ACCZ,[ =	β\ +	βDDCFOZ,[ + βCCFOZ,[ +	βLDCFOZ,[ ∗ CFOD + β=MS + β>DCFOZ,[ ∗ MS +
βACFOZ,[ ∗ MS + βWDCFOZ,[ ∗ 	CFOZ,[ ∗ MS + 		ε    (11) 
 β\ βD βC βL β= β> βA 0 
Coefficient -.0199 .0170 -.349 .305 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001 
(t-statistic) -2.17** 2.07** -32.76*** 3.31** 2.13** 2.41** 0.66 0.47 
 Adj. BC 16.17 %        
Obs. 16328        
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 7-5:  
ACC is total accruals in year t lagged by the total assets at the beginning of year t. CFO is cash 
flow from operations for firm i in year t. DCFO is Dummy variable set equal to 1 if CFO <0 
and 0 otherwise. MS is the strength of capital market. MS is the market capitalisation of listed 
companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as the share price times the 
number of shares outstanding.    
 
On the other hand, there is a need to investigate the effect of country specific factors on value 
relevance of accounting information. The presence of conservatism, which is influenced by 
institutional factors, may not be optimal from an equity evaluation perspective.  
To that end, we tested the effect of investor protection on value relevance of book value and 
earnings via the regression in Table 7-6. From Table 7-6, strong investor protection does not 
increase the value relevance of earnings; rather, it marginally increases the value relevance of 
book values. The coefficient (β=) is positive and significant whereas the coefficient β> is not 
significant.  
 
Chapter 7. Second Empirical 
 
        
 
180 
Table 7-6 The effect of investor protection on the value relevance of book values and earnings 
			MVZ[ = β\ +	βD	BVPSZ[ + βC	EPSZ[ + βLINV + β=INV ∗ BVPSZ[ + β>INV ∗ EPSZ[ 	
+ ε									12 
 
 β\ βD βC βL β= β> 
Coefficient 2.525 
 
.913 2.933 -.007 
 
.0241 .0631 
(t-statistic) 12.32*** 42.57*** 4.40*** -0.11 1.79* 0.56 
 
 Adj. BC 76.11%      
Obs. 16328      
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 7-6: MVZ[	is market value per share three months after the fiscal ye r end. 
5$! is book value per share of firm i in year t. $! is earnings per share of firm i in year 
t. INV is the investor protection computed by component principle analysis of six variables. 
These variables are: BIND is the board independence scores from the World Economic Forum 
(2008-2011). SEC is the enforcement of securities laws scores from the World Economic 
Forum (2008-2011). MIN is the protection of minority shareholders interest scores from the 
World Economic Forum (2008-2011). ENF is the enforcement of accounting & auditing 
standards scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). JUD is the judicial 
independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MS is the market 
capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as 
the share price times the number of shares outstanding.    
 
Table 7-7 Enforcement and the value relevance of book values and earnings 
MVZ[ = β\ +	βD	BVPSZ[ + βC	EPSZ[ + βLENF + β=ENF ∗ BVPSZ[ + β>ENF ∗ EPSZ[ 	
+ ε					13				 
 
 β\ βD βC βL β= β> 
Coefficient 3.501 .450 2.315 -.170 0813 .104 
(t-statistic) 2.28** 1.95* 0.86 -0.65 2.02**   0.22 
 Adj. BC 76.03%      
Obs. 16328      
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 7-7:  
MVZ[	is market value per share three months after the fiscal year end. ijklmn is book value per 
share of firm i in year t. oklmn is earnings per share of firm i in year t. ENF is the enforcement 
of auditing and accounting standards scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011).   
 
In Table 7-7, we assessed the effect of enforcement on value relevance of earnings and book 
values. Similar to investor protection, strong enforcement contributes to the increase in book 
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values but has no effect on the value relevance of arnings as the coefficient (	β=) is positive 
and significant. These results for value relevance are consistent with Davis-Friday et al. (2006) 
who found that weak corporate governance decreases the value relevance of book values with 
no effect on earnings during the crisis. In contrast, the strength of the capital market increases 
the informativeness of earnings since the coefficient (β> = .00574 ) is positive and significant, 
as is apparent from Table 7-8. This is consistent with the findings of Ali and Hwang (2000), 
who concluded that there is higher value relevance i  countries where the financing system is 
market oriented.  
Table 7-8 The effect of strength of capital market on the value relevance of book values and earnings 
					MVZ[ = β\ +	βD	BVPSZ[ + βC	EPSZ[ + βLMS + β=MS ∗ BVPSZ[ + β>MS ∗ EPSZ[ 	
+ ε				14					 
 
 β\ βD βC βL β= β> 
Coefficient 3.498 .9098 2.429 -.0065 -.0000 .00574 
(t-statistic) 7.58*** 28.11*** 3.53*** -4.30***  -0.22 2.37** 
 Adj. BC 76.03%      
Obs. 16328      
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 7-8:  
MVZ[	is market value per share three months after the fiscal year end. BVPSmn is book value per 
share of firm i in year t. oklmn  is earnings per share of firm I in year t. MS is the market 
capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as 
the share price times the number of shares outstanding.    
 
The overall results suggest that:  
I. Strong investor protection increased the conditional conservatism of reported earnings 
as Hypothesis 3 predicted. 
II.  Rigorous enforcement of accounting standards enhanced conditional conservatism, 
which means we accept Hypothesis 4.  
III.   There was no effect of capital market strength on c servatism as we predicted in 
Hypothesis 5. 
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IV.  The value relevance of book values increased in countries with strong investor 
protection, which did not influence the value relevance of earnings; therefore, we accept 
Hypothesis 6. 
V. Strict enforcement of accounting standards increased th  value relevance of book values 
but had no effect on earnings as assumed in Hypothesis 7.  
VI.  In strong capital market, the value relevance of earnings was larger than in weak capital 
market, whereas there was no significant difference i  the value relevance of book 
values across those markets, as in Hypothesis 8.  
7.4. Discussion  
Our sample included 23 countries that put IFRS in place in 2005 or before. The IASB 
conceptual framework, issued in 1989, included prudence as a feature of financial reporting but 
in 2006, the IASB released a discussion paper in collab ration with FASB seeking to drop 
prudence from the conceptual framework. In spite of the opposition to the IASB plan, the IASB 
conceptual framework issued in 2010 removed prudence as a desirable attribute of financial 
statement due to its conflict with neutrality. Prior studies on the effect of IFRS adoption on 
conservatism concluded that there was a decline in conservatism after the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS (e.g. Chen et al., 2010; Ahmed et al., 2013) despite the fact that those studies covered 
the period when prudence was in the conceptual framework. André et al. (2015) demonstrate 
that strong enforcement and strong auditing quality have reduced the decline in conservatism 
after IFRS adoption in Europe in 2005. Irrespective of the effect of IFRS on conservatism, 
country specific factors still shape the accounting practices after mandatory IFRS adoption as 
explained in chapter 3. In such case, the adoption of IFRS alone is not enough to obtain 
consistent accounting practices across different countries. 
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Indeed, our findings reveal that strong investor protection and strong enforcement 
increase the degree of conservatism in financial reporting. Under the contracting 
perspective, the function of accounting is to provide information useful in evaluating 
contracting settings and economizing the transactions costs. From this perspective, 
our results indicate higher quality of earnings in countries with strong investor 
protection and legal enforcement. There are several explanations for why strong 
investor protection and strong enforcement are associated with a greater degree of 
conservatism.  
The principle-agent relationship provides a possible explanation for the demand for 
conservative accounting and for the effect of legal f ctors represented by investor 
protection and enforcement on it. Agency theory assumes that all individuals are 
driven by their self-interests to maximize their own utilities; as such, the outsiders will 
anticipate that the corporate insiders will expropriate wealth from the firm at their 
expense. This would necessitate setting up mechanisms, internal and external, to 
protect investors against expropriation by insiders.  
Apart from internal mechanisms such as compensation pla s and director monitoring, external 
mechanisms, such as monitoring managers by shareholders and debt holders are important to 
prevent the opportunistic behaviour of managers. Given the conflicts in interests and the 
incentives, there would be a demand for conservatism in accounting, which is likely to be 
greater in countries characterized by strong investor protection and strong enforcement. Ball et 
al. (2000) asserts that conservative accounting, which is an important feature of corporate 
governance in common law counties, facilitates monitori g corporate insiders.   
Pushing further, the internal mechanisms such as managerial incentive plans would also 
necessitate having strong external mechanisms which serve as control over the managers. 
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Managers have the incentives to manage earnings upwards to increase their compensation, 
which is negatively influenced by conservatism. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) argue that the 
limited liability of firms’ managers may generate a demand for verifiable measures that defer 
compensation until verifiable evidence of managers’ actions becomes available. For this reason, 
shareholders may demand conservative accounting to avoid managers’ overpayments that 
reduce the share value. Debt holders also prefer accounting practices that lead to less reported 
earnings and thus less distribution to assure that their debt can be repaid.  
Kothari et al. (2010) argue that the demand for verifiable information by both shareholders and 
debt holders contributes to the increase in conditional conservatism. What causes managers to 
act in contrast to their incentives should exceed what they would achieve from aggressive 
accounting. Strong investor protection and strong eforcement imposes a limit on managers’ 
actions in a way that supports contracting, which requires credible accounting information as in 
debts contracts and compensation contracts. On the other hand, managers have greater room to 
manage earnings upwards in countries where the investor protection and the enforcement are 
weak; thus, the contracts are less enforceable, and the accounting information is less verifiable.  
Another reason for conservative accounting is sharehold r litigation (Watts, 2003). 
Shareholder litigation embedded in a well-functioning and efficient judicial/legal 
system can protect the rights of outsiders and prevent the corporate directors and 
managements from expropriating the outsiders. Ball et al. (2000) show a greater 
degree of conservatism in common law countries than in code law counties, where the 
litigation is not as in the common law countries. When the litigation risk is high, 
managers are more likely to be conservative in reporting earnings (Ball et al., 2000). 
With stronger investor protection and enforcement, the litigation costs may increase, 
and, as a consequence, more conservative accounting is l kely to be the case.  
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In general, conservatism may be a desirable attribue of financial reporting since the 
understatement of assets and earnings is of less concern compared with the 
overstatement. Indeed, on 15 February 2015, a group f shareholder representatives, 
asset managers, and institutional investors published a letter asking the IASB to 
restore prudence as a guiding principle in the financial statements (Quinn et al., 2015). 
They believe that the shareholders and lenders have greater confidence in prudent 
financial statements. Strong investor protection and strong enforcement contribute to 
lessening the risks the investors bear, which are much greater in less conservative 
earnings than in conservative earnings.  
Notwithstanding, the IASB’s president Hans Hoogervorst (2012) argues that prudence 
may create scope for opportunism in financial statements in terms of earnings 
management. In fact, conservatism in the form of timely loss recognition may help 
managers manage earnings downwards (income decreasing). However, we may state 
that conservative accounting mitigate earnings management if the managers use it on 
purpose. In other words, it depends on the intention of the managers, which is difficult 
to prove.  
In our first empirical chapter, the results revealed that strong investor protection and 
strong enforcement are associated with less accruals e rnings management and greater 
real earnings management. Taken together, strong investor protection and strong 
enforcement lead to less accruals earnings management, greater real earnings 
management and more conservative accounting. This is consistent with García Lara et 
al. (2012), who showed that the increased conditional conservatism was associated 
with a decline in accruals earnings management, and with an increase in real earnings 
management. While they used a US sample, we prove that his condition exists 
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consistently across countries in that strong investor protection and strong enforcement 
lead to less accruals earnings management, greater real earnings management and 
more conservative earnings.  
Given the discussion above, it is not surprising that strong investor protection and strong 
enforcement of accounting standards increase the conditi nal conservatism captured by the 
timeliness of loss recognition in the financial statements. Our results on the effect of investor 
protection and enforcement on conservatism are consiste t with Bushman and Piotroski (2006), 
who tested the effect of institutions on the extent of conservatism across countries. Bushman 
and Piotroski (2006) found higher conservatism in countries with higher quality judicial 
systems, strong investor protection, and stronger enforcement of securities laws. 
Nevertheless, the effect of investor protection ande forcement on accounting information from 
valuation perspective has implications different from those under contracting perspective.  
At first glance, our results of the effect of investor protection and enforcement on value 
relevance do not seem logical in that we found no significant effect of investor protection and 
enforcement on the value relevance of earnings. Strong investor protection and strong 
enforcement do not increase the value relevance of arnings; rather, they increase the value 
relevance of book values. Some (e.g. Holthausen and Watts, 2001) argue that the value 
relevance research is of value in equity valuation perspective but this does not apply to 
contracting perspective and therefore it is of less value in measuring earnings quality. In 
addition, to explain these results, it is important to link them with the results of conservatism. 
That is, the relevance of earnings as a performance indicator is influenced by the degree of 
conservatism in the financial statements. For example, the Chairman of the IASB Hans 
Hoogervorst (2012) maintains that ‘[a] systemic bias towards conservatism undermines the 
value of earnings as a performance indicator’.  
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The literature illustrates that conservative accounting practices influence the value relevance of 
earnings. Early works by Hayn (1995) and Basu (1997) suggest that the decline in value 
relevance of earnings across time can be explained by the increase in nonrecurring items and 
negative earnings, in other words higher conservatism. In this case, book values become more 
important than earnings in explaining stock prices (Barth et al., 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997). Our results are consistent with the aforementioned notion in that strong investor 
protection and strong enforcement are associated with higher conditional conservatism and, at 
the same time, book values explain the stock prices more than earnings do.  
In the same vein, Collins et al. (1997) found no decrease in the combined value relevance of 
book value and earnings; instead, there was a slight increase over time. The value relevance of 
book value increased while the value relevance of earnings decreased over time. They attributed 
the decrease in value relevance of earnings to the increase in the frequency of negative 
earnings, significant incidence of one-time items, and changes in intangible intensity. These 
findings indirectly support the argument that conservative accounting reduces the value 
relevance of earnings across time.  
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) suggest a positive relationship between the reliability of earnings 
and the usefulness of earnings, over book values, when explaining stock prices. Earnings are 
deemed more reliable if they have a higher predictab lity of future earnings. Earnings become 
less reliable with higher conditional conservatism. Taken together, higher conservatism leads to 
less reliable earnings, making the book values more useful in explaining the stock prices than 
the current earnings. As such, balance sheets numbers ar  relatively higher in value relevance 
compared with income statements amounts. This is con istent with Barth (2006), who contends 
that accelerating the recognition of future expenses and losses reduces the ability of earnings to 
predict themselves while it improves the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows.  
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Heflin et al. (2014) concluded that conditional conservatism reduced the informativeness and 
persistence of earnings, and made the earnings less smooth. Consequently, investors preferred 
Street earnings that are less conservative than GAAP earnings. Investors may have other 
sources of information than financial reporting; therefore, the potential bias resulting from 
conservatism may be corrected. As mentioned before, th  shareholders may demand  
conservatism to impose constraints on managers’ compensations. If earnings become less 
relevant in explaining the stock price because of conservative accounting, the shareholders may 
use other sources of information in addition to book value. Indeed, Ewert and Wagenhofer 
(2013) argue that investors adjust the face value of reported earnings for interpretation 
purposes.  
Another reason for the increase in the value relevance of book values at the expense of earnings 
after IFRS adoption is the increase in conservative accounting because of the fair value 
requirements in the standards. For example, Givoly and Hayn (2000) note more conservative 
accounting in the United States because of the FASB’s fair value rules that require earlier 
recognition of expenses and loses or deferral recogniti n of revenues. As such, the recognition 
of losses resulting from fair value accounting may increase in response to strong investor 
protection and strong enforcement.  
Furthermore, the association between market price and reported earnings may not be an 
indication of the absence of aggressive earnings management or better quality. For instance, 
Altamuro et al. (2005) found that accelerating revenue recognition is associated with higher 
market response, even when earnings management incentives are high. This means that either 
aggressive accounting is not an indication of lower quality of earnings, or the high market 
response is not evidence of better quality.  
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It is important to point out that we did not examine the effect of conservatism on value 
relevance; instead, we tested the effect of local factors on conservatism and value relevance of 
accounting information. We indirectly infer a potential effect of conservatism on the value 
relevance of accounting information based on the eff ct of local factors on both conservatism 
and value relevance of earnings and book values.  
In terms of the strength of capital market, the results did not show a significant relationship 
with conservatism. However, stronger capital market increases the value relevance of earnings 
while there is no effect on book value. To put it differently, a strong capital market, which has 
no effect on conservatism, increases the value relevance of earnings. This is consistent with our 
other results in that when there was greater conservatism, there was an increase in the value 
relevance of book value at the expense of earnings.  
Despite the fact that the 23 countries in our sample mandate IFRS adoption, country specific 
factors still shape the accounting practices. In other words, there is a variation in the extent of 
conservatism and value relevance of accounting information due to the differences in the 
strength of investor protection, enforcement and the depth of capital market.  
Since accounting information has a dual purpose, both a source for equity evaluation (valuation 
perspective) and for contracting (contracting perspctive) (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), 
what is desirable from a contracting perspective may not be desirable from a valuation 
perspective. Indeed, higher conservatism is more pronounced in countries with strong investor 
protection and strong enforcement of accounting standards, which is preferred from a 
contracting perspective. At the same time, strong investor protection and strong enforcement do 
not increase the value relevance of earnings; instead, the book values are more important. This 
may indirectly indicate that conservative accounting resulting from local factors has a negative 
effect on the relevance of earnings.  One can then conclude that, from a contracting perspective, 
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the quality of earnings is better in countries having high investor protection and strong 
enforcement, while from a valuation perspective, earnings are not of better quality.  
7.5. Additional tests  
In this section, we provide additional tests, some ch cks using different measures of investor 
protection and control variables in the conservatism model.  
Firstly, we ran the basic regression of conservatism without the country specific factors to 
obtain a general picture of conservatism. Appendix 2 Table I shows the pooled regression of 
conservatism clustered by firm and year. From the table	βC = −.337  < 0 reflects the role of 
accruals in lessening the noise in operating cash flows whereas βL = .327	> 0 reflects more 
timely loss recognition. In general, financial reporting is conservative but it marginally 
increases with strong investor protection and strong e forcement as reported before in Table 7-
3 and Table 7-4.  
Secondly, given that there is no straightforward or uncontroversial measure of investor 
protection, we tried another measure of investor protection in our test. We used anti-self-
dealing index as an alternative measure of investor pr tection to test its effect on both 
conservatism and value relevance as shown in Appendix 2 Table II and Table III. With regard 
to conservatism, we found similar results to that when we used our metric of investor 
protection. As shown in Appendix 2 Table II, βW = 2.55) is positive and significant, which 
indicates that strong anti-self-dealing increases th  conditional conservatism in accounting.  
For value relevance, we found a decrease in the value relevance of earnings with the increase of 
self-dealing, which is consistent with our results, a  it is apparent in Appendix 2 Table III. 
Taken together, when there is higher investor protection (measured by self-dealing index), there 
is a higher extent of conservatism, and the value relevance of earnings decreases.  
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Thirdly, following Peek et al. (2010), we included three control variables to control for 
leverage, size and growth. The findings show that strong investor protection and strong 
enforcement increases the extent of conservatism while the strength of capital market has no 
effect on conservatism, as shown in Appendix 2 Table IV, Appendix 2 Table V, and Appendix 
2 Table VI. Therefore, we conclude that firm-specific factors do not drive the results of the 
effect of country-specific factors on conservatism.  
Finally, we ran the basic regression of value relevance without the country level variable, as 
shown in Appendix 2 Table VII, to find out the value relevance of book values and earnings in 
general before using the interaction. Appendix 2 Table VII reveals that both book values and 
earnings are relevant and reflected in the stock pri es. We thus conclude that earnings and book 
values in general are relevant but relatively different from one country to another based on the 
country specific factors.  
7.6. Conclusion 
This chapter of the thesis has presented the results and discussions of the effect of investor 
protection, enforcement of accounting standards and the strength of capital market on both 
conditional conservatism and value relevance of book values and earnings under IFRS across 
23 countries from 2007 to 2010.  
The findings reveal that strong investor protection a d strong enforcement of accounting 
standards increase timely loss recognition, which is a type of conditional conservatism. 
Simultaneously, strong investor protection and strong enforcement increase the value relevance 
of book values rather than earnings. These results are consistent with the literature on the effect 
of conditional conservatism on value relevance, the case in which book values become more 
important than earnings in explaining stock prices. The increases in the value relevance of book 
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values can be caused by the higher conservatism resulting from strong investor protection and 
strong enforcement.  
From a contracting perspective, strong investor protection and strong enforcement increase the 
conditional conservatism, which means better earnings quality. From a valuation perspective, 
strong investor protection and strong enforcement increase the value relevance of book values 
because of the increased conservatism in accounting. In eneral, conservative accounting is 
safer than aggressive accounting in spite of its effect on the informativeness of earnings. 
Investors may use other sources of information. Work by Heflin et al. (2014) revealed that 
investors preferred Street earnings that were less conservative than GAAP earnings as the 
conditional conservatism reduced the informativeness and persistence of earnings, and made the 
earnings less smooth.  
As regards the effect of capital market on conservatism and value relevance, we found no 
significant effect on conservatism. On the other hand, the value relevance of earnings is higher 
in countries with strong capital markets.  
Our results are important in that they reveal the eff ct of country-specific factors on earnings 
quality under IFRS from two different perspectives, contracting and equity valuation, which is 
the first study to do so. The results confirm the fact that earnings quality means different things 
to different users, and different country-specific actors drive different earnings quality 
dimensions under IFRS. Despite the fact that the 23 countries in the sample made IFRS 
compulsory for listed companies, there is still a variation in accounting quality across countries. 
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8.1. Introduction  
The main goal of the current thesis was to determine how earnings quality varies across 
countries under IFRS driven by the notion that local environments may continue to influence 
accounting practices under IFRS; accounting quality may vary across nations using IFRS. 
Exploring accounting quality under IFRS is of interest because the IASB neglects the features 
of different countries by prescribing accounting standards alleged to fit all.   
Since the inception of the IASC, the focus of the IASC and then the IASB has been on 
developing a high quality single set of accounting standards accepted globally. The use of a 
single set of accounting standards in producing financial reports across the world helps 
investors compare opportunities and risks and reducs the cost of financial reporting in that 
there is no need to adjust the financial statements. On the face of it, this makes sense as the 
variation in accounting standards used in lodging the financial statements across countries leads 
to incomparable financial statements and thus incurring costs for adjustments to the statements.  
The literature, however, suggests that the accounting standards are not the only determinant of 
the quality of financial statements but other local factors also play a role (Ball et al., 2000; Ball 
et al., 2003; Leuz et al, 2003; Burgstahler et al.,2006; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; 
Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Daske et al., 2008). For example, the enforcement of the standards 
is important to assure the compliance of the companies with the standards. What are the 
benefits of high quality accounting standards unless they are properly enforced? This is of key 
importance owing to the fact that enforcement remains in the hands of local authorities and the 
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IASB has no power to enforce IFRS. Without full compliance with the spirit of the standards, 
the adoption becomes in name only and is even highly misleading.  
The works by Houqe et al. (2012), Isidro and Raonic (2012) and Ahmed et al. (2013) are the 
most recent studies examining accounting quality after mandatory IFRS adoption. While Houqe 
et al. (2012) examined the effect of IFRS adoption on accruals earnings management 
conditional on investor protection, Ahmed et al. (2013) tested the effect of IFRS adoption on 
earnings smoothing, earnings benchmarks, accruals aggressiveness, and timely loss recognition, 
controlling for their enforcement. Both Houqe et al. (2012) and Ahmed et al. (2013) covered the 
first years of IFRS adoption up to 2007 focusing of the effect of IFRS themselves on quality. 
Isidro and Raonic (2012) investigated the effect of institutional factors on value relevance of 
accounting information and manipulation across 26 countries that mandated IFRS adoption, 
covering only two years, namely 2006 and 2007. It can also be noticed that recent international 
studies on earnings quality lack theory on the factors hat shape accounting practices after IFRS 
adoption. In this study, the choice of the factors was based on a theoretical framework derived 
from previous studies on factors shaping accounting, before and after IFRS adoption (See 
Chapter 3). Further, I employed agency theory to address the importance of strong investor 
protection, more efficient enforcement and large capital markets to yield high quality financial 
reporting.  
In the literature, accrual-based earnings management has been widely used to capture earnings 
manipulation. However, the literature shows that managers are more likely to take real actions 
in managing earnings to escape detection as real earnings management is difficult to detect (e.g. 
Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). On an interna ional basis, exploring real earnings 
management in addition to accruals earnings management provides a better picture of the role 
of institutions in determining accounting practices. Our first empirical chapter fills this gap in 
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the literature by examining both accruals and real rnings management across nations 
contingent on institutional factors. In addition, conservative accounting may provide evidence 
of high quality earnings because it requires a downward bias in measuring earnings. On the 
other hand, conservative accounting may have a negativ  impact on equity valuation. For this 
reason, we explored both conservatism from a contracting perspective and value relevance from 
an equity valuation perspective to address how earnings quality may vary based on the decision 
context. The work by Barth et al. (2008) is the only study that used earnings smoothing, 
conservatism captured by timely loss recognition, and value relevance as proxies for accounting 
quality. In it, they investigated the effect of voluntary IFRS adoption on accounting quality.  
Overall, the thesis contributes to the literature of earnings quality, mandatory IFRS adoption 
and the effect of country specific factors by exploring a variety of metrics that capture earnings 
quality from different decision contexts. In addition, it covers a longer period of mandatory 
IFRS adoption from 2007 to 2010 dropping the first years of adoption (2005 and 2006), in 
contrast to prior studies which covered the first years of adoption. This is important because 
companies in the first years of IFRS adoption may continue to implement the traditional 
accounting practices as mentioned by Nobes (2011b).  
The remaining part of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of 
Chapters 1-5. Section 3 presents a summary of the findings of the two empirical chapters. This 
is followed by section 4, which presents the implications. The final section discusses the 
limitations of this thesis along with some suggestions for future research.  
8.2. Summary of the Chapters 1-5 
The introductory chapter set the scene for this thesis. It highlighted the background and 
motivation behind this research, the research questions, and the significance of the thesis. The 
aim was to explore how accounting quality varies under IFRS contingent on investor protection, 
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enforcement of accounting standards and capital market. In particular, it focused on four 
dimensions of earnings quality, namely accruals earnings management, real earnings 
management, conservatism and value relevance. 
Chapter 2 presented the context of the study. It described the IFRS foundation and the IASB, 
and discussed the countries involved in the study. More specifically, it showed the endorsement 
process of IFRS adoption across these countries, th date of adoption and the firms that are 
required to use IFRS. By doing so, we overcame the shortcomings of prior studies in terms of 
identifying firms using IFRS. In Section 5.6, we provided a detailed explanation of the 
shortcomings in prior studies with regard to specifying firms using IFRS.  
Chapter 3 provided a general model of the factors determining accounting practices after IFRS 
adoption, and discussed agency theory to show how strong investor protection, more efficient 
enforcement and large capital markets influence accounting quality under IFRS. Agency theory 
indicates that the firm is a ‘’nexus of contracts’’ between different parties who act in their self-
interests and, therefore, there are conflicts betwen those parties.  For instance, there are 
conflicts between: managers and shareholders, controlli g shareholders and minority 
shareholders and debt holders, and shareholders and debtholders. Such conflicts require some 
external mechanisms to align the interests of different parties.  
After IFRS adoption, strong investor protection is necessary to ensure that managers are not 
hiding information from external investors, and contr lling shareholders are not expropriating 
minority shareholders and debtholders. Similarly, effici nt enforcement is important to make 
firms comply with IFRS as the IASB lacks enforcement power. Financial reporting contributes 
to mitigating the moral hazard and adverse selection problems as it reduces the information 
asymmetry between managers and external investors. Thi  is of particular importance in large 
capital markets where there is greater demand for financial reporting compared with small 
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capital markets where investors, banks, governments or families have their own access to 
information.  
Chapter 4 presented the literature review. More specifically, it provided definitions of 
accounting quality, earnings management, conservatism, value relevance, investor protection, 
enforcement and the strength of capital markets. It also revealed that prior studies focused on 
accruals earnings management while managers might manage earnings through real activities; 
this gap in the literature was filled by the first empirical chapter. In addition, Chapter 4 showed 
that earnings quality for contracting purposes may differ from that for investment decisions; 
therefore, the second empirical chapter investigated both conservatism and value relevance of 
accounting. Eight hypotheses were formulated based on the discussions in the theoretical 
framework chapter and the literature review chapter.  
Chapter 5 discussed the research methodology, includi g the models used to measure earnings 
quality, measuring the variables and the sample. We employed the positivist paradigm to 
achieve the aim of this study and tested hypotheses u ing quantitative data in an independent, 
value free and unbiased way.  
We used the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to capture accruals earnings 
management and followed Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) to measure 
the abnormal level of cash flow from operations, discretionary production costs and 
discretionary expenses. We also employed a model dev loped by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
to measure conservatism, and Ohlson’s model to investigate the effect of country-specific 
factors on the value relevance of book value and earnings.  
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8.3. Summary of the findings  
In chapter 6 and 7, the thesis examined four research questions. In the following sections, the 
main findings of the two empirical chapters are discussed.  
8.3.1. Earnings management  
Chapter six analysed whether accruals and real earnings management differ under IFRS due to 
the differences in institutional factors across countries. The first question in this empirical 
chapter sought to examine the effect of investor protection, enforcement of accounting 
standards and capital market on accruals-based earnings management. As mentioned before, 
mangers may take real actions in managing earnings to escape detection (e.g. Graham et al., 
2005; Cohen et al., 2008); therefore, the second question sought to test how real earnings 
management differs across nations contingent on local fa tors.  
On the question of accruals earnings management, the study found that firms in countries 
having strong investor protection, strong enforcement, and large capital market are less likely to 
manage earnings upward by accruals. In such countries, earnings are more likely to be managed 
upward via real activities, which is the finding of question two of the first empirical chapter. 
These findings support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  
With tighter institutions, firms prefer to manage earnings upward by real activities because such 
institutions cannot prevent managers from postponing a project or accelerating sales but they 
put more control on managers when exercising their professional judgment. With strong 
institutions, managers try to avoid potential litigations associated with increasing earnings via 
accruals. However, with real earnings management activities, there is no such fear, as these 
activities are in line with the regulations despite th ir potential negative effects on long term 
performance.  
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Further, the findings provide some evidence that firms are engaged in both accrual and real 
earnings management. Zang (2012) concludes that companies in the post SOX period have 
taken accruals earnings management to a minimal degree and real earnings management to a 
large degree as they engage in both streams of earnings management. The net effect of accruals 
and real earnings management is beyond the scope of this study.  
Interestingly, in large capital markets, firms manage earnings upward via real earnings 
management activities despite the possible negative effect of real earnings management on the 
subsequent performance. Graham et al. (2005) argue that managers may prefer to hit the target 
even if this may influence future performance as mising the target would be costly. Despite the 
negative influence on future performance, managers may undertake real actions to beat the 
target when they become under the pressure of capital markets and overreactions.  
The work by Doukakis (2014) found no significant effect of mandatory adoption on real or 
accrual based earnings management while our results revealed that both accruals and real 
earnings management are influenced by institutional factors. Taken together, the accounting 
practices under IFRS continue to be nationally determined by local institutions governing the 
preparation of financial reporting.  
Overall, these results indicate that earnings management under IFRS varies across countries due 
to the differences in local environments. This raises a question about the IASB’s claim that 
using a single set of accounting standards across cuntries leads to consistent accounting 
practices.  
8.3.2. Conservatism and value relevance  
The specific objective of chapter seven was to examine the effect of country specific factors on 
earnings quality from two perspectives, contracting and equity evaluation. From contracting 
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perspective, conservatism was employed as a metric fo  earnings quality, whereas value 
relevance was used from an equity valuation perspective.  
The third question in this thesis was whether conditional conservatism varied across countries 
enforcing IFRS due to the variation in the strength of investor protection, enforcement of 
accounting standards and capital market governing the preparation of financial reporting. Along 
with conservatism, the fourth research question washether there was any effect of investor 
protection, accounting standards enforcement, and strength of capital market on the value 
relevance of book values and earnings across countries using IFRS.  
In essence, the criticisms of conservatism as a desirable attribute of financial reporting 
are partially tied to its effects on equity valuation. For example, Hans Hoogervorst 
(2012) asserted that conservative accounting might undermine the value of earnings as 
a performance indicator and create some opportunities for earnings manipulation.  
The results of chapter seven showed that strong investor protection and enforcement of 
accounting standards increases the conditional conservatism captured by timely loss recognition 
across countries using IFRS. With higher litigation associated with stricter regulations, 
managers prefer to avoid lawsuits and thus be conservative in reporting earnings. Being 
conservative would benefit the parties contracting with the firm, both shareholders and debt 
holders. These findings are in line with Bushman and Piotroski (2006), who found higher 
conservatism in countries with higher quality of judicial systems, strong investor protection, 
and stronger enforcement of securities laws. These findings support Hypothesis 3 and 
Hypothesis 4.  
The results also showed that strong investor protecti n and strong enforcement increase the 
value relevance of book values, as predicted in Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 7. These results 
are consistent with the results in terms of the effct of investor protection and enforcement on 
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conservatism. Strong investor protection and strong e forcement increase conservatism, which 
in turn leads to an increase in the value relevance of book values. Prior studies provide evidence 
that with conservative accounting, book value becomes ore important than earnings for equity 
evaluation (e.g. Barth et al., 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collins et al., 1999). Heflin et 
al. (2014) showed that conditional conservatism reduc  the persistence and informativeness of 
earnings, and made the earnings less smooth.  
With regards to the effect of capital markets on coservatism, the results revealed no significant 
effect. Earnings in small capital markets, which tend to be weak, are more likely to be 
conservative (Nobes, 1998); however, in large capital markets there would be some 
conservative accounting due to the effect of legal systems associated with capital markets. At 
the same time, the results revealed that strong capital markets enhance the value relevance of 
earnings. The findings of the effect of capital market on conservatism and value relevance 
confirm Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 8. Taken together, t e strength of capital market does not 
influence the extent of conservatism but has an impact on the value relevance of earnings. The 
results support the argument that when there is a gre ter extent of conservatism, shareholders 
look at book values for equity valuation.  
Together, these results provide important insights into the effect of country specific factors on 
accounting quality under IFRS from different perspectives. In spite of using the same 
accounting standards across the countries in the sample, country specific factors continue to 
influence earnings quality. Further, the effect of c untry specific factors on accounting quality 
has different implications based on the decision cotext. In combination with IFRS adoption, 
different institutions drive different ‘quality’ earnings.  
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8.4. Implications   
These findings have significant implications for accounting standards setters, policy makers, 
regulators, audit committees, non-executive directors, investors, lenders, and researchers. First, 
accounting standards setters, policy makers, and regulators should focus on other local factors 
determining the accounting practices along with the accounting standards. Despite the fact that 
firms in our sample used IFRS in the preparation of their financial reporting, there was variation 
in accounting quality across countries due to the diff rences in investor protection, enforcement 
of accounting standards and strength of capital markets. The mere adoption of IFRS, as the 
IASB calls for, without improving the other mechanisms necessary for enforcing the 
compliance with the standards, is not enough to obtain high quality accounting across countries. 
Further, the findings contribute to the ongoing debat  on the concept of prudence or 
conservatism in the conceptual framework. Our data id not cover the period after 2010 when 
the IASB dropped prudence from its conceptual framework to be replaced by neutrality; 
however, we may infer that conservatism is more related to the legal system of a country. As 
such, conservative accounting may continue to exist in pite of the opposition of the IASB.  
Second, regulators should consider that with higher t reat of litigation, there would be higher 
earnings management via real activities. The high litigation associated with strong institutions 
curtails the ability of managers to increase earnings by means of accruals; instead, they tend to 
take real actions. Earnings management by means of real activities themselves is not fraud; 
however, it has a negative impact on the future performance. Audit committees and non-
executive directors should evaluate such effects and prevent real actions if they lead to a 
decrease in firm value, even though these actions are in line with regulations. This can be done 
through asking questions about managers’ economic actions, and by paying the managers less 
compensation when their actions lead to negative effects on future performance. Investors and 
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lenders should be aware of the potential negative effects of real earnings management on future 
performance as real earnings management is difficult to detect in comparison with accruals 
earnings management.   
Third, our findings show that earnings quality is contingent on the decision context and 
different institutions drive different earnings quality. In addition to accruals and real earnings 
management, the results show that stronger investor protection and enforcement increase the 
extent of conditional conservatism. At the same time, such strong factors, which increase 
conservatism, increase the value relevance of book values rather than the earnings. With 
increasing conservatism, the informativness of earnings decreases while book values substitute 
earnings as a performance indicator. Regulators should consider the influence of regulations on 
different stakeholders.  
Finally, researchers should be cautious about drawing conclusions on earnings quality given its 
different dimensions and different meanings to stakeholders, especially when investigating the 
effect of country-specific factors, in combination with IFRS, on accounting quality. Exploring 
earnings quality from one specific perspective may not provide a full picture of the quality, as 
the results showed in terms of accruals and real earnings management, and conservatism and 
value relevance. Concluding that less accruals earnings management is an indication of better 
quality is not enough without looking at real earnings management, which may have negative 
economic effects. Similarly, conservative accounting may provide managers with room to 
manage earnings if they want to decrease the reported earnings, and it may have negative 
effects on equity valuation.  
8.5. Limitations and opportunities for future research  
We acknowledge several potential limitations inherent in this study. Firstly, countries included 
in the sample had followed different approaches to apply IFRS; thus, the differences in IFRS 
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versions might be an influencing factor on the differences in earnings quality. The variation in 
accounting quality under IFRS could be partial because of the different versions of IFRS in 
addition to the differences in country-specific factors. Secondly, one can question the validity 
of the investor protection measure since there is ne ther a straightforward nor uncontroversial 
measure of investor protection. Our results would be different when using other metrics of 
investor protection. Thirdly, some countries in thesample included a small number of firms; 
therefore, the results would be driven by countries with a large number of firms.  Finally, the 
models used to capture earnings quality may be criticised but there is no one perfect model to 
capture earnings quality. That is, accounting quality may be broader than what earnings quality 
metrics measure.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings areimportant in that they highlight the effect of 
country-specific factors on different metrics of earnings quality across 23 countries using IFRS. 
Using different metrics is important to overcome ths ortcomings of earnings quality models.  
In further research, it might be possible to investigate whether the benefits of less accruals 
earnings management, resulting from strong institutions, exceed the costly higher real earnings 
management across countries. Further, more research on the benefits and drawbacks of 
conservatism needs to be undertaken. It would be interesting to compare conservatism under 
IFRS across countries before and after 2010 when th IASB dropped prudence from the 
conceptual framework to address whether local factors still influence accounting practices.  
An interesting question is to investigate earnings quality under IFRS during the financial crisis, 
2007 to 2010, and after the crisis, probably 2011 to 2015. This is important to address the effect 
of economic consequences on earnings quality.  
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Finally, in future investigations it would be interesting to explore whether there was a change in 
investor protection and enforcement after the introduction the IFRS across countries, and 
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Appendix 1 Table I Modified Jones model: the effect of investor protection 
&! = ' + '	! + '$#(! + ')! + '*+,-! + '$-$! + '.#/
+ 																	 
 
 ' '	 ' ' ' ' '. 
Coefficient .0078 .215 -.004 .0003 .0023 -.0019 -.0004 
(t-statistic)  2.43** 16.63*** -4.29*** 1.99** 0.76 -3.69*** -2.92** 
 Adj. BC													0.11 
Obs.                   16328 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 1 Table I: EM is the residuals from the modified Jones model. ROA is 
return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year 
equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in 
year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural logarithm 
of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. INV is the investor protection computed by 
component principle analysis of six variables. These variables are: BIND is the board 
independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). SEC is the enforcement of 
securities laws scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MIN is the protection of 
minority shareholders interest scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). ENF is the 
enforcement of accounting & auditing standards scores f om the World Economic Forum 
(2008-2011). JUD is the judicial independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-
2011). MS is the market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank 













Appendix 1 Table II Modified Jones model: the effect of enforcement 




 ' '	 ' ' ' ' '. 
Coefficient .0199 .215 -.004 .0003 .0023 -.001 -.0021 
(t-statistic) 4.42*** 16.53*** -4.46*** 1.97** 0.77 -3.35** -3.43** 
Adj. BC           0.11 
Obs.                16328 
Notes to Appendix 1 Table II: EM is the residuals from the modified Jones model. ROA is 
return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year 
equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in 
year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural logarithm 
of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. ENF is the enforcement of accounting & auditing 




Appendix 1 Table III Modified Jones model: the effect of the strength of capital market 
&! = ' + '	! + '$#(! + ')! + '*+,-! + '$-$! + '.&$
+ 																	 
 
 ' '	 ' ' ' ' '. 
Coefficient .0091 .216 -.004 .0002 .0023 -.0004 -.00001 
(t-statistic) 2.89 **     16.92*** -5.24 *** 1.88*   0.75 -0.68   -2.73 **  
Adj. BC															0.113 
Obs.                     16328  
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 1 Table III:   EM is the residuals from the modified Jones model. ROA is 
return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year 
equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales 
in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural 
logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. MS is the market capitalisation of listed 
companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as the share price times the 
number of shares outstanding.   
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Appendix 1 Table IV The effect of investor protection on abnormal production costs, abnormal 
discretionary coasts and abnormal cash flows 
 (1) (2) (3) 
























































Observations 16328 16328 16328 
Adj. BC 0.057 0.010 0.19 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 1 Table IV: Abnormal cash flows are the residuals from equation (2) 
multiplied by negative one. Abnormal production costs are the residuals from equation (3). 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are the residuals from equation (4) after multiplying it by 
negative one.  ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities 
divided by end of year equity book value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, 
defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is 
the natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm  in year t. INV is the investor protection 
computed by component principle analysis of six variables. These variables are: BIND is the 
board independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). SEC is the 
enforcement of securities laws scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MIN is 
the protection of minority shareholders interest scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-
2011). ENF is the enforcement of accounting & auditing standards scores from the World 
Economic Forum (2008-2011). JUD is the judicial independence scores from the World 
Economic Forum (2008-2011). MS is the market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) 
from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as the share price times the number of shares 












Appendix 1 Table V Enforcement on abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary costs, and 
abnormal cash flows 
 (1) (2) (3) 






















































-.0299                      
-4.37*** 
Observations 16328 16328 16328 
Adj. BC 0.057 0.010 0.19 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 1 Table V:  Abnormal cash flows are the residuals from equation (2) 
multiplied by negative one.  Abnormal production costs are the residuals from equation (3). 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are the residuals from equation (4) after multiplying it by 
negative one.  ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities 
divided by end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth 
rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. 
SHARES is the natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. ENF is the 














Appendix 1 Table VI The effect of strength of capital market on abnormal production costs, abnormal 
discretionary costs, and abnormal cash flows 
 (1) (2) (3) 
























































Observations 16328 16328 16328 
Adj. BC 0.058 0.010 0.1922 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 1 Table VI:  Abnormal cash flows are the residuals from equation (2) 
multiplied by negative one. Abnormal production costs are the residuals from equation (3). 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are the residuals from equation (4) after multiplying it by 
negative one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities 
divided by end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth 
rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. 
SHARES is the natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. MS is the market 
capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as 














Appendix 1 Table VII Protection of minority shareholders’ rights and earnings management 
 (1) (2) (3) 


























-0.33   
GROWTH -.0011 
-0.50   
-.0281 



























Observations 16328 16328 16328 
Adj. BC 0.238 0.0169 0.0488 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 1 Table VII:  DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal 
accruals are estimated using modified DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings 
management computed by adding abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying it by negative one. RM2 is the second measure of real earnings 
management, which is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying them by negative one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net 
income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. 
LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book Value for firm i in 
year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 
and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm 
i in year t. MIN is the protection of minority shareholders interest scores from the World 













Appendix 1 Table VIII Anti-self dealing and earnings management  
 (1) (2) (3) 





















LEV .0002 -.0002 -.000 
 1.93* -0.38 -0.08 
GROWTH -.00171 -.0286 -.0223 
 -0.77 -4.84*** -4.25*** 
SHARES No No  No 
Anti-Self -.005 .0201 .012 
 -3.61*** 1.65* 1.74* 
Constant .011 -.0100 -.0164 
 2.95** -0.80 -1.92* 
Observations 16328 16328 16328 
 Adj. BC 0.2204 0.0161 0.0484 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes to Appendix 1 Table VIII:  DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal 
accruals are estimated using modified DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings 
management computed by adding abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying it by negative one. RM2 is the second measure of real earnings 
management, which is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying them by negative one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net 
income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. 
LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value for firm i in 
year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 
and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm 
i in year t. Anti-self is anti-self-dealing index in Djankov et al. (2008) ranging from 0 (low 
protection) to 1(high protection). We dropped shares in this model because of it is highly 











        
 
233 
Appendix 1 Table IX Investor protection and strength of capital market 
































































Observations 16328 16328 16328 
 Adj. BC 0.222 0.0184 0.0509 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 1 Table IX:  DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals 
are estimated using modified DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings management 
computed by adding abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after 
multiplying it by negative one. RM2 is the second measure of real earnings management, which 
is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses after 
multiplying them by negative one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by 
total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of 
year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is 
the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in 
year t-1. SHARES is the natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. INV the 
investor protection is computed by component principle analysis of five variables. These 
variables are: BIND is the board independence score from the World Economic Forum (2008-
2011). SEC is the enforcement of securities laws scores from the World Economic Forum 
(2008-2011). MIN is the protection of minority shareholders interest scores from the World 
Economic Forum (2008-2011). ENF is the enforcement of accounting & auditing standards 
scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). JUD is the judicial independence scores 
from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MS is the market capitalisation of listed 
companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as the share price times the 












Appendix 1 Table X Securities regulation and strength of capital market   
 (1) (2) (3) 





























































Observations 16328 16328 16328 
 Adj. BC 0.2223 0.0181 0.0509 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 1 Table X:  DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals 
are estimated using modified DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings management 
computed by adding abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after 
multiplying the latter by negative one. RM2 is the s cond measure of real earnings 
management, which is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary 
expenses after multiplying them by negative one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net 
income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm I in year t. 
LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book Value for firm I in 
year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 
and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm 
I in year t. SEC is the enforcement of securities laws scores from the World Economic Forum 
(2008-2011). MS is the market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) from the World 














Appendix 1 Table XI Investor protection (two factors)  
 
Panel A principal-component factors 
Retained factors             =           2 
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaise off)                                              
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 4.30653 3.27801 0.7178 0.7178 
Factor2 1.02852 . 0.1714 0.8892 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:                 chi2(15) = 1.1e+05 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Panel B: Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness 
BIND 0.9083 -0.3202 0.0725 
SEC 0.9056 0.0849 0.1727 
MIN 0.9228 -0.1967 0.1098 
ACC 0.9772 0.0930 0.0364 
JUD 0.8565 -0.0239 0.2658 
























Appendix 1 Table XII Investor protection (two factors) and earnings management  
 (1) (2) (3) 

























































Observations 16328 16328 16328 
 Adj. BC 0.2217 0.0180 0.0505 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes to Appendix 1 Table XIII: 
DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are estimated using modified 
DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings management computed by adding abnormal 
production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying it by negative one. 
RM2 is the second measure of real earnings management, which is the aggregation of both 
abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying them by negative 
one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by 
end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as 
the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. SHARES is the natural 
logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t. F1 and F2 are the rotated two factors to 
measure investor protection, computed by component pri ciple analysis of six variables. These 
variables are: BIND is the board independence score from the World Economic Forum (2008-
2011). SEC is the enforcement of securities laws scores from the World Economic Forum 
(2008-2011). MIN is the protection of minority shareholders interest scores from the World 
Economic Forum (2008-2011). ENF is the enforcement of accounting & auditing standards 
scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). JUD is the judicial independence scores 
from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MS is the market capitalisation of listed 
companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as the share price times the 
number of shares outstanding.    
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Appendix 1 Table XIII   DAACR & RM1 
 
&! = ' +'	! + '$#(! + ')! + '*+,-! + '$-$!
+ '.r6																		+ 		 
 (1) 




ROA                                     '	 .2333 
 26.58*** 
SIZE                                     ' -.00495 
 -4.57*** 
LEV                                     ' .00026 
 1.98 **   
GROWTH                           ' -.00119 
 -0.54 
SHARES                             ' -.001955 
 -3.57 *** 
RM1                                   '. .0126 
 4.88*** 
Constant                             ' 0.010 
 2.47** 
Observations 16,328 
Adj. BC 0.224 
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 6-8: DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are 
estimated using modified DD; RM1 is the first measure of real earnings management computed 
by adding abnormal production costs to the abnormal discretionary expenses after multiplying 
the latter by negative one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by total 
assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of year 
total liabilities divided by end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the 
sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in 
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&! = ' +'	! + '$#(! + ')! + '*+,-! + '$-$!
+ '.r6																	+ 		 
 
 (1)   




    
ROA                      '	 .2469   
   25.83 ***   
SIZE                      ' -.00533   
 -4.57***   
LEV                      ' .00026   
 2.04 **     
GROWTH            ' -.00044   
 -0.20   
SHARES              ' -.00183   
 -3.47 ***   
RM2                    '. .05118   
 10.72 ***   
Constant               ' 0.010   
 2.44**   
Observations 16,328   
Adj. BC 0.247   
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Table 6-8: DACCR is the level of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals are 
estimated using modified DD. RM2 is the second measure of real earnings management, which 
is the aggregation of both abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expenses after 
multiplying them by negative one. ROA is return on assets, defined as net income divided by 
total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t. LEV is the end of 
year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is 
the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in 
year t-1. SHARES is the natural logarithm of outstanding shares for firm i in year t.  
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Appendix 2 Table  I The pooled regression of conservatism  
ACCZ,[ =	β\ +	βDDCFOZ,[ + βCCFOZ,[ +	βLDCFOZ,[ ∗ CFOD + ε 
 β\ βD βC βL Adj. B
C Obs. 
Coefficient -.0127 .0268 -.337 .327 % 15.05 16328 
(t-statistic) -1.49 4.05*** -29.10*** 6.75***   
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 2 Table I: 
ACC is total accruals in year t lagged by the total assets at the beginning of year t. CFO is cash 
flow from operations for firm it in year t. DCFO is a Dummy variable set equal to 1 if CFO <0 





Appendix 2 Table  II Anti-self-dealing and conservatism 
ACCZ,[ =	β\ +	βDDCFOZ,[ + βCCFOZ,[ +	βLDCFOZ,[ ∗ CFOD + β=SD + β>DCFOZ,[ ∗ SD +
βACFOZ,[ ∗ SD + βWDCFOZ,[ ∗ 	CFOZ,[ ∗ SD + 		ε        (7) 
 
 β\ βD βC βL β= β> βA 0 
Coefficient .0054 .0145 -.372 .188 .0189 .0176 .0180 .293 
(t-statistic) 1.55 1.97** -11.33*** 1.97** 3.98*** 1.64 0.42 2.55** 
Adj. BC %15.64        
Obs. 16328        
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 2 Table II:  
ACC is total accruals in year t lagged by the total assets at the beginning of year t. CFO is cash 
flow from operations for firm it in year t. DCFO is a Dummy variable set equal to 1 if CFO <0 
and 0 otherwise. SD is anti-self-dealing index in Djankov et al. (2008) ranging from 0 (low 














Appendix 2 Table  III Anti-self-dealing and value relevance  
												MVZ[ = β\ +	βD	BVPSZ[ + βC	EPSZ[ + βLSD + β=SD ∗ BVPSZ[ + β>SD ∗ EPSZ[ 	
+ ε									8 
 β\ βD βC βL β= β> 
Coefficient 4.380 .866 3.994 -2.767 .0658 -2.392 
(t-statistic) 6.59*** 16.58*** 3.98*** -3.17*** 0.95 -1.34* 
Adj. BC 76.05%      
Obs. 16328      
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 2 Table III:  
MVZ[	is market value per share three months after the fiscal year end. ijklmn is book value per 
share of firm i in year t. oklmn is earnings per share of firm I in year t. SD  is anti-self-dealing 




















Appendix 2 Table  IV The effect of investor protection on conservatism including control variables 
Independent variables   Coefficient 
t-value 
DCFO βD -.0025 
-0.28 
CFO βC -.3037 
-14.46*** 
DCFO*CFO βL .336 
5.35*** 
INV  β= .0021 
0.90 
DCFO*INV β> .0042 
3.97*** 
CFO*INV βA .0222 
2.81** 
tuvw*uvw*INV βW .0970 
6.47*** 
LEV βx -.0008 
-2.01** 
LEV*DCFO βy -.0002 
-0.45 
LEV* 	CFO βD\ .0005 
0.27 
LEV* 	DCFO*CFO βDD -.0046 
-1.99** 
SIZE βDC .0054 
2.74** 
SIZE*DCFO βDL .0108 
4.60*** 
SIZE*	CFO βD= -.0341 
-2.96** 
SIZE*	DCFO*CFO βD> -.0588 
-0.88 
GROWTH βDA .0539 
3.73*** 
GROWTH*DCFO βDW -.0024 
-0.15 
GROWTH*	CFO βDx -.0640 
-1.67* 
GROWTH*	DCFO*CFO βDy .0478 
0.85 
Constant  β\ -.0248 
-2.38** 
Observations  16328  
 Adj. BC % 22.62  
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Notes to Appendix 2 Table IV: ACC is total accruals in year t lagged by the total assets at the 
beginning of year t. CFO is cash flow from operations for firm it in year t. DCFO is a Dummy  
 variable set equal to 1 if CFO <0 and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets 
for firm i in year t. Lev is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book 
Value for firm i in year t. Growth is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus 
sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. INV is the investor protection computed by 
component principle analysis of six variables. These variables are: BIND is the board 
independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). SEC is the enforcement of 
securities laws scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). MIN is the protection of 
minority shareholders interest scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011). ENF is the 
enforcement of accounting & auditing standards scores f om the World Economic Forum 
(2008-2011). JUD is the judicial independence scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-
2011). MS is the market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank 



























Appendix 2 Table  V The effect of enforcement on conservatism including control variables  
Independent variables   Coefficient 
t-value 
DCFO βD -.1004 
-3.45** 
CFO βC -.6798 
-4.02*** 
DCFO*CFO βL -2.015 
-4.69*** 
ENF β= .0048 
1.10 
DCFO*ENF β> .0176 
3.87*** 
CFO*ENF βA .0671 
2.19** 
tuvw*uvw*ENF βW .4173 
6.17*** 
LEV βx -.0008 
-2.00**   
LEV*DCFO βy -.0002 
-0.46 
LEV* 	CFO βD\ .0008 
0.40 
LEV* 	DCFO*CFO βDD -.0044 
-1.99** 
SIZE βDC .0056 
2.77** 
SIZE*DCFO βDL .0102 
4.01*** 
SIZE*	CFO βD= -.0361 
-3.05** 
SIZE*	DCFO*CFO βD> -.0653 
-1.06 
GROWTH βDA .0539 
3.74*** 
GROWTH*DCFO βDW -.00218 
-0.13 
GROWTH*	CFO βDx -.06127 
-1.60 
GROWTH*	DCFO*CFO βDy .05410 
0.95 
Constant  β\ -.0531 
-3.00**   
Observations  16328  
Adj. BC % 22.57  
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 2 Table V: ACC is total accruals in year t lagged by the total assets at the 
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beginning of year t. CFO is cash flow from operations for firm it in year t. DCFO is a Dummy 
variable set equal to 1 if CFO <0 and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets 
for firm i in year t. Lev is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book 
Value for firm i in year t. Growth is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus 
sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. ENF is the enforcement of accounting & 
auditing standards scores from the World Economic Forum (2008-2011).  
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Appendix 2 Table  VI The effect of capital market on conservatism including control variables  
Independent variables   Coefficient 
t-value 
DCFO βD .00119 
0.11 
CFO βC -.2972 
-14.16*** 
DCFO*CFO βL .4513 
5.14*** 
MS β= .00003 
1.37 
DCFO*MS β> .00006 
2.12** 
CFO*MS βA .00009 
1.87** 
tuvw*uvw*MS βW .0002 
0.53   
LEV βx -.0008 
-1.73* 
LEV*DCFO βy -.00011 
-0.20 
LEV* 	CFO βD\ .00133 
0.63 
LEV* 	DCFO*CFO βDD -.00332 
-1.61 
SIZE βDC .00609 
3.27** 
SIZE*DCFO βDL .00509 
2.23** 
SIZE*	CFO βD= -.0388 
-3.30** 
SIZE*	DCFO*CFO βD> -.1255 
-1.46 
GROWTH βDA .0533 
3.73*** 
GROWTH*DCFO βDW -.00072 
-0.04   
GROWTH*	CFO βDx -.05911 
-1.66* 
GROWTH*	DCFO*CFO βDy .07104 
1.13   
Constant  β\ -.0322 
-3.22** 
Observations  16328  
Adj. BC % 21.33  
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 2 Table VI: ACC is total accruals in year t lagged by the total assets at the 
beginning of year t. CFO is cash flow from operations for firm it in year t. DCFO is a Dummy 
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variable set equal to 1 if CFO <0 and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets 
for firm i in year t. Lev is the end of year total li bilities divided by end of year equity book 
Value for firm i in year t. GROWTH is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t 
minus sales in year t-1 and scaled by sales in year t-1. MS is the market capitalisation of listed 
companies (% of GDP) from the World Bank (2007-2010), defined as is the share price times 
the number of shares outstanding.    
 
 
Appendix 2 Table  VII The pooled regression of value relevance  
												MVZ[ = β\ +	βD	BVPSZ[ + βC	EPSZ[ 	+ ε									 
 β\ βD βC 
Coefficient 2.503 .909 2.916 
(t-statistic) 13.20*** 33.20*** 4.37*** 
Observations  16328   
Adj. BC %75.88   
Clustered by firm and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes to Appendix 2 Table VII: MVZ[	is market value per share three months after the fiscal year 
end. ijklmn is book value per share of firm i in year t. oklmn is earnings per share of firm i in 
year t.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
